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Overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity.  
It is an act of justice. It is the protection of a 
fundamental human right: the right to dignity 
and to a decent life. 
(Nelson Mandela) 
 
The test of our progress is not whether we add 
more to the abundance of those who have much; 
it is whether we provide enough for those who 
have too little. 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt) 
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1.1 Introduction 
Ending poverty is the first sustainable development goal that the United Nations, sup-
ported by governments and other international organisations, has set for 2030. Although 
poverty rates have decreased by more than half in recent decades, more than 767 million 
people are still living on less than the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day (World 
Bank 2016a). Weak institutions, imperfect financial markets, insufficient redistribution, 
and a slowdown in the economic growth rates of China and other emerging economies, 
mean that economic growth will be insufficient to eradicate extreme poverty (World 
Bank 2016a; Bluhm et al. 2014). 
Governments around the world have therefore adopted social protection programmes 
as one of the key elements of their poverty reductions strategies (Bastagli et al. 2016; 
Barrientos 2013). Social protection is usually defined as the set of “policies and actions 
which enhance the capacity of the poor and vulnerable to escape poverty and better 
manage risks and shocks” (OECD 2009, p.10). Social protection and, in particular, non-
contributory transfers or social assistance, is crucial to reduce poverty and increase the 
resilience of the poor. In fact, the third target of the first Sustainable Development Goal 
calls for the implementation of “nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for 
all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable”.1 
In recent decades, investment in social protection programmes has increased signifi-
cantly in the developing world, and social assistance transfers now reach more than 1.9 
billion people in almost all developing countries (Honorati et al. 2015). The expansion 
in coverage followed the increased spending in social protection, both in absolute as well 
as in relative terms. On average, developing and transition economies spend 1.6 percent 
of their GDP on social assistance (World Bank 2017a).2 According to estimates from 
the World Bank based on the ASPIRE database, social assistance lifts 69 million people 
out of absolute poverty each year (World Bank 2017a). 
Although many households rely on social protection to make ends meet, many poor 
households do not have access to, or are not covered by government interventions. As 
a result, they depend on informal strategies to achieve better living standards. Migration 
-through remittances- is one of such strategies, especially when defined as a risk mitiga-
tion strategy that reduces financial vulnerability and raises household living standards 
(Stark and Bloom 1985). Remittances, or money sent back home by emigrants from 
abroad, can contribute to improving the living conditions of the poor by diversifying the 
sources of income available to a household and increasing the total value of incoming 
                                                        
1 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg1 
2 The World Bank refers to social assistance (or non-contributory transfers aimed at reducing poverty) as Social 
Safety Nets. 
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monetary flows. Based on this definition, migration can be understood as a form of 
informal social protection (UNICEF 2012).  
Although the poverty reduction potential of remittances is not mentioned in the first 
Sustainable Goal (“No poverty”), the 2030 Agenda calls for a reduction in the transac-
tion costs of remittances in SDG 10 and explicitly refers to migration in SDGs 8, 16, 
and 17 (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker 2017). Remittance flows to developing countries have 
been increasing steadily and were estimated at $429 billion in 2016 (World Bank 2017b), 
as compared to $81.3 billion in 2000 (World Bank 2010), and there is broad evidence of 
positive effects of remittances on well-being outcomes such as income, health, and        
education (Ratha 2013).  
The aim of this dissertation is to look at the effects of both social assistance and remit-
tances on a wide range of outcomes, from expenditure patterns to food insecurity and 
subjective well-being. By doing so, it explores and compares their role in the fight against 
poverty, one of the primary goals of both transfers. In recognising that migration 
(through remittances) can be considered an informal social protection strategy, this the-
sis adopts a broader approach to social protection that includes private transfers (remit-
tances), and defines social protection as “the set of public and private mechanisms that protect 
and prevent individuals and households from suffering the worst consequences of shocks and stresses” 
(Brunori and O’Reilly 2010, p.2). Moreover, in this thesis social assistance is defined as 
cash or in-kind transfers received by certain groups of the population -generally poor 
and vulnerable families- and which are independent from the level of contributions made 
by recipients. This work does not focus, therefore, on other types of social protection 
benefits such as social insurance. 
Social assistance and remittances are both important dimensions in the reduction of 
poverty and, despite the fact that they share many similarities, there is scant literature 
comparing the two types of transfers (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 2015). This the-
sis, therefore, explores whether the effects of social assistance and remittances on pov-
erty reduction differ and, if this is the case, the mechanisms driving these differences. 
Section 1.2 describes the motivation for this research, whereas Section 1.3 discusses the 
definition of poverty used in this work. Sections 1.4 describes the academic and societal 
contributions of this dissertation, whereas Section 1.5 describes the case studies chosen. 
Finally, Section 1.6 provides the outline of the thesis. 
1.2 Motivation 
Many studies have analysed the effects of social protection transfers or remittances on 
household well-being. Although the specific impacts of transfers differ across countries 
depending on the characteristics of the migration process and the type and design of the 
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social protection programme in place, social transfers and remittances are, in general, 
positively related to well-being. A review of all the available studies from 2000 until 2015 
measuring the impact of social assistance programmes on well-being finds, with a few 
exceptions, that cash transfers consistently reduce monetary poverty and improve non-
monetary well-being indicators such as education and health (Bastagli et al. 2016). In 
addition, a review of studies on the effects of remittances concludes that this source of 
income improves several measures of well-being including income, consumption, asset 
accumulation, and educational attainment (Ratha et al. 2011). 
The relationship between the two transfers remains understudied, however. Contrary to 
expectations that remittances and social assistance would have similar effects on well-
being, there is limited evidence suggesting that remittances and social assistance transfers 
are substitutes for raising living standards. In addition, some studies argue that they may 
complement each other (Van den Berg and Viet Cuong 2011; McDade 2010, and Her-
nandez et al. 2012).  
A rigorous, evidence-focused literature review by Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 
(2015) found only 11 relevant studies comparing the impact of social protection transfers 
and remittances on a number of well-being indicators. In the majority of the studies, 
both social transfers and remittances led to positive effects on households’ wellbeing, 
but the effects on poverty reduction generally appeared to be larger for remittances than 
for social transfers (Hernandez et al. 2012; Van den Berg and Viet Cuong 2011; McDade 
2010; Maitra and Ray 2003). Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2015) only found one 
study (Gianetti et al. 2009) in which social protection transfers were found to have a 
stronger poverty reduction impact than remittances.  
There are a number of factors that can explain why remittances have a higher (or lower) 
impact than social protection transfers, including:  
(1) Targeting: The way transfers are distributed across the population affect their poverty 
reduction impact. One would expect that transfers that reach the poorest will have the 
greatest impacts on poverty reduction. Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2015) point out 
that contradicting much of the migration literature, which states that remittances do not 
reach the poorest of the poor, a number of studies in the review suggest that remittances 
are more likely to reach the extreme poor or vulnerable than social protection transfers 
(World Bank 1999; Tesliuc and Lindert 2002; Van den Berg and Cuong 2011). One of 
the reasons, however, is that social protection transfers that are not directly aimed at 
reducing poverty, such as contributory transfers, may be regressive (Tesliuc and Lindert 
2002). 
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(2) Coverage: Transfers with low coverage (that is, received by a small share of the pop-
ulation) are expected to have a low impact on poverty reduction. In the countries in-
cluded in the review, for instance, the coverage of social protection was low, which also 
helps explain the higher poverty reduction impact of remittances. This does not mean, 
however, that the coverage of remittances is always higher than social protection trans-
fers, as migrants do not always send remittances. 
(3) Amount of the transfer: It is also expected that the bigger the transfer the larger the 
impact on poverty reduction. In many of the studies of the review (i.e. World Bank 1999; 
Tesliuc and Lindert 2002; Van den Berg and Cuong 2011; Hernandez et al. 2012) remit-
tances were larger than social protection transfers. The differences in the value of remit-
tances compared to social protection transfers can partly explain the stronger poverty 
reduction impact of one transfer against the other.  
(4) Predictability of the transfer: While social transfers tend to be regular and predictable 
(DFID 2011), a number of studies point out that remittances are countercyclical and 
sensitive to negative shocks (Banga and Sahu 2010; Hernandez et al. 2012). This means 
that social transfers do not respond to variations in households needs over time, whereas 
remittances might be less predictable but more responsive to intermittent spikes in 
household needs for cash (such as an expensive health shock). One can relate the timing 
of the transfer to the “permanent income hypothesis” (Friedman 1957), which states 
that different sources of income may be spent differently (either on consumption or 
investment) depending on whether the household sees them as temporary or permanent 
income.  
(5) Use of the transfer: The literature mentions three reasons why social transfers and 
remittances may not be spent in the same way. The first has to do with the predictability 
of the transfer (explained above). The second one relates to who in the household re-
ceives the transfer, as there is growing evidence rejecting the pooling of income in the 
household (Schady and Rosero 2008; Maitra and Ray 2003; Duflo and Udry 2004). The 
third is related to the transfer conditionality (implicit or explicit), as the purposes for 
sending these transfers and the responsibility households feel towards the government 
or the migrant can influence the way transfers are spent.  
Evidence on the comparative impact of social protection transfers and remittances is 
limited and highly specific to the context, as it differs in terms of geographical coverage, 
type of social transfer, indicator of poverty or well-being considered, and methods used 
to perform the analyses (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 2015). Moreover, many of 
these studies are subject to important methodological limitations, such as not taking into 
account the possible endogeneity bias between the transfer(s) and the dependent varia-
ble.  
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By analysing two different contexts and datasets and addressing methodological issues 
that existing studies on the topic have faced so far, this research investigates and com-
pares the effects of remittances and social assistance transfers on different dimensions 
of poverty. 
1.3 Defining and measuring poverty 
“Poverty is a pronounced deprivation in well-being” (World Bank 2000), yet well-being 
can be defined in many different ways. The most common approach is to take a mone-
tary definition of well-being based on income or consumption. A broader view is the 
capabilities approach, which was first articulated by Sen in the early 1980s and challenges 
traditional unidimensional means of evaluating well-being and deprivation (Sen 1987). 
According to this theory, individuals -to be well-off- need to achieve a number of capa-
bilities that they consider important to function in society (such as appropriate health, 
education, freedom of speech, etc.). Lack of capabilities, or the freedom to choose 
among them, leads to limited realisable functionings—deprivation or poverty (Sen 1993; 
Robeyns 2005). Organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank recognise 
that poverty comprises many dimensions, including low income and poor access to basic 
goods and services, as well as low levels of health and education, poor access to clean 
water and sanitation, inadequate physical security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity 
and opportunity to better one’s life (World Bank 2000). 
Alongside the capabilities approach, other conceptual frameworks are based on multidi-
mensional understandings of poverty (Roelen 2017). Some of them, in addition to ob-
jective measures of well-being such as consumption, educational attainment, or nutri-
tion, include relational and subjective components of well-being in their definition. An 
example is the framework proposed by White (2010), which defines wellbeing as a social 
process with material, relational, and subjective dimensions. Subjective well-being is 
gaining increasing attention among researchers and policy makers (Stiglitz, Sen and 
Fitoussi 2009), and there is a growing literature stating that several dimensions of sub-
jective wellbeing (lack of stress, happiness, satisfaction with life) have an instrumental 
value, as they are positively related with outcomes such as productivity, decision-making, 
and educational and health outcomes (Attah et al. 2016). 
This thesis takes a multidimensional approach to poverty, as each chapter looks at a 
different -non monetary- indicator of well-being. One of the reasons for this is method-
ological, given that there is a clear problem of reverse causality when studying how re-
mittances and social assistance transfers affect the income levels of recipients, or mon-
etary poverty. The other reason is an interest to look at less studied outcomes, such as 
food security (including nutrition) and subjective well-being. 
Chapter 1 
24 
Although all the outcome variables explored in this thesis constitute one dimension of 
poverty (or well-being) or are related to poverty,3 the relationship is not always direct. 
For instance, expenditure patterns may or may not have an effect on poverty reduction. 
Similarly increased access to food or to a greater variety of food may or may not translate 
into somebody becoming "non-poor" in the food security or nutrition dimension. How-
ever, all the outcomes analysed in this work are related to individuals or households' 
standards of living, and therefore poverty is given a broad definition. 
Moreover, in order to compare different transfers targeted and received by different 
household members, this thesis assumes a unitary model of household decision making. 
Unitary models, as opposed to bargaining or collective models of decision making,4 as-
sume decisions are taken by the head of the household and that the preferences of the 
head become the preferences of the whole household. The household is therefore as-
sumed to act as one (Alderman et al. 1995). For social protection policies, the unitary 
approach implies that what matters for household well-being is the total amount of 
money a household receives and not the identity of the individual receiving it. 
Many authors have rejected the unitary model arguing that who in a household receives 
a transfer and the bargaining power of the different members of a household affect how 
decisions are made and, therefore, the effects of transfers on households’ well-being 
(Schady and Rosero 2008; Maitra and Ray 2003; Duflo and Udry 2004). This thesis 
adopts a unitary model to simplify the empirical work. Having in mind the limitations of 
this approach, several parts of the thesis (especially chapters 2 and 3) analyse how factors 
such as who in the household receives the transfer or who is the intended beneficiary 
could affect the relationship between transfers and the outcomes studied. 
Sending remittances is a decision that an individual or household as a whole take, which 
makes it a private decision.5 Despite the fact that this thesis tries to account as much as 
possible for this endogeneity (through instrumental variable approaches for instance), 
there are chapters where remittances had to be assumed exogenous, such as chapter 2. 
Accounting for this endogeneity is harder in the case of remittances than in the case of 
social assistance transfers, where eligibility is determined by the government and many 
times is based on exogenous factors such as age or other individual characteristics. 
                                                        
3 Understood here as having access to a minimum level of resources to enjoy an adequate standard of living 
4 Bargaining or collective models assume household members have different tastes and preferences, and that deci-
sions on how to allocate resources are taken collectively. 
5 This is not the case with social protection transfers, as eligibility is determined by the government and therefore 
transfers are less likely to be endogenous (or it is easier to correct for potential endogeneity). 
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1.4 Contribution 
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the role of remittances and 
non-contributory social protection by answering three sub-questions: (1) Do remittances 
and social assistance have different effects on expenditure patterns? (2) What are the 
impacts of remittances on food security and nutrition, as compared to social assistance? 
(3) How are remittances and social assistance related to subjective indicators of well-
being, such as life satisfaction and subjective economic standards? 
Expenditure behaviour (sub-question 1) is a dimension that has not been sufficiently 
explored when studying the effects of social assistance or remittances, most likely due 
to a lack of adequate data. By offering immediate alleviation of spending constraints to 
poor beneficiaries, both private and public transfers are likely to contribute to poverty 
reduction. This would be the case if transfers are spent on goods and services that 
alleviate pressing needs and help reduce recipients’ deprivations. The few studies that 
have looked at expenditure patterns have found evidence on this, as social transfers are 
often spent on necessities such as food (The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012; 
Coetzee 2013), health (The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012), and clothing (Koo-
reman 2000; The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012). In terms of remittances, Ad-
ams and Cuecuecha (2010) found that both internal and international remittances in-
creased expenditure on education and housing, whereas Adams (1991; 2002) proved that 
remittances are likely to be saved and used for investment. 
Many arguments among policymakers against the expansion of social protection 
programmes are based on pressumptions that recipients misuse or make bad decisions 
on how to spend transfers (Du Toit and Neves 2009). In the migration and development 
debate, there have also been claims that remittances are used for conspicuous 
consumption and that, thefore, they do not contribute to development (Amuedo-
Dorantes 2014). Based on the above, it is important to understand how expenditure 
decisions are made in poor households when studying the welfare impacts of private and 
public transfers. One chapter of this dissertation, therefore, analyses the expenditure 
patterns of remittances and social assistance, and whether these transfers are spent dif-
ferently than other sources of income.  
In order to analyse whether increases in expenditure contribute -in fact- to poverty re-
duction, sub-question 2 explores whether remittances and social assistance reduce food 
insecurity and malnutrition. While previous studies have found positive effects of remit-
tances or social assistance on food security (access to food or quality of food consumed), 
in the case of nutritional outcomes the evidence is not consistent, as studies find nega-
tive, positive, or no effects of these transfers on different measures of nutrition (Manley, 
Gitter and Slavchevska 2012; Bastagli et al. 2016). Looking in the same study at the 
effects of both social assistance and remittances on food security and nutrition can give 
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a better idea of the effectiveness of formal and informal social protection strategies in 
reducing food insecurity, a challenge that many low and middle income countries face. 
Transfers may also affect unintended outcomes that are not necessarily linked to social 
protection programs' objectives or to the main reasons for migration, such as happiness 
or subjective well-being. Understanding this relationship has an intrinsic and instrumen-
tal value in development (Natali et al. 2018). In addition to being an end in itself, sub-
jective well-being has been linked to better educational and health outcomes, increases 
in productivity, savings, and consumption, and better social relationships (Natali et al. 
2018; Attah et al. 2016). 
Most of the studies analysing the relationship between social protection transfers and 
subjective well-being focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, and all of them have found positive 
effects (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016; Kilburn et al. 2018; Daidone et al. 2015; Natali et 
al. 2018). On the other hand, most of the evidence on the impacts of migration and 
remittances on subjective well-being comes from Latin America. Most of these studies 
have found a negative effect of migration on subjective well-being or happiness, and 
positive or no effects of remittances. Given the limited evidence on the effects of trans-
fers on subjective well-being and that most of the studies focus on specific regions such 
as Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa, this dissertation takes a broader approach to 
impact evaluation by looking at this well-being dimension in a new context that has not 
been studied before. 
Understanding how remittances and social transfers are related will contribute to the 
current policy debate regarding the role of migration in development. One view is that 
migrants do (and should) contribute to improving living standards in the home country 
through remittances (when social protection schemes or other government policies are 
not sufficient to tackle poverty). The contrasting view is that remittances cannot substi-
tute social protection schemes and that the task of reducing poverty should be assigned 
to the public sector (for a discussion on the different views regarding the development 
role of migration and remittances, see De Haas (2010)). 
1.5 Case studies and datasets used 
This dissertation explores the links between social assistance and remittances in two dif-
ferent contexts, South Africa and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries have representative and 
longitudinal household surveys from which the four empirical chapters draw. In spite of 
their differences, social protection and migration are important poverty reduction strat-
egies in both countries. A key difference, however, is that while in South Africa social 
transfers have replaced or “crowded out” (internal) remittances as a consequence of the 
significant expansion of its social protection system, among other reasons (Du Toit and 
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Neves 2009), in Kyrgyzstan (international) remittances are a much more important 
source of poverty reduction, as they represent more than 30 percent of the country’s 
GDP (World Bank and KNOMAD 2017). Below I present an introduction to the case 
studies and datasets used in the dissertation. 
South Africa 
South Africa is a middle-income country with one of the highest inequality rates in the 
world. Since the transition to democracy, the country has made considerable progress in 
reducing poverty due to, among other reasons, its social protection system (World Bank 
2017c). Since the end of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa has seen an extraordinary ex-
pansion in the coverage of government transfers. The two main social protection pro-
grammes in South Africa are the Old Age Pension (often referred to as the Older Per-
son’s Grant) and the Child Support Grant. Both are non-contributory, means-tested, 
and unconditional, and they are targeted at poor elderly individuals and poor caregivers 
with children, respectively.6 Almost three quarters (3.2 million) of the elderly in South 
Africa are income eligible and receive the Old Age Pension, and around 60 percent of 
age eligible children (11.9 million people) receive the Child Support Grant (Sassa 2016). 
Direct spending on social assistance accounted for 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013 (World 
Bank 2016b). Over the last few years, however, progress towards poverty reduction has 
slowed down as a result of structural challenges such as a dual labour market, low quality 
education, a decline in economic growth and high unemployment (World Bank 2017c). 
The majority of South African migrants move within the country. Labour migration 
from rural to urban areas is mainly temporary and dates back to the Apartheid period. 
Even though in 1987 racial restrictions on residence were lifted, migration patterns did 
not alter as expected, and internal migration remains temporary for a large number of 
individuals and households (Posel 2004). Poor households in South Africa, especially in 
rural areas, continue to rely on remittances to cover their daily needs (Posel and Casale 
2006). However, Posel (2009) points out that many labour migrants are now settling in 
destination areas, which translates into an important decline in the number of 
households receiving remittances compared to statistics derived from previous 
household surveys. 
To study how remittances and social assistance transfers in South Africa affect well-
being, this work relies on three waves (2008, 2010, and 2012) of the National Income 
Dynamics Study (NIDS), a longitudinal and nationally representative survey covering all 
                                                        
6 Unconditional transfers - as opposed to conditional cash transfers or CCTs-are not conditional upon specific 
behaviours, such as school attendance or regular medical check-ups. Means-tested means that only individuals meet-
ing some income requirements (e.g. earnings below a certain threshold) can benefit from social assistance. 
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regions in South Africa.7 The first wave was collected in 2008 with a sample of around 
28,000 individuals and 7,300 households, and household members were followed over 
time and interviewed every two years. NIDS provides information on the livelihoods of 
individuals and households over time, their ability to cope with shocks, poverty and well-
being, fertility, migration, labour market participation, education, vulnerability, etc. 
Chapters 2 and 3 draw on this dataset. 
Remittances are defined in the NIDS as all contributions from non-resident members 
as well as non-households members. This implies that in addition to contributions sent 
back home by internal migrants, remittance income can include other contributions such 
as child maintenance payments.  However, as Posel (2016) points out, given the history 
of temporary migration in South Africa and the fact many families remain geographically 
divided, informal contributions in South Africa are often associated with remittances 
sent by migrant workers. In terms of social assistance transfers, this thesis analyses the 
two main social protection programmes: the Old Age Pension and the Child Support 
Grant. Social assistance transfers, or social transfers, are often referred to in South Africa 
as social grants.  
Kyrgyzstan 
The Kyrgyz Republic, or Kyrgyzstan, is a land-locked mountainous country and one of 
the poorest in Central Asia, with a GNI per capita of $1,100 in 2016 (World Bank 
2017d). After becoming independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, poverty rates in-
creased considerably due to the transition to a market economy and the consequent 
decline of industrial activity and jobs. Despite economic growth and poverty reduction 
achieved in the last two decades- mainly due to an increase in real wages and private 
transfers like remittances- a third of the Kyrgyz population is considered poor based on 
the national poverty line (World Bank 2017d). Kyrgyzstan's main economic activity is 
agriculture, and nearly two-thirds of its population lives in rural areas. 
As a result of the full employment regime that characterised the Soviet Union, social 
protection policies were designed to support families and certain groups unable to work. 
Social protection in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, therefore, gave more weight to social 
insurance and categorical benefits than to poverty-targeted transfers (Barrientos and 
Kudebayeva 2015). Social insurance and categorical transfers target certain vulnerable 
groups and help to enhance their capacity to manage economic and social risks, but do 
not necessarily reach low-income households. After independence in 1991, some new 
targeted cash transfer programs were introduced. The most important one is the 
Monthly Benefit for Poor Families (MBPF), originally the Unified Monthly Benefit 
                                                        
7 For more information, see http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/about/what-is-nids 
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(UMB), which was established in 1998 in an attempt to unify and simplify cash social 
assistance policy (Tesliuc 2004). The MBPF is a means-tested non-contributory transfer 
which assigns a monthly benefit to poor families with children.  
Despite numerous attempts in reforming the social protection system to protect indi-
viduals who became unemployed and fell into poverty during the transition to the mar-
ket economy, the social protection system in Kyrgyzstan remains complex and frag-
mented (Barrientos and Kudebayeva 2015). Non-contributory benefits, or social assis-
tance, consist of categorical state benefits and energy compensations, in addition to the 
poverty targeted transfer (MBPF). Categorical benefits are independent of household 
income and are received by specific groups (often vulnerable citizens) such as orphans, 
people with disabilities, elderly individuals without pension rights, war veterans, or 
mothers with infants.8 The most important benefit is the Monthly Social Benefit, tar-
geted at vulnerable groups with limited income generating opportunities, such as people 
with disabilities, orphans, and elderly without pension rights. Social assistance transfers 
also include energy compensations provided to pensioners with a small pension and to 
households living in high-mountain areas (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015). The 
impact of social assistance transfers on poverty reduction is limited, however, due to the 
low coverage of the transfers (which reach between 1 and 10 percent of the population) 
and the small benefit size. The MBPF, for instance, accounts for only 10 percent of total 
income of poor beneficiaries (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015).  
At present, Kyrgyzstan still suffers from the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, such as high unemployment, widespread corruption and state failure to deliver 
basic services, strong gender disparities, and inter-ethnic conflict (ICG 2016). Given the 
lack of livelihood opportunities in Kyrgyzstan, many working-age individuals migrate to 
Russia and other neighbouring countries on a temporary and regular basis to help their 
families finance their daily needs. Remittances, therefore, constitute a very important 
source of income in poor households, in many cases the most important source (Thieme 
2014). International remittances represent more than 30 percent of the country’s GDP 
(World Bank and KNOMAD 2017), and are received by approximately 25 percent of 
the Kyrgyz population, therefore having a determinant role in poverty reduction 
(Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015; Guelfi and Sattar 2015). Nevertheless, the side 
effects of migration include labour shortages and lack of qualified and well-trained per-
sonnel in rural areas, where most migrants come from (Thieme 2014).  
                                                        
8 Despite war veterans are not considered vulnerable, and these compensations are usually defined as benefits based 
on merit or to the privileged, the percentage of individuals receiving this transfer is very low.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 draw on three waves (2011, 2012, and 2013) of the Life in Kyrgyzstan 
(LiK) survey, a panel survey conducted annually that covers a sample of approximately 
3,000 households (and 8,000 individuals). The survey was administered in all seven ob-
lasts of Kyrgyzstan and the cities of Bishkek and Osh, and data were collected at the 
household, individual (administered to all adults aged 18 and above), and community 
level. LiK provides comprehensive information on income, consumption patterns, re-
mittances, well-being indicators, employment, and socio-demographic characteristics of 
households (Brück et al. 2014). The survey tracks individuals over time and includes new 
household members that become part of the households which are re-interviewed.9 
The LIK survey defines remittances as monthly monetary transfers sent by migrants 
from outside Kyrgyzstan. In the case of social protection transfers, this analysis includes 
all social assistance (non-contributory) transfers that are included in the survey, such as 
the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families, the Monthly Social Benefit, and other categorical 
state benefits. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
The dissertation is composed of four empirical papers (chapters 2 to 5), and all of them 
make use of quantitative research methods, more specifically quasi-experimental meth-
ods of impact evaluation. Chapters 2 and 3 look at the case of South Africa, whereas 
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the case of Kyrgyzstan. 
Chapter 2 studies the expenditure patterns of remittances and social assistance. A 
relevant policy question when assessing the effects of remittances or social assistance is 
whether the increased consumption or poverty reduction experienced by recipient 
households is only explained by a pure income effect (i.e. having more money) or also 
by the fact that different income sources affect expenditure patterns in different ways. 
A common assumption in economics is that money is fungible, which means that spend-
ing patterns do not depend on the source of income, only on the total amount. The 
mental accounting theory (a concept introduced by behavioural economist Richard Tha-
ler (1985)), however, rejects this assumption by arguing that people compartmentalise 
their income into different mental accounts and decide on their consumption within 
each of these accounts. This chapter uses mental accounting as a theoretical framework 
and hypothesises that households associate private transfers coming from a migrant dif-
ferently to public transfers received from the government, and that this impacts the way 
transfers are spent.  
Chapter 3 looks at the effects of remittances and social assistance on food security. Food 
security is commonly understood as having access to sufficient food for a healthy and 
                                                        
9 For more information on the study and project, see https://lifeinkyrgyzstan.org/. 
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active life. It is a basic human need, and the right to food is enshrined in South Africa’s 
Constitution. Nutrition status, notably undernutrition, is an objective measure of food 
insecurity and hunger. Although several studies have looked at whether social assistance 
or remittances improve food security and/or nutritional outcomes, few of them have 
looked at a comprehensive set of indicators of food security and nutrition. South Africa 
makes an interesting case study due to the fact that levels of food insecurity (including 
malnutrition) have remained high despite many poor households being recipients of so-
cial assistance and/or remittances (Hendriks 2014; Devereux and Waidler 2017). Con-
sequently, Chapter 3 addresses two questions: do social assistance and remittances im-
prove food security and nutritional outcomes? If so, do these impacts differ between 
public and private transfers? 
Although many studies have looked at objective measures of well-being, subjective well-
being has received less attention in the migration as well as in the social protection liter-
ature. Chapters 4 and 5 study the relationship between social assistance and subjective 
well-being, and remittances and subjective well-being, respectively, in Kyrgyzstan. Sub-
jective well-being is measured through self-reported indicators of life satisfaction and 
subjective economic well-being. Due to the fact that households receiving remittances 
and social assistance are highly heterogeneous, the effects of these two transfers on sub-
jective well-being are analysed in separate chapters. 10 
The relationship between social assistance and subjective well-being is explored in Chap-
ter 4. The mechanisms by which social assistance transfers affect subjective well-being 
are likely to differ from the ones affecting objective indicators of well-being. If receiving 
social assistance leads to stigma or shame, subjective well-being could be reduced despite 
the increase in financial resources, and, hence, objective well-being. On the other hand, 
one can expect increased levels of subjective well-being if social assistance transfers re-
duce poverty as well as address the negative mechanisms associated with poverty, such 
as stress, mental health problems or shame (Haushofer and Fehr 2014; Roelen 2017). 
Under the Soviet Union, social assistance, understood as transfers targeted to people 
living in poverty, was highly residual and considered a last resort due to the denial of 
poverty. As a result, benefits were stigmatised and only targeted ‘the deserving poor’ 
(Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). This topic has not been studied in a former Soviet 
country before and, consequently, findings can be informative for other countries that 
share a similar history. 
                                                        
10 In the dataset used, the overlap of those individuals living in households receiving both social assistance and 
remittances is less than 2 percent, and the correlation between the two transfers is almost zero. As a result, in the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, social assistance and remittances are analysed in different chapters and their effects compared 
in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 5 studies how remittances affect subjective well-being in Kyrgyzstan. The spec-
ificities of migration in Kyrgyzstan, its history as a member of the Soviet Union, and its 
family values and traditions, are likely to influence the relationship between remittances 
and subjective well-being and consequently, lead to different findings from the previous 
case studies analysed so far. This paper contributes to the existing literature by introduc-
ing a new case study and by looking at how money transfers from abroad affect both 
life satisfaction (often used as a proxy for happiness), and subjective economic well-
being. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the main findings and implications from each Chapter 
and discusses the role of social assistance and remittances in the fight against poverty. It 
also provides a brief discussion of the differences and similarities between the two case 
studies, South Africa and Kyrgyzstan. The dissertation ends with some concluding re-
marks. 
  
Introduction 
33 
References 
Adams, R. H. (2002). Precautionary saving from different sources of income: Evidence from rural Pakistan. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (2761). 
Adams, R. H. (1991). The economic uses and impact of international remittances in rural Egypt. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 39(4):695–722. 
Adams, R. H. & Cuecuecha, A. (2010). Remittances, household expenditure and investment in Guatemala. World 
Development, 38 (11): 1626–1641. 
Alderman, H., Chiappori, P. A., Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., & Kanbur, R. (1995). Unitary versus collective models 
of the household: is it time to shift the burden of proof? The World Bank Research Observer, 10(1), 1-19. 
Atkinson, A. B., & Micklewright, J. (1992). Economic transformation in Eastern Europe and the distribution of income. Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Attah, R., Barca, V., Kardan, A., MacAuslan, I., Merttens, F., & Pellerano, L. (2016). Can social protection affect 
psychosocial wellbeing and why does this matter? Lessons from cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
Journal of Development Studies, 52(8), 1115-1131. 
Banga, R., & Sahu, P. K. (2010). Impact of remittances on poverty in developing countries. eSocialSciences Working 
Paper id 3100 
Barrientos, A. (2013). Social assistance in developing countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barrientos, A., & Kudebayeva, A. (2015). Social Transfers and Women's Labour Supply in Kyrgyzstan. BWPI Work-
ing Paper 215, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. 
Bastagli, F., Hagen-Zanker, J., Harman, L., Barca, V., Sturge, G. & Schmidt, T. (2016) Cash transfers: what does the 
evidence say? A rigorous review of programme impact and of the role of design and implementation features. 
London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 
Bluhm, R., de Crombrugghe, D. P. I., & Szirmai, A. (2014). Poor trends-The pace of poverty reduction after the 
Millennium Development Agenda (No. 006). United Nations University-Maastricht Economic and Social Re-
search Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT). 
Brown, P.C., & Jimenez, E. (2007). Estimating the net effects of migration and remittances on poverty and inequal-
ity. UNU-WIDER Research Paper No. 2007/23.United Nations University, Finland. 
Brück, T., Esenaliev, D., Kroeger, A., Kudebayeva, A., Mirkasimov, B., & Steiner, S. (2014). Household survey data 
for research on well-being and behavior in Central Asia. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42(3), 819-835. 
Brunori, P. & O’Reilly, M. (2010). Social protection for development: A review of definitions. Paper prepared in the 
framework of the European Report on Development 2010. Brussels: European Commission. 
Coetzee, M. (2013). Finding the benefits: Estimating the impact of the South African child support grant. South 
African Journal of Economics, 81(3):427–450. 
Daidone, S., Handa, S., Davis, B., Park, M., Osei, R. D., & Osei-Akoto, I. (2015). Social Networks and Risk Man-
agement in Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Programme, Papers inwopa 781, Innocenti 
Working Papers. 
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: A theoretical perspective. International migration review, 44(1), 227-
264. 
Devereux, S. & Waidler, J. (2017). Why does malnutrition persist in South Africa despite social grants? Food Security 
SA Working Paper Series No.001. DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Food Security, South Africa. 
Duflo, E., & Udry, C. (2004). Intra household resource allocation in Cote d’Ivoire: Social norms, separate accounts 
and consumption choices (No. w10498). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Friedman, M. (1957). The permanent income hypothesis. In A theory of the consumption function (pp. 20-37). 
Princeton University Press. 
Foresti, M. & Hagen-Zanker, J. (2017). Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
Gassmann, F. & Zardo Trindade, L. (2015). Analysis of Potential Work Disincentive Effects of the Monthly Benefit 
for Poor Families in the Kyrgyz Republic. Report No. 99776-KG. World Bank Group, Washington DC. 
Giannetti, M., Federici, D., & Raitano, M. (2009). Migrant remittances and inequality in Central and Eastern Europe. 
International Review of Applied Economics, 23(3), 289-307. 
Guelfi, A., & Sattar, S. (2015). Poverty and Economic Mobility in the Kyrgyz Republic. Some insights from the ‘Life 
in Kyrgyzstan Survey’. Report No. 99775-KG. World Bank Group, Washington DC. 
Hagen-Zanker, J. & Himmelstine, L. (2015). What is known about the differential impacts of cash transfers and 
remittances on poverty and vulnerability of households? Social Policy and Society, 14(2), pp. 00-14. 
Chapter 1 
34 
Haushofer, J., & Shapiro, J. (2016). The short-term impact of unconditional cash transfers to the poor: experimental 
evidence from Kenya. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1973-2042. 
Haushofer, J., & Fehr, E. (2014). On the psychology of poverty. Science, 344(6186), 862-867. 
Hendriks, S. (2014). Food security in South Africa: Status quo and policy imperatives. Agrekon, 53(2): 1–24. 
Hernandez, E., Sam, A. G., Gonzalez-Vega, C., & Chen, J. J. (2012). Does the insurance effect of public and private 
transfers favour financial deepening? Evidence from rural Nicaragua. Review of Development Finance, 2(1), pp. 9-
21.  
Honorati, M., Gentilini, U., & Yemtsov, R. G. (2015). The state of social safety nets 2015. Washington (DC): World 
Bank Group. 
ICG (2016). Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation, Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°83 
Jongwanich, J. (2007). Workers’ remittances, economic growth and poverty in developing Asia and the Pacific coun-
tries. UN ESCAP Working Paper WP/07/01: 275-18.  
Kilburn, K., Handa, S., Angeles, G., Tsoka, M., & Mvula, P. (2018). Paying for Happiness: Experimental Results 
from a Large Cash Transfer Program in Malawi. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 37(2), 331-356. 
Kooreman, P. (2000). The labeling effect of a child benefit system. The American Economic Review, 90(3):571–583. 
Maitra, P., & Ray, R. (2003). The effect of transfers on household expenditure patterns and poverty in South Africa. 
Journal of Development Economics, 71(1), pp. 23-49.  
Manley, J., Gitter, S. & Slavchevska, V. (2012). How effective are cash transfer programmes at improving nutritional 
status? A rapid evidence assessment of programmes’ effects on anthropometric outcomes. London: EPPI-
Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Mansuri, G. (2006). Migration, school attainment, and child labor: evidence from rural Pakistan. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, (3945). 
McDade, Z. (2010). Are Conditions on Cash Transfers Necessary to Improve Rural Education Outcomes? Evidence 
from Nicaragua. Honors Project. Paper 31. 
Natali, L., Handa, S., Peterman, A., Seidenfeld, D., & Tembo, G. (2018). Does money buy happiness? Evidence 
from an unconditional cash transfer in Zambia. SSM-population health, 4, 225-235 
OECD (2009). The role of employment and social protection: making economic growth more pro-poor. Policy 
Statement, DAC High-level meeting. 
Posel, D. (2016). Inter-household transfers in South Africa: Prevalence, patterns and poverty. Technical report, 
SALDRU Working Paper No. 180/NIDS Discussion paper 2016/7. 
Posel, D. (2009). Migration: Analysis of the NIDS wave 1 dataset. Technical report, NIDS Discussion Paper, no.1. 
Posel, D. (2004). Have migration patterns in post-apartheid South Africa changed? Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 
15 (3-4):277–292. 
Posel, D. (2001). Intra-family transfers and income-pooling. South African Journal of Economics, 69(3): 501-528 
Posel, D. and Casale, D. (2006). Internal labour migration and household poverty in post-apartheid South Africa. HSRC Press 
Cape Town. 
Posel, D. (2004). Have migration patterns in post-apartheid South Africa changed? Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 
15 (3-4):277–292. 
Ratha, D. (2013). The impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty reduction. Migration Policy Institute, 
Policy Brief, 8, 1-13. 
Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S. and Scheja, E. (2011). Impact of migration on economic and social development. A review 
of evidence and emerging issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5558, Washington DC.    
Robeyns, I. (2005). The capability approach: a theoretical survey. Journal of human development, 6(1), 93-117. 
Roelen, K. (2017). Shame, Poverty and Social Protection. CSP working paper No 489, Institute of Development 
Studies 
SASSA (2016). Factsheet: Issue no 4 of 2016. A statistical summary of social grants in South Africa. 
Schady, N., & Rosero, J. (2008). Are cash transfers made to women spent like other sources of income? Economics 
Letters, 101(3), 246-248.  
Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The new economics of labor migration. The American Economic Review, 173-178.  
Sen, A. (1993). Capability and well-being. In Nussbaum, M. and Sen, A. (eds), The Quality of Life. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 30–53 
Sen, A. K. (1987). The Standard of Living. In G. Hawthorn (ed.), The Standard of Living (pp. 1–38). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J. P. (2009). The measurement of economic performance and social progress revisited. 
Reflections and overview. Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, Paris. 
Introduction 
35 
Tesliuc, E. D. (2004). Mitigating Social Risks in Kyrgyz Republic. Social Protection discussion paper series; no. 408. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Tesliuc, E., & Lindert, K. (2002). Social protection, private transfers and poverty, Technical paper No. 3, Guatemala 
Poverty Assessment program, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing science, 4(3):199–214. 
The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team. (2012). The impact of the Kenya Cash Transfer Program for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children on household spending. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 4(1), 9-37. 
Thieme, S. (2014). Coming home? Patterns and characteristics of return migration in Kyrgyzstan. International Mi-
gration, 52(5), 127-143. 
du Toit, A. & Neves, D. (2009). Trading on a Grant: Integrating Formal and Informal Social Protection in Post-
Apartheid Migrant Networks. BWPI working paper 75. 
UNICEF (2012). Integrated Social Protection Systems: Enhancing Equity for Children, United Nations Children’s 
Fund, New York. 
Van den Berg, M., & Cuong, N. V. (2011). Impact of public and private cash transfers on poverty and inequality: 
evidence from Vietnam. Development Policy Review, 29(6), pp. 689-728.  
White, S. C. (2010). Analysing wellbeing: a framework for development practice. Development in Practice, 20(2), 158-
172. 
World Bank (2017a). Closing the Gap: The State of Social Safety Nets 2017 “Safety Nets where Needs are Greatest”. 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
World Bank (2017b). Migration and remittances. Recent developments and outlook. Migration and development 
policy brief 2017. Washington, DC: World Bank 
World Bank (2017c). The World Bank in South Africa, Overview. http://www.worldbank.org/en/coun-
try/southafrica/overview [accessed 10 March 2018]. 
World Bank (2017d). World Bank Data, Kyrgyz Republic. https://data.worldbank.org/country/kyrgyz-republic 
[accessed 10 November 2017] 
World Bank and KNOMAD (2017). Migration and Development Brief 27: Migration and Remittances-Recent Developments 
and Outlook. World Bank Publications, Washington DC. 
World Bank (2016a). Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality. Washington DC: World Bank. 
doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0958-3.  
World Bank (2016b). ASPIRE: The Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity. http://datatop-
ics.worldbank.org/aspire/ [accessed 15 January 2018]. 
World Bank (2010). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (2000). World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank. (1999). Poverty and social development in Peru, 1994–1997. Washington DC: 
The World Bank. 
 
  
Chapter 1 
36 
  
 37 
Chapter 2 
 
On the Fungibility of Public and Private Transfers: A Mental Accounting Approach 
Chapter 2 
On the Fungibility of Public and Private 
Transfers: A Mental Accounting Approach11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It is time to stop making excuses. We need an 
enriched approach to doing economic research, 
one that acknowledges the existence and rele-
vance of Humans.” 
“If you want to encourage someone to do some-
thing, make it easy.” 
(Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving) 
  
                                                        
11 This Chapter is based on: Waidler, J. (2016). On the fungibility of public and private transfers: a mental accounting 
approach, UNU-MERIT Working Paper 2016-060. 
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2.1 Introduction 
A common assumption in economic theory is that money is fungible. In other words, 
spending patterns do not depend on the source of income, only on the total amount. A 
number of theories like the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) developed by Friedman 
(1957) or the mental accounting theory initiated by behavioural economicsts like Thaler 
(1985, 1990) have challenged this assumption, however. According to the permanent 
income hypothesis, consumption is determined by the permanent/anticipated income 
and should not react to transitory changes in income. The second argues that people 
compartmentalise their income into different mental accounts and decide on their 
consumption within each of these accounts. Based on this theory, spending behaviour 
is associated with the income source and therefore money cannot be treated as fungible. 
There are a number of examples why individuals would allocate income transfers into 
different mental accounts. One is self-control, which stresses that people keep different 
accounts as means of self-control (e.g. to resist overspending) by allocating usually large 
windfalls into a separate assets or savings account that is not expected to be used for 
consumption in the immediate future (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). Another example of 
why people would allocate income into different mental accounts is the “flypaper or 
labelling effect”, where current consumption is associated with a desire to comply with 
externally imposed labels, which has received particular attention. Kooreman (2000), for 
example, finds that government provided child grants in the Netherlands are more likely 
to be spent on child clothing than on other goods. Private transfers such as remittances 
(money sent by migrants living abroad) can also be analysed in the mental accounting 
framework. Several studies have shown that households do not use remittances in the 
same way as income from other sources (Adams 1991; Adams 2002; Adams and 
Cuecuecha 2010). 
Despite the growing literature on mental accounting, and that a few studies have 
investigated whether government-provided social transfers or remittances are spent 
differently than income from other sources, the question on whether social transfers are 
spent differently than remittances remains under researched. To the knowledge of the 
author, only two studies have tested whether social transfers from the government are 
spent differently than remittances received from migrants who live abroad, and none of 
them have explicitly tested the mental accounting theory in this context.12 Comparing 
public and private transfers can give additional and important insights into policy making 
as the welfare impacts of transfers not only depend on their value, but also on how they 
are perceived and therefore, spent. 
                                                        
12 The other studies comparing how social transfers and remittances are spent are (Maitra and Ray 2003) and (Waid-
ler et al. 2016) 
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This paper hypothesises that individuals or households perceive a private transfer 
coming from a family member differently than a public transfer received from the 
government, and that this impacts the way transfers are spent. To test this hypothesis, 
the first nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted in South Africa (the 
National Income Dynamics Survey), covering the years 2008, 2010, and 2012, is used. 
South Africa provides an excellent case study to answer the question at hand, as both 
remittances and social transfers constitute an important source of income in poor 
households. For more than 35 percent of rural black households (which are more likely 
to live in poverty) remittances are the main source of income (Posel and Casale 2003, 
2006). At the same time, the two main social protection programmes aimed at reducing 
poverty and vulnerability of the most deprived -the child support grant and the old age 
pension- reach almost 60 percent of children and more than 80 percent of the non-white 
elderly population (Sassa 2016). 
The next section reviews the literature on the mental accounting theory. Section 2.3 
describes the case of South Africa and the hypothesis on how remittances and social 
transfers are likely to be spent. Section 2.4 introduces the demand model and the 
econometric estimation used to analyse the relationship between the different income 
sources and expenditure patterns. Section 2.5 describes the data and section 2.6 presents 
the findings and the different robustness tests. Finally, section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
Social protection transfers provided by the government or remittances sent by migrants 
working in a different locality or country facilitate consumption smoothing of 
households and offer immediate alleviation of spending constraints to poor 
beneficiaries. A relevant policy question when assessing the effects of these transfers is 
whether the increased consumption or poverty reduction experienced by recipient 
households is only explained by a pure income effect (i.e. having more money) or also 
by the fact that different income sources affect expenditure patterns in different ways. 
The latter would reject standard microeconomic theory as it implies that the composition 
of income matters and that certain sources of income may have higher welfare effects 
than others. 
Mental accounting theory supports the idea that money is not fungible, but that the 
source of income influences spending decisions. Behavioural economists such as Thaler 
(1985, 1990), and Shefrin and Thaler (1988) argue that people have different mental 
accounts for different sources of income. There are different reasons why people would 
compartmentalise different income transfers into different mental accounts. Shefrin and 
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Thaler (1988) show that some people create mental accounts as a self-control device to 
resist overspending by, for example, allocating large windfalls into a separate -assets or 
savings- account where money is less likely to be spent. Christiaensen and Pan (2012) 
explore the notion of emotional accounting (Levav and McGraw 2009), which argues 
that people categorise their incomes based on the feelings they evoke by suggesting that 
the coding of income is based on the effort involved in obtaining it. The authors test the 
hypothesis that people are more likely to spend hard earned money on necessities, and 
unearned money on hedonic (pleasure) goods. In line with their predictions, they find 
that the marginal propensity to consume from unearned income is higher for clothing, 
alcohol and tobacco, transportation and communication, and gifts, while earned income 
is more likely to be spent on staple food and education. 
An example of mental accounting that has been recently debated is the “flypaper or 
labeling effect”, which is the desire to comply with externally imposed labels. Kooreman 
(2000) tests this theory in the context of child benefits in the Netherlands and finds that 
these benefits are more likely to be spent on child clothing than other sources of income. 
In the same way Jacoby (2002) and Islam and Hoddinott (2009) prove that benefits from 
the school feeding and supplementary nutrition programs benefit the child directly. As 
these studies look at in-kind transfers, the authors test the mental accounting theory by 
looking at whether there is intra-household reallocation of calories in response to the 
program. Coetzee (2013), studying the Child Support Grant in South Africa, finds that 
child grants have a positive impact on children as they are more often spent on goods 
that benefit children (for example, food) as opposed to adult goods. Benhassine et al. 
(2013) show that an unconditional cash transfer program in Morocco to fathers of 
school-age children, which is labelled as an educational support program, increases 
school participation. Moreover, Beatty et al. (2014) find a robust labelling effect in the 
case of the winter fuel transfers in the UK: on average, households spend 41 percent of 
this unconditional transfer on fuel, as compared to 3 percent that would be spent on 
fuel if the transfer was treated as normal cash. 
Remittances can also be analysed in the mental accounting framework. Several studies 
have shown that households do not use remittances in the same way as income from 
other sources (Adams 1991; Adams 2002; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010). Adams (1991) 
proves that remittances are also invested and not only spent on consumption. Adams 
(2002) states that the marginal propensity to save from those sources of income that are 
more variable and uncertain -like external remittances- is much higher than from those 
sources of income that are more predictable. The author finds evidence of the 
permanent income hypothesis as the marginal propensity to save out of remittances is 
found to be higher than for any other source of income and suggests that this is due to 
income volatility and risk aversion, noting that income sources with greater variability 
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exhibit greater marginal propensities to save. Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) show that 
households receiving either internal or international remittances spend more on 
education and housing than households not receiving remittances, keeping total income 
constant. 
Davies et al. (2009) argue that remittance income is likely to be allocated to its own 
mental account for several reasons: remittances may come with specific conditions 
attached (the remitter may require the receiving household to use their income for 
specific purposes such as education). Moreover, households may attach specific 
emotional tags to remittances based on how they perceive the migrant (or the migration 
experience) and/or the motivation behind the remittances. The authors state that 
“remittances may be considered as either manna from heaven or else the product of 
someone else’s hard work” (p. 324). This will determine in which mental account these 
transfers are allocated to and, as a result, how they are spent. In the first case, remittances 
are more likely to be spent on consumption, whereas in the second they will be used for 
productive purposes such as investment in human and physical capital. 
Based on the literature described above, there are reasons to believe that social transfers 
will have different expenditure patterns than remittances. Social transfers can bring a 
label attached and influence the types of goods recipient households buy based on the 
aims of the programme and the intended outcomes. In the case of remittances, recipients 
may feel conditioned to spend the money in a certain way, plus, the feelings associated 
with the migration experience of the relative abroad may influence their spending 
behaviour. However, the decision to allocate different transfers into different mental 
accounts is context specific and will depend on the type of social protection program 
and on the migration patterns in the country studied. For instance, whether migration is 
temporary or long-term, internal or international, low-skilled or highly-skilled, etc. can 
influence the remittance sender’s behaviour and/or the spending behaviour of the 
recipient households. The next section describes the case of South Africa and proposes 
a model where remittances and social transfers are allowed to differ from other income 
sources in the way they are spent. 
2.3 The case of South Africa: migration, remittances and social 
protection transfers 
2.3.1 The social protection system 
The social protection system in South Africa is well-established, with one of the largest 
non-contributory pension programs in the world and one of the largest social cash 
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transfer programmes (the Child Support Grant) in terms of the number of participants 
(World Bank 2015). Both programs are means-tested and targeted at poor elderly 
individuals and poor households with children, respectively. Under apartheid, the system 
was designed and developed to target the white population. In 1992, the Social 
Assistance Act eliminated all discriminatory provisions and the system expanded to 
cover all other groups. Nowadays, the majority of the beneficiaries are Black13 (many of 
them living in rural areas). Almost three quarters (3.2 million) of the elderly in South 
Africa are income eligible and receive the Old Age Pension, and around 60 percent of 
eligible age children (11.9 million people) receive the Child Support Grant (Sassa 2016). 
Direct spending on social assistance accounted for 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013 (World 
Bank 2016). 
Many studies have assessed the impact of the two main social protection programs in 
South Africa on different indicators of well-being. Lund (1993), and Ardington and 
Lund (1995) identify poverty reduction effects of the social pensions as they reach 
individuals in the lower deciles of income and provide food security and household 
security. Barrientos (2005) concludes that benefits associated with non-contributory 
pension programs like the South African one include poverty reduction among the 
elderly and their households, facilitation of investment in human and physical capital, 
strengthening of intergenerational solidarity, and insurance against the adverse effects of 
agricultural reform. More recent papers (Duflo 2000, Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012, Case and 
Menendez 2007) confirm previous findings and stress that elderly pool their income to 
other members of the households, which translates into significant improvements in 
well being of the whole households, especially children. The Child Support Grant (CSG) 
has also played a significant role in reducing the number of poor people (Woolard and 
Leibbrandt 2010). Aguero et al. (2006) find a positive impact of the CSG on child 
nutrition. A recent impact assessment by DSD, SASSA and UNICEF (2012) finds a 
positive developmental impact of the Child Support Grant in promoting nutritional, 
educational and health outcomes. 
Analysing how social transfers are spent, Cross and Luckins (1993) document the role 
of social pensions in enabling recipient households to acquire farming inputs, hire 
tractors, and hire labour for household tasks such as working the land. Social grants also 
directly support nutrition, access to transportation services, and other short run 
productivity enhancing expenditures. Case and Deaton (1998) find that pension income 
is spent as other income, although money received by women is more likely to be spent 
on children. Case (2001) looks at the impacts of pension on health and conclude that 
                                                        
13 This paper uses the official classification of racial groups defined by Statistics South Africa, which is used by 
policy makers and researchers to measure inequality, identify the most vulnerable groups, design and evaluate social 
protection interventions, etc. There are four main ethnic groups in South Africa: Black Africans, Coloured, In-
dian/Asian, and White, and the first three altogether are denominated more generally as Black. 
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income is pooled in 84 percent of the households, which means that transfers are more 
likely to benefit the household as a whole and not only the elderly recipients. Maitra and 
Ray (2003), by analysing whether remittances, pensions, and other income have different 
expenditure patterns, also find that pensions do not have much of an impact on 
household expenditure patterns. 
Regarding the Child Support Grant, there does seems to be a direct effect on child 
expenditure: Lund (2002) finds an impact of child transfers on increased school expenses 
and trips to health services, while Coetzee (2013) concludes that the CSG has a higher 
marginal propensity to be spent on food than on adult goods, and a higher expenditure 
on food is expected to have a higher beneficial impact on children than on other 
household members. Moreover, a qualitative evaluation done by DSD, SASSA and 
UNICEF (2011) shows that the most frequent uses of the grant are school related 
expenses (including school fees, transportation, clothing and uniforms) and food (mainly 
general household food but sometimes child specific). Other uses include clothing and 
beauty. However, households that were struggling to meet their food needs would first 
use the grant to buy food and only buy child specific goods once basic needs were 
satisfied. 
Based on previous studies as well as on the labelling effect hypothesis described in the 
previous section, it seems likely that child transfers will benefit the child directly. 
Moreover, in the case of South Africa there are information campaigns stressing that the 
grant is child specific and intended for educational support and nutritional improvement 
(DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2011). This paper therefore hypothesises that the Child 
Support Grant will have a positive impact on the share spent on food and on human 
capital goods such as education, which are more likely to benefit children. In the case of 
the Old Age Pension and in line with the studies mentioned above, no significant change 
in expenditure behaviour is expected due to the fact that pension income is essentially 
income replacement. Despite the fact that elderly individuals usually pool their income 
to help the whole household, no major expenditure differences are expected between 
pension income and the income elderly individuals were earning before becoming 
eligible for the Old Age Pension. 
2.3.2 Migration and remittances 
South Africa has a history of internal migrants in its labuor force. Under apartheid, there 
were racial restrictions to urban areas and the permanent settlement of migrants was 
highly restricted (Posel 2001). As a result, labor migrants (usually black) were moving 
from rural to urban areas on a temporary basis and living in “homelands” (labor reserves 
built by the government for migrants). Based on South Africa’s history, there are good 
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reasons why migrants would remit and retain strong ties with their household of origin: 
in addition to altruistic motivations, migrants faced insecure employment opportunities 
and would remit as insurance against unemployment, or for their retirement (as 
permanent settlement in places of employment was not permitted) (Posel 2004). 
In 1987 racial restrictions on movement and residence were lifted; however, migration 
patterns did not alter after apartheid as expected and internal migration from rural to 
urban areas remains temporary for a large number of individuals and households (Posel 
2004). Poor households in South Africa, especially in rural areas, continue to rely on 
remittances to cover their daily needs (Posel and Casale 2006). However, analysing the 
National Income Dynamics Survey of 2008, Posel (2009) points out that many labour 
migrants are now settling in destination areas and that ties between migrants and 
households of origin are weakening. This translates into an important decline in the 
number of households receiving remittances compared to statistics derived from 
previous household surveys. 
There are a limited number of studies analysing the effects of remittances in post-
apartheid South Africa, mainly due to a lack of nationally representative surveys that can 
explore patterns and trends in migration. However, it is evident that poor households 
highly rely on these transfers as they are a significant source of income, especially for 
rural black households (Posel and Casale 2003, 2006). Lund (1999) points out their 
income smoothing effects and, while for this author remittances are seen as a wage 
income that is earned in the market, Haddad and Zeller (1997) treat remittances as an 
exogenous transfer coming from outside the household. Maitra and Ray (2003) provide 
evidence supporting the second hypothesis, as they find that remittances are spent 
differently than the income earned by the household. Remittances are found to have a 
significant impact on several expenditure shares and, in the case of food and other goods 
(covering mainly luxury goods), remittances are spent differently than other sources of 
income: remittances increase the share spent on food, whereas income reduces it, and 
the opposite occurs in the case of luxury goods. 
Studies on other countries have found that given the particularities of this income 
transfer, remittances are sometimes spent differently than other sources of income 
(Adams 1991; Adams 2002; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Davies et al. 2009; De and 
Ratha 2012). Given the temporary nature of migration in South Africa, where migrants 
retain strong ties with the household of origin and remit frequently, one can expect 
migrants to have an influence on how transfers are spent. As labor migration is generally 
low skilled, and that sending money represents a big effort to remittance senders, this 
paper hipothesises that remittance transfers are expected to be spent on basic household 
needs such as food, health, or household goods. 
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2.4 Demand model and empirical analysis 
2.4.1 The model 
The relationship between expenditure shares and income is analysed by estimating Engel 
curves, which linearly relate expenditure shares to the logarithm of income. The demand 
model chosen for this analysis is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) from Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) given that it satisfies several useful properties: it gives a first order 
approximation to any demand system, it satisfies the axioms of choice exactly, it 
aggregates perfectly over consumers, it has a functional form consistent with previous 
household budget data, and it is simple to estimate in its linear approximation choice 
(Blanciforti et al. 1983). In other words, the AIDS model provides a good statistical fit 
to the different goods (including luxuries, necessities and inferior goods) (Adams and 
Cuecuecha 2010), allowing the same commodity to be a necessity for the rich and a 
luxury for the poor. It also satisfies the adding-up condition (that the sum of all total 
expenditure elasticities weighted by budget shares must add up to one) and represents 
consumer behaviour closely. Finally, AIDS is directly non-additive, meaning that 
consumption of one good can affect the marginal utility of another good. This model, 
therefore, does not impose severe substitution limitations implied by other demand 
models (Blanciforti et al. 1983). 
At the household level, the AIDS model can be written as:  
 𝑤𝑖ℎ𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 log 𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 log (
𝑥ℎ𝑡
𝑘ℎ𝑡
⁄
𝑃𝑡
) 𝑁𝑗=1   (1) 
where i=1,...,N represent the N commodities, h=1,...,H index households, t=1,..., and 
hT  represent time periods for households h. Here, ihtw  denotes the budget share on 
good i for household h at time t; htx  denotes total income for household h at time t; 
𝑝𝑗𝑡 denotes the price of commodity j at time t; and htk  are characteristics of household 
h. P is the Stone’s price index, which is chosen to make the system linear in parameters. 
14 The price index is defined as:  
 log 𝑃𝑡 =  ∑ ?̅?𝑖𝑡 + log 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  (2) 
where ?̅?𝑖𝑡 is the mean of the budget shares across households. The AIDS model satisfies 
the following properties of demand functions: 
 Adding up: ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1,𝑖 ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖   (3) 
                                                        
14 Also used in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Moschini (1995), and Ghalwash (2007) 
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 0=: ij
j
yHomogeneit γ∑  (4) 
 jiij
Symmetry  =:
  (5) 
The budget share equations have the properties of demand functions, namely that the 
sum of budget shares add up to one and ensures that total expenditure is equal to the 
sum of individual expenditure on different commodities and goods (equation 3); that 
the demand functions are homogoeneous of degree 0 in prices and total expenditure 
(equation 4); and that they satisfy the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix (equation 5), 
necessary for the integrability of the demand system to well-defined preferences. 
2.4.2 Empirical estimation 
The demand model is estimated equation by equation using OLS, and include household 
fixed effects to control for unobserved variation that can be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. To test whether remittances and social transfers have an effect on 
expenditure behaviour other than its effects through total income, I include three 
variables that express the share of each transfer (Child Support grant, Old Age Pension, 
and remittances) out of total income. In this way I test for behavioural changes that can 
occur after a specific transfer represents a higher proportion of total income (besides 
their effect through total income). The econometric estimation is expressed as: 
 
          ihtihththththtiiht tHHRSTYw   4321log=  
where ihtw  is the share of total household expenditure on good i at time t, htY  denotes 
total household income of household h at time t. R and ST are the ratios of remittances 
and social transfers to total income. In this case coefficients will capture a slope effect, 
that is the percentage point change in expenditure shares when the ratio of the respective 
transfer to total income increases by 1 percentage point. HH corresponds to the various 
household characteristics that influence the spending behaviour of the household and 
that can have an effect on how income is spent the different expenditure categories. 
These are number of children and number of adults in the household (which controls 
for the effect of a potential change in household composition induced by the receipt of 
the transfer), province of residence, whether the household lives in a rural, urban, or 
tribal area, maximum level of education, etc. tt  are year dummies which control for 
macroeconomic changes and seasonal variation that can affect expenditure. Finally, i  
is the household fixed effect and it  the error term. 
Note that prices are not included in this equation. Assuming that prices in each region 
are the same for all households, regional and year dummies are collinear with prices, 
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which means prices can be excluded from the equations. Region fixed effects had to be 
dropped from the model as there was not enough within variation, meaning that there 
were only a few households who changed provinces during these years. Moreover, in 
this case I do not impose cross-equation restriction as it is not possible to estimate the 
system of equation with panel data and individual effects. Note, however, that there is 
no loss in efficiency due to the fact that all equations have identical explanatory variables; 
in this cases, the FGLS estimation of the full system is identical to the equation by 
equation OLS estimation (Zellner 1962). 
Fixed effects are used for two reasons. The first is to control for unobserved variation 
that can be correlated with the explanatory variables included in the model. As long as 
the unobserved variation is constant over time for a household, then one should not 
expect to have a problem of endogeneity. For instance, one may expect households to 
select into migration (and thus to send remittances) based on both observed and 
unobserved characteristics. If these unobserved characteristics are time invariant (such 
as ability, motivation, etc.), then the error term will not be correlated with the 
independent variables and will therefore not generate any bias in the estimation. The 
second reason to use fixed effects is to analyse how changes in income affect 
expenditures over time: for instance, one can see if there is a change in expenditure 
behaviour caused by a change in recipient status or in the amount received. 
There can still be systematic differences between recipients and non-recipients that are 
not accounted for in fixed effects estimation, however. If there are time varying 
unobserved characteristics that affect both the outcome and whether a household 
receives transfers, then results may be biased and not representative. In the absence of 
a proper instrument for remittances, the Child Support Grant, and the Old Age Pension, 
estimations are done for different sub-samples in order to compare more homogeneous 
population groups and see whether results from the main estimation hold. I therefore 
repeat the estimations restricting the sample to the African population (who are more 
likely to be poor and receiving transfers), and to households that receive either the Old 
Age Pension or the Child Support Grant (and can or cannot receive remittances). I 
restrict the sample to only social grant recipients in order to account for possible 
selection bias. The reason for this is that only households with certain characteristics are 
eligible for these grants, while everybody is eligible to receive remittances. In this way 
we obtain a better comparison between the effects of private and public transfers on 
expenditure. Finally, I also restrict the sample to households living in KwaZulu-Natal, a 
poor province with a high percentage of households receiving both social transfers and 
remittances. This allows for a better comparison of the different transfers on 
expenditure patterns. 
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Due to the fact that there are other factors that can influence the spending behaviour of 
the household, like the gender of the recipient and how regular or unpredictable transfers 
are, I perform extended models as a robustness check. To capture the effect of who 
receives the transfer on expenditure shares, binary variables indicating the recipient of 
the respective transfer (i.e. men or women) are added to the model. To assess whether 
the regularity/unpredictability of the transfers has an effect on expenditure shares, a 
variable indicating how many times per year the transfer is received is also tested in the 
model. This will probably be relevant only for remittances, as social transfers are always 
received monthly. In addition, I explore other potential mechanisms that can influence 
the relationship between transfer receipt and expenditure behaviour of beneficiaries.  
2.5 Data 
The data used for this study is the National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS), South 
Africa’s first nationally representative panel survey that consists of three waves (2008, 
2010, 2012). In the first wave 28,247 individuals (7,296 households) were interviewed, 
in 2010 28,641 individuals (9,134 households), and in 2012 32,633 individuals (living in 
10,236 households). 18,864 individuals were successfully interviewed in all three waves. 
Detailed data on expenditure was collected at the household level by asking about the 
amount of money the household spent in the last month on each particular item for each 
category of expenditure. Expenditure is classified into nine categories: food and 
beverages, alcohol and tobacco, clothing, health, transport, education, leisure, housing, 
utilities and insurance, and miscellaneous. Household income was collected at an 
individual level, by asking each adult household member how much they received per 
month from different income sources (labor wage, agricultural income, government 
transfers, loan interest, remittances, etc.). 
As this paper looks at how social transfers (specifically the Old Age Pension and the 
Child Support Grant) and remittances affect expenditure patterns, a variable for each of 
these income sources was created at the household level. All income variables were 
defined in per adult equivalent terms to account for the composition of the household 
and economies of scale within the household. Finally, the data was deflated to January 
2012 as the base period. Deflators were computed from CPI data taken from the South 
African statistical office (Stats SA). 
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of households receiving remittances, the Old Age 
Pension, and the Child Support Grant in each wave. In 2008, slightly less than 12 percent 
of the households were receiving remittances. In 2010, the percentage of remittance 
recipient households declined by more than 6 percentage points, and increased again in 
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2012 to approximately 11 percent. The low percentage of households receiving 
remittances confirms the findings from Posel and Casale (2006) and Posel (2009), who 
state that remittances in South Africa have been decreasing over the last few decades. 
The percentage of households receiving the Old Age Pension, on the other hand, 
increased between 2008 and 2010 (from 20.1 percent to 25.7 percent) and slightly 
decreased in 2012. The decline in remittances after the year 2008 and the increase in the 
Old Age Pension reflects the effects of the economic crisis, where migrants had more 
difficulties to remit and the government needed to reach a higher percentage of the 
population due to increased poverty rates. The Child Support Grant has the highest 
coverage, with 31 percent of the households in the year 2008 and 37.7 percent in the 
year 2012 receiving the grant. This increase is due to changes in age eligibility, which 
increased from 14 years old in 2008, to 16 years old in 2010, and finally to 18 years old 
in 2012. The percentage of households receiving both remittances and the Child Support 
Grant, remittances and the Old Age Pension, and remittances and either the Old Age 
Pension or the Child Support Grant does not exceed 6.2. This means that these transfers 
reach different population targets, mainly due to the fact that remittances have a lower 
coverage than social transfers. 
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of households receiving transfers 
Source: NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012.  
While the Old Age Pension is quite generous in comparison to other social transfers 
(R940 in 2008, R1080 in 2010, and R1200 in 2012), the Child Support Grant is the least 
generous, despite its large coverage (R100 in 2008, R250 in 2010, and R280 in 2012 per 
eligible person). Table 2.1 shows the average amount of transfers received in recipient 
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households. The average amount received from the Child Support Grant is around half 
the amount received from the Old Age Pension; this is due to the fact that, on average, 
there are more children than elderly living in a household. The average amount of 
remittances lies in between the two social protection transfers in the years 2008 and 
2010. However, in 2012 the average amount of remittances increased significantly and 
reached 1319 rands on average. When accounting for the size of the household and 
looking at the value of the transfers per capita, one can see that the maximum average 
amount of the Child Support Grant does not exceed 128 rands, while remittances are, 
on average, similar in value to the Old Age Pension (and even higher in the year 2012). 
Finally, in this dataset, it is possible to get information on who in the households receives 
the transfers. The table shows that both the Child Support Grant and remittances are 
usually received by women, although to a larger extent in the case of the Child Support 
Grant, where more than 94 percent of recipients were women in 2008 and 2010 (in 2012 
this percentage decreased to 88 percent). In the case of remittances, around 80 percent 
of remittance recipients are female. 
Table 2.1: Average value (in Rands) of transfers received and gender of recipients 
 2008 2010 2012 
Mean remittances (per hh) 739 915 1319 
Mean Child Support Grant (per hh) 409 548 630 
Mean Old Age Pension (per hh) 1018 1259 1411 
Mean remittances (per capita) 215 283 507 
Mean Child Support Grant (per capita) 77 101 128 
Mean Old Age Pension (per capita) 263 330 404 
Percentage of females receiving Child grant 97.4 94.9 88.0 
Percentage of females receiving remittances 78.2 80.6 80.0 
Source: Author’s calculations; NIDS 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of household expenditure according to recipient status. 
Transfer recipients have a higher share of expenditure on food, as compared to non-
recipients. Non-recipients, which are more likely to be richer, spend a slightly larger share 
of their total budget on housing and utilities, leisure and transport. Recipients of the 
Child Support Grant spend a slightly larger share of their expenditure on education 
(0.06), as compared to the other groups (0.05). However, one needs to keep in mind that 
for richer households, expenditure on education in absolute terms is very high, mainly 
as a result of high school fees for those children who attend private schools. 
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Table 2.2: Expenditure shares according to recipient status in 2008 
Source: Author’s calculations; NIDS 2008.  
Table 2.3 shows some basic household characteristics according to recipient status. 
Households receiving social transfers are, on average, larger in size (5.6/4.8) compared 
to households receiving remittances (4.6) and no transfers (3.0). Regarding the province 
where the household lives, both remittances and social transfers go disproportionately 
to households in KwaZulu-Natal. Gauteng and Limpopo are two other provinces 
receiving a high percentage of total remittances, whereas households living in provinces 
like Western Cape or Northern Cape receive a smaller share of remittances on average. 
The fact that transfers target poor households can be seen by looking at the average 
income and expenditure per adult equivalent in the different households: households 
receiving no transfers are by far the richest, followed by households receiving 
remittances, the Old Age Pension and the Child Support Grant. These transfers also go 
disproportionately to the Africans who are also more likely to live in poverty. Finally, 
table 2.4 shows the summary statistics of all the variables used in the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Receives CSG Receives OAP Receives remittances Non recipients 
Share food  0.56 0.58 0.54 0.46 
Share alcohol and 
tobacco  
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Share clothes  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Share health  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Share housing and 
utilities  
0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Share education  0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Share transport  0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 
Share leisure  0.08 0.08 0.09 0.1 
Other  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
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Table 2.3: Main descriptive statistics according to recipient status (2008) 
Variable Receive 
remittances 
Receive CSG Receive OAP Non recipients Total 
Household size  4.6 5.6 4.8 3.0 3.9 
Province 
Western Cape  8.7 7.1 8.5 19.2 13.8 
Eastern Cape  13.8 14.0 17.5 10.7 12.7 
Northern Cape  6.4 7.2 7.0 8.5 7.8 
Free State  5.3 5.7 5.6 6.2 6.1 
KwaZulu-Natal  29.3 34.1 31.6 17.7 24.3 
North West  6.0 7.1 7.6 6.4 6.7 
Gauteng  8.1 7.7 4.7 17.7 12.8 
Mpumalanga  7.1 8.0 6.2 8.0 7.6 
Limpopo  15.4 9.3 11.3 5.9 8.3 
Race 
African  85.7 88.4 84.7 68.6 77.1 
Coloured 10.2 10.8 11.9 15.7 13.8 
Asian/Indian  0.9 0.4 1.5 2.1 1.5 
White  3.2 0.4 1.9 13.6 7.6 
Income per capita 842.5 385.8 552.9 2175.9 1269.3 
Expenditure per 
capita 
912.4 456.4 578.1 2230.8 1438.0 
Source: Author’s calculations; NIDS 2008.   
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Share food  0.53 0.24 0.001 0.99 
Share alcohol and tobacco  0.03 0.07 0 0.68 
Share clothes  0.02 0.07 0 0.76 
Share health  .05 0.10 0 0.97 
Share housing and utilities  0.16 0.14 0 0.98 
Share education  0.07 0.15 0 0.96 
Share transport  0.05 0.11 0 0.86 
Share leisure  0.07 0.09 0 0.94 
Share other  0.05 0.05 0 0.72 
Logarithm of total income (pae)  6.5 1.2 0 11.2 
Share of OAP out of total income  0.16 0.31 0 1 
Share of CSG out of total income  0.18 0.30 0 1 
Share of remittances out of total income  0.07 0.20 0 1 
Number of adults  3.1 1.7 0 16 
Number of children  1.8 1.7 0 12 
Urban formal  0.39 0.49 0 1 
Urban informal  0.07 0.25 0 1 
Rural  0.54 0.50 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations; NIDS 2008.  
2.6 Results 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the fixed effects model for the nine budget shares. The 
model shows how the share of remittances, the Child Support Grant, and the Old Age 
Pension to total income affect expenditure shares (controlling for household and 
residential characteristics). The table shows that an increase in ratio of remittances to 
total income is associated with an increase in the share spent on food. This means that 
the more important this transfer becomes as a source of income, the higher is the share 
of total expenditure on food, which is in line with the findings from Maitra and Ray 
(2003). An increase in the ratio of remittances to total income is also associated with a 
decrease in expenditure on alcohol and tobacco, clothing, and transport, and with an 
increased expenditure on education (although in the latter case the coefficient is only 
significant at a 10 percent level). This is an interesting finding, as it shows that 
remittances are not spent on conspicuous consumption and that they are spent 
differently than other sources of income. These results also support the hypothesis that 
remittances are likely to be spent on basic household needs. 
When the share of income from the Old Age Pension out of total income increases by 
one percentage point, expenditure on food increases by 0.03 percentage points. 
Expenditure on education and on housing and utilities both increase by 0.01 percentage 
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points, although coefficients are only significant at a 10 percent level. The positive 
relationship between income from the Old Age Pension and certain expenditure 
categories contradicts the hypothesis that pension income will not affect expenditure 
behaviour as these transfers are essentially income replacement. Households seem to be 
changing their consumption patterns by increasing the share spent on goods that benefit 
the household as a whole (like food and utilities) as well as goods that benefit children 
in particular (education and food). At the same time, increased income from the Old 
Age Pension is associated with a decrease in expenditure on transportation, clothing, 
leisure, and alcohol and tobacco. 
With regards to the Child Support Grant, a one percentage point increase in the share 
of this source of income is associated with a 0.02 percentage points increase in the share 
spent on education, and a decrease in 0.02 and 0.01 in the shares spent on alcohol and 
tobacco and leisure, respectively. This finding supports the hypothesis that child grants 
are likely be spent on goods that benefit the children (like education), and this could be 
due to a labelling effect. The findings also support the theory of change hypothesis which 
says that caregivers (grant recipients) will spend the grant on goods that benefits the 
beneficiary, in this case children. 
This analysis shows that social transfers and remittances are not always spent in the same 
way as other sources of income, and some difference between them are observed. There 
is a positive effect of the Child Support Grant, remittances and the Old Age Pension on 
education, although in the case of the Child Support Grant the relationship is stronger 
as the coefficient is significant at a 5 percent level (as compared to 10 percent in the 
other cases) and larger in magnitude. This can be due to the fact that the Child Support 
Grant is explicitly targeted at children and it is the aim of the programme to improve 
children’s educational outcomes and school attendance. At the same time, both 
remittances and the Old Age Pension increase the share spent on food, but this is not 
the case for the Child Support Grant. While remittances and the Old Age Pension are 
both negatively associated with clothing and transportation, all three grants are 
negatively associated with expenditure on alcohol and tobacco. In addition, both the 
Child Support Grant and the Old Age Pension are associated with a decreased 
expenditure on leisure, but this does not apply to remittances. Finally, an increase in the 
share of the Old Age Pension to total income increases the share spent on utilities and 
household goods, while in the case of remittances and child grants no significant results 
are found. This can be due to the high value of the Old Age Pension in comparison to 
the other two transfers, as child grants are worth approximately four times less than the 
Old Age Pension and are less likely to be pooled, and remittances received by poor 
households are very low in value. 
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Table 2.5: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- Whole sample 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.02** 0.00** 0.00+ 0.00 0.01** -0.00+ 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.03** -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** -0.02** 0.01+ -0.02** 0.01+ -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out of  0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.02* -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.05** -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** 0.02+ 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of adults -0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00* -0.00 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.01+ 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2008 0.04** -0.00* 0.01** -0.01** 0.01* 0.03** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.09** -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.70** -0.00 0.00 0.05** -0.04** 0.02 0.06** 0.15** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Given that there are systematic differences between social transfers recipients and 
remittance recipients, the model can still suffer from endogeneity if there are omitted 
variables that are time variant and affect both the treatment and the outcome. For 
instance, if there is a shock in the household (or in the community) that causes a change 
in expenditure and, at the same time, generates a response in the person sending 
remittances or the government by increasing or decreasing transfers sent, our 
coefficients may be subject to bias. In absence of a proper instrument for the Child 
Support Grant, the Old Age Pension, and remittances, the estimations are performed 
separately for different population groups to test for heterogeneity in effects. I re-
estimate the model in three ways: (1) restricting the sample to the African population in 
order to compare public and private transfers within a more homogeneous group, (2) 
restricting the sample to households that receive social transfers (and that can or cannot 
receive remittances), and (3) restricting the sample to households living in KwaZulu-
Natal, a province with a high share of households receiving both social transfers and 
remittances. 
When the sample is restricted to the African population -households who are likely to 
be poor and receive transfers- (Table 2.6) results from the previous estimation hold, 
although a small positive impact of the Child Support Grant on food are now observed. 
By excluding other population groups who are less likely to receive grants and therefore 
have little or no variation in the amount of transfers received (like the white or Asian 
population), one can see that the Child Support Grant is, in fact, increasing recipients’ 
expenditure on food more than on other goods. This is also in line with the labelling 
effect hypothesis that the Child Support Grant is meant to be spent on goods that benefit 
the child (in this case increased food consumption is expected to lead to better 
nutritional outcomes). 
In table 2.7 the sample is restricted to households receiving the Old Age Pension or the 
Child Support Grant. In this case the relationship between transfers and expenditure 
shares is slightly different. Remittances do not longer increase expenditure on food. The 
reason for this is that the number of households receiving both social transfers and 
remittances is not very high, and households that receive both social transfers and 
remittances are very poor, which means remittances received are usually low in value as 
well as lower in value compared to social transfers. In the case of educational 
expenditure, we no longer observe significant effects of transfers on this category. One 
reason could be that there is not much variation in educational expenditure among social 
transfer recipients across the 3 waves. Results may also imply that the relationship 
between the Child Support Grant and educational expenditure is not very robust because 
of data limitations regarding educational expenditure, among other reasons, which will 
be discussed in the limitations section. 
Chapter 2 
58 
Finally, table 2.8 reports the regressions when the sample is restricted to households 
living in KwaZulu-Natal. This province is characterised by high levels of poverty and a 
big percentage of households that are recipients of both social transfers and remittances. 
What one can see now is a positive and strong impact of the three transfers on food 
expenditure: a 1 percent increase in the ratio of the Old Age Pension, the Child Support 
Grant, and remittances to total income increases the share spent on food by 0.08, 0.03, 
and 0.07 percentage points, respectively. This means that when one compares more 
homogeneous groups and allows for a better comparison between social transfers and 
remittances by taking a sub-sample of households that are likely to receive all three 
transfers, one can see that both social transfers and remittances have a positive and 
significant effect on the share spent on food. The positive effects of social transfers on 
education are not significant in this specification though. 
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Table 2.6: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- African sample 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.02** 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.03* -0.01+ 0.00 -0.01** -0.02** 0.01+ -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out of  0.02+ -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.00 0.02* -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.05** -0.02* -0.00 -0.02** -0.03** 0.02+ 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of adults -0.00* -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00* -0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.01+ 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2008 0.03** -0.00+ 0.02** -0.01** 0.01** 0.03** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.09** -0.00+ -0.00* -0.00** -0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.70** -0.00 -0.00 0.04** -0.04** 0.02 0.06** 0.16** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 15767 15767 15767 15767 15767 15767 15767 15767 15767 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Chapter 2 
60 
Table 2.7: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- Social transfer recipients 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.01 0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.00 0.01+ 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.06** -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 
total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Share of CSG out of  0.07** -0.00 -0.02* -0.02* -0.03** -0.02 -0.02+ 0.01 0.01 
total income (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share of remittances 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03** -0.04** 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Out of total income (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Number of adults -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.00** -0.00* 0.01** -0.00 -0.01* -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.04** 0.04** -0.01 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Urban informal -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06** 0.04 -0.06+ -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Year 2008 0.05** -0.01* 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.11** -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.01** -0.02** -0.04** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 0.59** -0.03 0.08** 0.01 0.05+ 0.11* 0.08* 0.14** 0.05* 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) 
Observations 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.8: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- KwaZulu-Natal 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.05** 0.01** 0.01** -0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.08** -0.01** -0.01* -0.02** -0.03** -0.00 -0.03** 0.01 0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out of  0.03** 0.01 -0.00 -0.02** -0.00 0.01 -0.01* -0.01+ 0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.07** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.02* -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of adults -0.00** -0.00 0.00* -0.00+ 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.01** 0.00** 0.00** -0.00** -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.13** 0.00 0.03** -0.01* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.06** 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.06** -0.00 0.02** -0.01+ 0.02** 0.04** 0.00 0.02** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Year 2008 0.03** -0.01** 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.06** 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.02** 0.03** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.91** -0.02** -0.06** 0.05** -0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.09** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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2.6.1 Potential mechanisms 
This paper explores whether remittances and social transfers have different expenditure 
patterns, as well as whether these transfers are spent differently than other sources of 
income. One explanation why transfers may not be fungible is the mental accounting 
theory, according to which different sources of income are allocated to different mental 
accounts for different consumption purposes. The mental accounting framework could 
explain the findings that social transfers and remittances are spent differently than other 
sources of income. However, there are other potential explanations for these findings 
that are explored in this section. 
Several studies have pointed out that who in the household receives the transfer (e.g. a 
male or a female) has an effect on how transfers are spent. For instance, in South Africa, 
Duflo (2003) showed that transfers received by women had a higher poverty reduction 
impact as they were more likely to be spent on basic needs like food. As in the data there 
is information on who receives the transfer, two binary variables (one for remittances, 
one for the Child Support Grant) were added to the model to test whether the effect of 
the transfers on expenditure patterns is influenced by the sex of the recipient (table 2.9). 
None of these variables were significant in the regressions, meaning that the change in 
expenditure patterns is not driven by the recipient of the transfer, but by the transfer 
itself. In this case, however, there is not much variation in recipient status, as both 
remittances and child grants are mainly received by women, although to a larger extent 
in the latter than in the former. Moreover, in absence of baseline data (collected before 
migration or social protection programmes were in place), it is not possible to assess 
whether there was a change in household expenditure behaviour after a change in 
recipient status (due to factors such an increase in women’s bargaining power). 
Another factor that can influence the effect of social transfers and remittances on 
expenditure patterns is the volatility of the transfer, which has to do with how often 
households receive the specific transfer. In the case of the Old Age Pension and the 
Child Support Grant, these transfers are regular as they are received every month. 
Remittances, however, can vary in their volatility, as certain households receive them 
almost every month, whereas others receive them only a few times per year. To test that 
this difference in regularity does not affect the way remittances are spent, the variable 
"number of times per year the household receives remittances" was added to the 
regression (table 2.10). This variable does not turn out to be significant, which implies 
that the effect of remittances on expenditure is due to the transfer itself, and not to the 
fact that remittances are more irregular and unperdicatable than social protection 
benefits. In the case of social transfers, however, it is difficult to dissentangle whether 
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the frequency of payments affect expenditure behaviour, as transfers have always been 
regular. 
Another potential explanation of the expenditure behaviour of beneficiaries of social 
transfers is the fact that regular and predictable transfers can lead to a change in 
preferences, as households can afford to be more forward-looking and therefore willing 
to spend more money on non-necessities such as education (The Kenya CT-OVC 
Evaluation Team 2012). Moroever, as mentioned in the literature review, unearned 
income is expected to be spent differently that earned income (Christiaensen and Pan 
2012). If this is the case, the different spending patterns of social transfers and 
remittances as compared to sources of ‘earned’ income would be simply explained by 
the fact that social transfers and remittances are ‘unearned’ income. However, this would 
not explain the differences in expenditure patterns between remittances and social 
transfers observed in this paper. In addition, the findings from this study contradict 
previous evidence that unearned income is likely to be spent on pleasure goods, as I find 
that both social transfers and remittances are spent either on necessities or on human 
capital goods. 
Finally, another explanation for why transfers increase expenditure on certain goods is 
that expenditure elasticities can differ at different levels of expenditure (The Kenya CT-
OVC Evaluation Team 2012). In this case, controlling for total income would not be 
enough as the relationship between expenditure shares and income would be non-linear, 
and households below a certain threshold of income would make different expenditure 
decisions than households above that threshold. To check for this, I include in the 
regressions a binary variable which indicates if the household is poor based on the 
national per capital poverty line. Results stay very similar, however, and the variable 
indicating poverty status is not significant in any of the regressions (see table 2.11). 
Based on the above, there are reasons to conclude that transfers are spent differently 
than other sources of income due to the fact that income is not fungible and differences 
sources of income are perceived -and therefore spent- differently. Nevertheless, there 
are other explanations that cannot be ruled out in absence of baseline data or a random 
allocation of transfer beneficiaries. One is the fact that the regularity of social transfers 
can impact how transfers are spent through a change in preferences. Another 
explanation is that women spend income differently than men, and both social transfers 
and remittances are received mainly by women. There is recent evidence, however, that 
the impacts of social assistance are not determined by who in the household receives the 
transfer (see Hagen-Zanker et al. (2017) for a review of studies in this topic). 
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Table 2.9: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- controlling for recipient’s gender 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.02** 0.00** 0.00+ 0.00 0.01** -0.00+ 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.03** -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** -0.02** 0.01+ -0.02** 0.01+ -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out of  0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.02* -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.05** -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Remittance recipient-  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
female (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
CSG recipient-  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
female (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of adults -0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00* -0.00 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.01+ 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2008 0.04** -0.00* 0.01** -0.01** 0.01* 0.03** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.09** -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.70** -0.00 0.01 0.05** -0.03** 0.02 0.06** 0.15** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.10: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- controlling for frequency of payments 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total income -0.02** 0.00** 0.00+ 0.00 0.01** -0.00+ 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OPG out of  0.03** -0.01* 0.00 -0.01** -0.02** 0.01+ -0.02** 0.01+ -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out of  0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.02* -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 
total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.05** -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Frequency of  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of adults -0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00* -0.00 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.01+ 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2008 0.04** -0.00* 0.01** -0.01** 0.01* 0.03** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2010 0.09** -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.70** -0.00 0.00 0.05** -0.04** 0.02 0.06** 0.15** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.11: Effects of income and transfer amounts on expenditure patterns- controlling for poverty status 
 Share food Share clothes Share health Share alcohol 
and tobacco 
Share transport Share education Share leisure Share utilities Share other 
Log of total  -0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.01** -0.00+ 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 
income (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of OAP  0.03* -0.01* 0.00 -0.01* -0.02** 0.01* -0.02** 0.02* -0.00 
out of total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of CSG out 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.02* -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 
of total income (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of remittances 0.05** -0.01* -0.00 -0.02** -0.02** 0.02+ 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
out of total income (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of adults -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00+ -0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Urban formal -0.07** 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Urban informal -0.07** 0.00 0.00 -0.01+ 0.05** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 1 0.03** -0.00* 0.02** -0.01** 0.01** 0.03** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2 0.09** -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.04** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Poor 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.68** -0.01 0.01 0.05** -0.03* 0.03 0.06** 0.17** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 18940 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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2.6.2 Limitations 
Despite the richness of the National Income Dynamics Survey, some data limitations 
are present in this study. The NIDS dataset is a longitudinal survey that follows 
individuals -and not households- over time. For this reason, even if each individual 
interviewed in the survey has a unique identifier for the three years, households have 
different identifiers in each wave because individuals can move and change households 
from one year to the other. As this paper looks at expenditure patterns (which are 
defined at a household level), this study has been conducted at the household level, 
which means a unique household identifier had to be created based on the individuals 
who had the same household identifier in all three waves. The drawback of defining a 
household level unique identifier is that, due to the fact that this is a panel study, 
individuals who moved from one household to another in any of the years studied were 
assigned a new household identifier. This implies that for a specific year, one household 
may appear in the data as 2 different households when they are actually the same. The 
fact that this analysis has to be done at the household level also implies that weights can 
not be used, as panel weights are defined at the individual level and there are no 
household panel weights available. 
It is also important to point out that in this survey remittances are defined as any con-
tribution from non-resident members or non-household members. This means that, 
even though these transfers are associated typically with remittances sent by migrant 
workers (Posel 2016), this definition can include other contributions such as child 
maintenance payments. Given the history of temporary migration in South Africa, how-
ever, and the fact that migration has continued in the post-apartheid period and many 
families remain geographically divided (Posel 2016), one can expect a big percentage of 
these remittances to come from migrant workers. 
Another limitation that is present in most studies that look at expenditure is the possible 
measurement error. I try to account for this by excluding potential outliers and unreliable 
information (i.e. households who spend less than 1 percent of their budget on food, or 
more than 90 percent of their budget on leisure). After re-running the regressions, results 
from the main estimation hold. 
Finally, an additional reason why one should be careful with drawing strong conclusions 
regarding expenditure on education is that data on education was collected at the 
household level and households were asked about the amount spent on different 
educational categories during the month preceding the interview. This is problematic as 
educational expenditure is seasonal and not smooth over the calendar year, and the 
months in which interviews took place differ by wave (Branson, Kekana, and Lam 2013). 
This means that, for some households, part of the increase or decrease in educational 
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expenditure could be a result of having been interviewed in different months. Moreover, 
there is a big difference in educational expenditure by income quintiles, not only in terms 
of the total amount spent but also in terms of allocation of expenditure across different 
categories. While the richest households spend most of their educational budget on 
school fees, for poor households the highest burden are uniforms, as poor households 
are exempted from paying school fees. Furthermore, in the year 2006 the government 
announced the abolition of compulsory school fees based on the National Norms and 
Standards for School Funding (NNSSF) (Branson, Kekana, and Lam 2013). Considering 
that education has become more accessible for poor households, there could have been 
an improvement in educational outcomes even if households did not increase their 
expenditure on education. 
2.7 Discussion 
A common assumption in economics is that money is fungible. In other words, spending 
patterns are determined by the total amount of income, and not by its source. In line 
with the mental accounting theory, this paper hypothesised that households associate 
private transfers coming from a migrant differently than a public transfer received from 
the government, and that this can influence the way transfers are spent. By analysing the 
first nationally representative longitudinal survey in South Africa- covering the years 
2008, 2010 and 2012- some evidence is found that supports the mental accounting 
theory, as public and private transfers are not spent in the same way. 
Following the labelling effect hypothesis, it was anticipated that the Child Support Grant 
would benefit the child directly through an increase in household expenditure on child 
goods relative to other expenditure categories. Results show, with some caveats, that an 
increase in the Child Support Grant increases the share of expenditure on education, 
which means the Government is effectively targeting and delivering the message that the 
child support grant is meant to be spent on children and especially on child’s education. 
Moreover, after restricting the sample to certain population groups or regions in South 
Africa where both remittances and social transfers have higher coverage, I also find that 
the Child Support Grant increases the share of expenditure on food, which is also 
expected to translate into nutritional benefits for the beneficiaries. This finding is 
important to highlight, as it demonstrates the programme is achieving its intended 
outcomes even if the grant is unconditional. 
In the case of the Old Age Pension, it was hypothesised that pensions would not cause 
significant behavioural changes as pensions are mainly income replacement. Results 
seem to contradict expectations, as an increase in pension income leads to an increase 
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in the share spent on food, education, and utility bills, therefore improving child well-
being as well as the well-being of the household as a whole. In South Africa there is a 
structural unemployment problem as well as high wage inequality, and in many poor 
households the Old Age Pension is the main source of income. This may be the reason 
the hypothesis of this paper does not hold, as pensions may not be an income 
replacement but a new source of income when the pensioner reaches the retirement age. 
Regarding the expenditure behaviour of remittances and given the nature of migration 
in South Africa (mainly internal, low skilled, and temporary), it was expected that 
remittances would be used to cover basic households needs. Results support this 
hypothesis, as remittances increase expenditure on food and decrease the share of 
expenditure on other non-basic goods such as alcohol and tobacco and clothing. 
To conclude, this paper has shown that expenditure behaviour can depend on the source 
of income, and not only on the total income a household earns. This finding has 
important implications for public policy design, as the expected welfare impacts in a 
specific country may not only depend on the type of program or amount of a transfer, 
but also on the potential behavioural effect that this transfer can generate. As a result, it 
seems important to take into consideration how people perceive different sources of 
income as well as the explicit or implicit conditions attached to them when estimating 
the effects of private and public transfers on well-being. 
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“He thinks about the amount of the grant, try-
ing to ascertain its actual worth to a family of 
four. If people lived only by eating, this money 
would still be small.” 
‘Hunger Eats a Man’ – Nkosinathi Sithole 
 
“In a world of plenty, no one, not a single per-
son, should go hungry. But almost 1 billion still 
do not have enough to eat. I want to see an end 
to hunger everywhere within my lifetime.” 
Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-
General 
  
                                                        
15 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Stephen Devereux, currently under review in a  
journal. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Social protection is a set of instruments that aim to alleviate poverty and assist vulnerable 
people to manage risk (Barrientos 2013; World Bank 2012). Narrow approaches restrict 
the definition to public policy interventions, and frame social protection as a government 
responsibility towards citizens, who have a right to claim social assistance or social se-
curity from the state (ILO 2012). In this paper we favour a broader approach that in-
cludes private as well as public sources, following Brunori and O’Reilly (2010: 2): “social 
protection is generally described as the set of public and private mechanisms that protect 
and prevent individuals and households from suffering the worst consequences of 
shocks and stresses”. Specifically, we focus on publicly provided social grants (govern-
ment-to-person (G2P) transfers) and on privately provided remittances (transfers within 
extended families).  
In this paper, we examine and compare the impacts of social grants and remittances on 
one set of wellbeing outcomes, namely food security and nutrition, using South Africa 
as a case study. Food security is commonly understood as having access to sufficient 
food for a healthy, active life. It is a basic human need, and the right to food is enshrined 
in South Africa’s Constitution. Nutrition status, notably under nutrition, is an objective 
measure of food insecurity and hunger. 
Although several studies have looked at whether social grants or remittances improve 
food security and/or nutritional outcomes, few of them have looked in the same study 
at a comprehensive set of indicators of food security and nutrition. Moreover, to date 
and to the knowledge of the authors, there is no evaluation that considers the effects of 
both social grants and remittances on nutrition and food security. There are several fac-
tors that differ across transfers and may influence whether public transfers are more 
effective than private ones (or vice versa) in reducing food insecurity, such as the fre-
quency and regularity of the payments, the size of the transfers, and the use of the trans-
fers (how transfers are spent). Comparing public and private transfers can give us a better 
idea of the effectiveness of social protection programmes, as compared to private      
strategies such as sending informal transfers (remittances) to a family member living in 
a different location.  
South Africa makes an excellent case study for several reasons: its history of internal 
migration and the fact that many families have relied and still rely on remittances; its 
comprehensive social protection system which has become more extensive post-Apart-
heid; and the fact that levels of food insecurity (including malnutrition) have remained 
high despite many poor households being recipients of social grants and/or remittances 
(Hendriks 2014; Devereux and Waidler 2017). 
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The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the literature on the impacts 
of social grants as well as of remittances on food security and nutrition, both in South 
Africa and in other countries. The paper continues with a description of the data and 
indicators used in our analysis, followed by the empirical strategy used to estimate the 
impacts of remittances and social grants on food security and nutrition. Afterwards, we 
present the descriptive statistics and the findings, before explaining and discussing the 
results and, finally, concluding. 
3.2 Literature review 
Public income transfers (social grants) and private income transfers (remittances) are 
both expected to improve the food security of recipients, through direct as well as indi-
rect channels. The theory of change is that an increase in income will increase expendi-
ture on food, which translates into increases in food intake and dietary diversity. This 
effect will be larger in poor households, who tend to allocate most of any incremental 
income to food purchases, because of ‘Engel’s law’ – poorer people spend higher pro-
portions of their total income on food. Increased quantity and quality of food consump-
tion should improve the nutritional status of transfer recipients directly. Indirectly, if 
some incremental income is allocated to health care this can also positively affect nutri-
tion, because healthier people absorb and utilise nutrients more effectively (DFID 2011; 
Bailey and Hedlund 2012). 
Several factors, however, will influence the extent to which social grants and remittances 
improve food security outcomes, as well as whether different transfers affect the out-
comes differently. These factors include the frequency and regularity of the payments, 
the size of the transfers, and the use of the transfers (how transfers are spent) (Hagen-
Zanker and Himmelstine 2015). One may expect that the bigger the size of the transfer, 
the higher the poverty reduction effect – or, for our purposes, the higher the improve-
ment in food security. Moreover, regular and predictable transfers are expected to lead 
to better outcomes, as compared to infrequent or irregular payments (Daidone et al. 
2015). While social grants are usually regular and predictable, the frequency of remit-
tances depends highly on the economic situation of the sender. When remittances come 
mainly from poor households, “family members may not be in a position to provide 
assistance at the time it is required and payments may not always be received on time” 
(Thomson and Posel 2002). 
Regarding the use of the transfers, different transfers may be spent differently, and this 
will ultimately affect their poverty reduction impact. How recipients use the transfer can 
depend on the purposes for sending the transfers (or the aim of the social protection 
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programme in place); who is the intended beneficiary of the transfer (i.e. if the transfer 
targets children or other family members); and who is the recipient of the transfer (e.g. 
women compared to men). For example, a few studies have shown that transfers re-
ceived by women tend to have a higher poverty reduction impact as they have a higher 
propensity to be spent on basic needs like food (Duflo 2003). These factors (size of the 
transfer, regularity, sex of recipient, and intended use of the transfer) are context-spe-
cific, given that the characteristics of social protection transfers and remittances depend 
on the country studied. 
3.2.1 Effects of social grants on food security 
Numerous evaluations of public cash transfer programmes (CTPs) analyse their impact 
on self-reported food security indicators, while a smaller number of studies measure 
their impact on nutritional status (see Manley, Gitter and Slavchevska 2012; Bastagli et 
al. 2016), usually of children in grant receiving households. 
There is widespread evidence that cash transfers increase access to food and food con-
sumption, and reduce food insecurity. A review of the impacts of conditional cash trans-
fers on household food security in Mexico and Nicaragua found significant increases in 
per capita caloric availability, diet quality (consumption of vegetables, fruit and animal 
products) and dietary diversity (Hoddinott and Wiesmann 2010). An evaluation of the 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia found that food insecure house-
holds that received free cash or food transfers as unconditional ‘direct support’ for at 
least two years improved their food security – measured by the number of months that 
the household self-reports that it can meet its food needs – by 0.4 months a year. This 
effect was larger for households receiving larger transfers, reaching 2.5 months in some 
cases (Berhane et al. 2011: 82). 
Empirical evidence on nutritional impacts is more limited, more variable and more      
ambiguous than data on self-reported food security indicators. The Mchinji Social Cash 
Transfer Scheme in Malawi recorded a substantial fall in the proportion of children with 
stunted growth, from 55% to 46% in just one year, while the prevalence of stunting in 
control group households remained unchanged – a significant attributable impact (Miller 
et al. 2011). On the other hand, a randomised controlled trial in Zambia found that 
households receiving regular cash transfers from the Child Grant Programme increased 
their food expenditure, food consumption (meals per day) and dietary diversity, relative 
to a control group, but these positive food security impacts did not translate into im-
provements in children’s nutritional status for the full sample. However, stunting was 
significantly reduced for children with educated mothers and for children with access to 
clean water (Seidenfeld et al. 2014: 41). 
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A systematic review covering 15 cash transfer programmes in 10 countries found no 
consistent relationship between receiving cash transfers and child nutritional status. 
“Half of the programmes showed positive effects and half negative effects on weight for 
age, and the same is roughly true for weight for height z-scores” (Manley, Gitter and 
Slavchevska 2012: 43).16 Interestingly, that review finds no difference in nutritional out-
comes between conditional and unconditional cash transfers, no effect of larger payment 
sizes, and a positive but statistically insignificant effect of longer programme duration. 
The authors conclude by noting that: “almost every programme was associated with 
increased food consumption and/or food diversity, a positive development. However, 
we see no effects on nutritional status. Clearly improved access to food alone is not 
sufficient to improve nutritional status” (Manley, Gitter and Slavchevska 2012: 65). A 
more recent systematic review found that seven of 12 studies recorded a statistically 
significant increase in dietary diversity, and five of 13 studies found statistically signifi-
cant reductions in child stunting (an indicator of long-term deprivation), but only one 
study of five and one study of eight found reductions in child wasting (an indicator of 
short-term hunger) and underweight respectively (Bastagli et al. 2016). This is interesting 
as it suggests that regular cash transfers can reverse the effects of long-term nutritional 
deficits. 
Recently, holistic package approaches that deliver cash transfers together with other 
forms of support, such as health insurance, access to microfinance and behaviour change 
communication (BCC) – have demonstrated more powerful impacts than cash transfers 
alone (Roelen et al. 2017). One pilot project in Bangladesh found that a combination of 
‘cash + BCC’, where cash was complemented by nutrition training, performed signifi-
cantly better than when cash only, food only, cash + food or food + BCC was delivered. 
In households that received cash+BCC, child stunting rates fell by 7.3 percentage points, 
but no other modality registered a significant impact on child undernutrition (Ahmed et 
al. 2016: 158). 
3.2.2 Effects of remittances on food security 
Studies looking at the effects of remittances on food security focus mainly on nutritional 
outcomes, especially of children, and the evidence so far is inconclusive as studies find 
positive, negative, as well as no effects of remittances on nutrition. Looking at interna-
tional remittances (sent by migrants living abroad) and nutritional outcomes in Ecuador, 
Antón (2010) finds a positive impact on short-term and medium-term child nutritional 
                                                        
16 Stunting, measured by height-for-age z-scores (HAZ), is an indicator of long-term or chronic undernutrition. A 
child has stunted growth if her or his height is less than 2 standard deviations below the height of a child the same 
age in a reference population. Wasting, measured by weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ), is an indicator of short-
term weight loss and hunger. 
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outcomes, but no significant impact of remittances on long-run anthropometric indica-
tors. On the other hand, Ponce et al. (2011) – also in Ecuador and using a different 
instrumental variable technique – find no effect of remittances on nutrition. In Guate-
mala, Davis and Brazil (2016) show that international remittances have no influence on 
the nutritional status of children left behind (aged 3 or less), which could indicate that 
fathers are not able to improve their economic situation soon enough to make an impact 
on their children's nutrition. Finally, a panel study in Mexico shows that migration (in-
cluding remittances) has a detrimental effect on children’s height-for-age (Nobles 2007). 
Outside Latin America, Babatunde and Martinetti (2011) find that remittance income 
contributes to improved calorie supply at the household level in Nigeria, but has no 
significant impact on diet quality, micronutrients supply, and child nutritional status, 
while a recent study in Tanzania using an instrumental variable approach (Isotto and 
Kraybill 2017) show that remittances increase the intake of nutrients such as proteins, 
vitamin A, vitamin C and calcium. In Ethiopia, Abadi et al. (2013) find that migration 
and remittances improve food security by allowing households to consume better quality 
food, a higher quantity of food, as well as reducing the frequency and severity of harmful 
coping strategies such as limiting the quantity or quality of food consumed. In China, 
however, Brauw and Mu (2010) find no significant association between internal migra-
tion and the prevalence of underweight children. 
From the review of these studies we conclude that remittances, like social grants, are 
likely to improve food security (in terms of food consumption and the quality of food 
consumed). However, the impact of remittances on nutrition – which is a measure of 
long-term well-being– is more inconclusive, as positive effects of remittances on nutri-
tion are not always observed. Moreover, the discussion on internal remittances remains 
“virtually non-existent” (McKay and Deshingkar 2014: 5), with the exception of some 
studies which have shown that internal remittances usually flow to a large number of 
poor and rural households (Castalso et al. 2012; Housen et al. 2013) and have the poten-
tial to reduce poverty and build human capital (Adams 2007; Adams 2005; Lokshin et 
al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2005). Studies on internal remittances in middle income countries 
have shown that, while international remittances are more effective in decreasing pov-
erty, internal remittances have a more equalising effect as they are better targeted at poor 
households (Taylor et al. 2005). The reason for this is that costs of international migra-
tion are higher, and therefore international migrants do not originate from the poorest 
households, whereas internal migration is often more concentrated among poor families. 
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3.2.3 Comparing the effects of social grants and remittances 
To date and to the knowledge of the authors, there are no empirical studies that compare 
the effects of remittances and social grants on food security (including nutrition). There 
are, however, a few studies that look at the effects of social grants and remittances on 
other well-being indicators, such as health, income poverty and education. Hagen-
Zanker and Himmelstine (2015) summarises these studies, and conclude that in most of 
them both types of transfers have a positive impact on household wellbeing. When look-
ing at the magnitude of the impact, however, remittances appear to have a larger poverty 
reduction effect, most likely due to a higher level of the transfer and the fact that in these 
specific case studies remittances are better targeted at poor households. In addition, 
Waidler et al (2016) compare the effects of remittances and social grants on expenditure 
patterns in Moldova and conclude that public and private transfers are not spent in the 
same way. 
3.2.4 Social grants and remittances in South Africa 
Social Grants 
South Africa’s Department of Social Development (DSD) administers seven social 
grants, which target poor individuals from vulnerable demographic groups. The largest 
is the Child Support Grant (11.9 million beneficiaries), followed by the Older Person’s 
Grant (3.2 million)17 and the Disability Grant (1.7 million). The CSG is the least gener-
ous, paying R350 per child per month as of April 2016, while the OPG and DG pay 
R1,505/month (SASSA 2016). Between the years 2008 and 2012, eligibility for the CSG 
was increased from 14 years old in 2008, to 16 years old in 2010, and finally 18 years old 
in 2012. Almost one in three South Africans (30%) is currently a recipient of a social 
grant. 
There is evidence from several household surveys and impact evaluations that the nutri-
tion status of children in households receiving social grants has improved. A 1999 survey 
found that children living with Older Person’s Grant (OPG) recipients were significantly 
taller, by approximately one standard deviation in height-for-age (Case 2001). Analysis 
of a 1993 survey found an increase in height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) of 1.16 standard 
deviations for girls living with a female OPG recipient (usually the child’s grandmother), 
but a much smaller increase for boys, and no significant impact on HAZ for either boys 
or girls living with a male OAG recipient (Duflo 2003).18 
                                                        
17 Older Person’s Grant and Old Age Pension are often used interchangeably.  
18 The Old Age Grant has subsequently been renamed the Older Person’s Grant. 
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An analysis of a sub-national panel dataset, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
(KIDS), found a significant positive impact of the CSG on child stunting. Boys who 
started receiving the CSG in their first year gained 0.40 in HAZ by three years of age, 
compared to boys in the control group (Agüero, Carter and Woolard 2007). An impact 
evaluation of the CSG conducted in 2011 found no impact of the CSG on stunting 
across the full sample. “However, it improves anthropometric measures for two sub-
samples, girls and children whose mothers have eight or more grades of schooling” 
(DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2012). 
Finally, an analysis of the first wave of NIDS panel dataset by Coetzee (2013) found a 
significant but small impact of the Child Support Grant on child HAZ, amounting to 
just 0.04 of a standard deviation. “These effect sizes are much smaller than expected, 
given the relative size of the transfer in relation to the mean per capita household ex-
penditure of households in the sample” (Coetzee 2013: 429). 
These empirical findings suggest that the positive nutritional impacts on children of the 
Older Person’s Grant, which is intended to be spent on the basic needs of older persons, 
are consistently larger than the impacts of the Child Support Grant, which is ‘labelled’ 
as a transfer intended for children. One factor might be the fact that the OPG pays 
substantially more than the CSG, and large numbers of older persons in South Africa 
are caring for grandchildren, either orphaned or living with them while the child’s par-
ents are working or looking for work elsewhere – so the OAG becomes a main source 
of income and food security for both older persons and children. 
Remittances 
The most common form of human mobility in South Africa has been rural to urban 
migration (Crush et al. 2005), as rural areas are characterised by high levels of poverty 
and limited economic activity. During apartheid, movements of labour were mainly tem-
porary, due to the fact that the permanent settlement of migrants was highly restricted 
(Posel 2001). Following the democratic transition in 1994, this trend was not altered as 
expected, and migration remains cyclical, although the proportion of female temporary 
migrants has increased (Collinson 2010). Rural poverty in South Africa remains high at 
around 70 percent (Stats SA 2014) and, due to the fact that productive land has been 
highly concentrated among the white population, poor households in South Africa con-
tinue to rely on remittances to cover their daily needs (Posel and Casale 2006). Never-
theless, analysing the National Income Dynamics Survey of 2008, Posel (2009) points 
out that many labour migrants are settling in destination areas where they move, as well 
as ties between migrants and households of origin are weakening. This translates into a 
sharp decline in the number of households receiving remittances compared to statistics 
derived from previous household surveys. 
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There are no studies – to the knowledge of the authors – looking at the effects of remit-
tances on nutrition or food security in South Africa. There are some studies, however, 
that analyse the effects of remittances on poverty in post-apartheid South Africa.19 
Woolard and Klasen (2004) found in a study covering the years 1993 to 1998 that remit-
tances were associated with a decrease in poverty in KwaZulu-Natal, while Maitra and 
Ray (2003) showed that remittances have a significant positive impact on the share spent 
on food. According to Collinson (2010), temporary migration improves the socio-eco-
nomic status of the households, mainly through remittances. 
In households where remittances decrease poverty and expenditure on food increases, 
food security indicators are expected to improve. 
3.3 Data and indicators 
For this analysis, we use the National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS), South Africa’s 
first nationally representative panel survey that follows more than 28,000 individuals 
over time. The first round was conducted in 2008 and subsequent rounds were carried 
out in 2010, 2012 and 2014. NIDS captures data on the livelihoods of individuals and 
households and therefore collects information on a range of socio-economic variables, 
such as income, employment, expenditure, migration, shocks, education, and health. In 
this study, we use only rounds 1 and 2, as some of the indicators used in our analysis 
had a large number of missing values in round 3, and round 4 was not available at the 
time of the study. Data also suffer from attrition due to non-response and refusal. To 
account for household and individual level attrition we use post-stratification calibrated 
weights when reporting cross-section analysis and panel weights when reporting on the 
balanced panel. 
Income data in NIDS was collected individually by asking every adult from the house-
hold the amount they received per month from each income source (such as wage in-
come, bonus payments, income from self-employment, as well as social grants and re-
mittances). In the case of child grants (such as the Child Support Grant), adults were 
asked whether they received the specific grant on behalf of a child. Remittances are de-
fined in the NIDS survey as all contributions from non-resident members as well as 
non-household members. We define all income variables in per capita terms. Finally, 
income and expenditure variables were deflated to 2008 as the base period. Deflators 
were computed from CPI data taken from the South African statistical office (Stats SA). 
                                                        
19 Due to lack of nationally representative survey that can explore trends in migration, studies on migration and 
remittances in South Africa are limited. 
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Our outcome variables consist of three indicators of food security: total expenditure on 
food, dietary diversity, and body mass index. All three indicators are objective, as sub-
jective indicators were only available for the first round. 
Dietary Diversity Index 
Dietary diversity is considered one of the best performing measures of food security 
(Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002) and nutritional adequacy, including in South Africa 
(Steyn et al., 2006). The Household Dietary Diversity Score indicator guide identifies 
twelve food groups based on the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation’s 
Food Composition Table for Use in Africa (Ryan and Leibbrandt 2015).20 Following 
this reasoning, the food items listed in the NIDS dataset were grouped into 12 food 
groups, based on the FAO’s table: cereals, white tubers and roots, vegetables, fruits, 
meat, eggs, fish and other seafood, legumes, nuts and seeds, milk and milk products, oils 
and fats, sweets, and spices, condiments and beverages. 
Detailed data on expenditure was collected at the household level by asking the amount 
of money the household spent in the last month on each particular food item (as well as 
whether the household has consumed it or not). The period of food consumption in 
NIDS is the previous 30 days. While an increase in the number of food categories con-
sumed gives a good indication of improved food access and food security, there is no 
established threshold of the number of categories a household needs to consume to be 
defined as “food secure”. While the HDDS guide suggests taking the average diversity 
of the upper tercile, we follow Ryan and Leibbrandt (2015) using the same dataset and 
take average dietary diversity as a cut-off point (so that households below the average 
are considered food insecure). The main reason for this is that the average dietary diver-
sity index (DDI) score is as high as 9 in NIDS, probably due to the long recall period 
for consumption (which is one month, compared to the 24 hours recall period recom-
mended by the HDDS guide). 
Food expenditure 
Food expenditure is a common indicator of food security. The rationale is that house-
holds that spend a high proportion of their total expenditure on food are more vulner-
able than households that spend a lower proportion (Maxwell 1999; Johnson and Toole 
1991). This is because households that spend a large share of their income on food are 
more vulnerable to changes in food prices, as well as to changes in income. 
Despite the fact that food expenditure does not perfectly capture the quality or quantity 
of food consumed (as this depends on availability and prices, and it also does not capture 
                                                        
20 For more information on the food composition table, see: www.fao.org/docrep/003/X6877E00.htm. 
Social Grants, Remittances, and Food Security: Does the Source of Income Matter? 
83 
food produced for own consumption),21 food expenditure is still a useful measure to 
add to the analysis. The variable is defined as the household share of monthly food 
expenditure out of total expenditure. As suggested by Maxwell et al. (1999), a high food 
expenditure proportion is regarded as 60% and above, and these households are classi-
fied as food insecure. In this case, we only analyse the binary variable as the continuous 
one is difficult to interpret. 
Anthropometrics 
We calculate the BMI for children aged 6 to 14 years, as well as for adults (above 14 
years old). We analyse these two samples separately, as the BMI of adults is more likely 
to remain relatively constant over time. BMI is calculated as weight divided by height 
squared and it is derived from the anthropometric data collected in the adult and child 
individual surveys. Children who have a BMI less than 2 standard deviations below the 
median BMI for the reference group are classified as undernourished (Dinsdale et al. 
2011). The classification of adults is less complex, with one threshold applied to all in-
dividuals over the age of 14. A BMI below 18.5 is identified as underweight and a BMI 
above 24.9 is identified as overweight. 
Although anthropometric data was available for children under 5 and we were able to 
create the indicators for stunted and wasted (based on the z-scores for height-for-age 
and weight-for-height respectively), in the second round of the survey many children 
had missing values for these variables and therefore it was not possible to analyse nutri-
tion with panel estimators for this age group. 
3.4 Empirical strategy 
We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data and estimate the relationship 
between transfers and food security via fixed effects regression. We also perform ran-
dom effects and Mundlak estimations for robustness, given that some variables do not 
change considerably over time.22 The Hausman test, however, always recommends the 
use of fixed effects regressions. In the case of the dietary diversity index, we estimate 
                                                        
21 Data on food consumption from own production in South Africa is inadequate and not credible. The assumption 
we would have to make, therefore, is that the vast majority of those involved in agriculture fail to consume anything 
from their farming (approximately 16 to 20 percent of the households based on the Labour Force Survey). This is 
unlikely given that, of those households who report to the LFS that they practice agriculture, most do so for the 
main purpose of food production for own consumption.” (Aliber, 2009: 399). Not including food for own produc-
tion in the analysis is, therefore, a limitation. 
22 The Mundlak approach allows correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the regressors by adding 
group means of the time varying explanatory variables in the model. The advantage of this method, as opposed to 
fixed effects estimation, is that one can estimate the coefficients of the time invariant variables.  
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random effects ordered probit regression (in addition to the linear fixed effects regres-
sion) as it is an interval variable and can only take 12 values, from 1 to 12. 
Fixed effects regressions allow us to remove unobserved time invariant heterogeneity, 
which is very likely to be present in this study. Personal or household characteristics that 
are unobserved, like for example eating habits, are likely to affect food security outcomes 
and at the same time be correlated with the independent variables, therefore causing 
estimation bias. However, as it seems plausible to assume these variables stay constant 
over time, we can remove this bias by introducing individual fixed effects. The model 
can be expressed as follows: 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1log (𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 log  (𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 log  (𝑂𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where FS are the different food security outcome indicators. The coefficients of interest 
are the CSG, OPG, and remittances which denote per capita monthly income (in Rands) 
from the Child Support Grant, Older Person’s Grant and remittances, respectively.23 
The HH term refers to various household characteristics that can change over time, such 
as number of adults and children living in the household, maximum level of education 
attained in the household, and whether the household is located in a rural, urban formal, 
or informal area.24 Y denotes the year fixed effects (in this case 2008) and 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 refers 
to the error term which in this case is divided into two terms: 𝛼𝑖 is the time invariant 
error (the individual fixed effect) and  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the time variant error, which is assumed to 
be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
As we are not only interested in analysing how transfers affect the continuous outcomes 
(values of BMI and DDI), but also how transfers affect the probability of being food 
secure (being neither underweight nor overweight in the case of adults, and having an 
above average DDI in the case of the whole household), we estimate fixed effects (con-
ditional) logits to see how an increase in the Older Person’s Grant, remittances, and 
Child Support Grant changes the odds of being food secure.25 In this case equation (1) 
remains the same with the only difference being that the dependent variable is replaced 
by the binary measures of food security. 
Given that both social transfers and remittances are not randomly assigned to recipients, 
the model can still suffer from endogeneity if there are omitted variables that are time 
variant and affect both the treatment and the outcome. For instance, if there is a shock 
                                                        
23 In order to have non-negative logarithms of income from the different transfers, we add 1 Rand (local currency) 
to the whole income distribution. 
24 Due to the fact that NIDS follows individuals and not households, some individuals can move to another house-
holds (and therefore change location) from one wave to the other. 
25 We could not look at BMI for children (probability of being nourished) as there were not enough individuals who 
changed their outcome (from being under-nourished to nourished or vice versa) from one year to the other. 
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that causes a change in food security outcomes and, at the same time, generates a re-
sponse in the remitter or the government by increasing or decreasing transfers, our co-
efficients may be biased. In the absence of a proper instrument for the three transfers 
(Child Support Grant, Older Person’s Grant and remittances), we perform the estima-
tions separately for different population groups to test for heterogeneity in effects. We 
re-estimate the model by: (1) restricting the sample to the African population in order 
to compare public and private transfer within a more homogenous group; and (2) re-
stricting the sample to households that receive social transfers (and that can or cannot 
receive remittances).  
As an additional robustness check and to better correct for potential endogeneity, we 
implement some standard tools of policy evaluation and look at the effects of each trans-
fer separately. The reason why we do not analyse all three transfers in the same model is 
that, in order to implement quasi-experimental techniques such as propensity score 
matching or instrumental variable estimation (in cases where an instrument is available), 
we can only analyse one treatment at a time. 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows descriptive information on the percentage of individuals living in house-
holds receiving the Older Person’s Grant (OPG), the Child Support Grant (CSG), and 
remittances – as well as combinations of these – and no transfers. Almost 50 percent of 
the South African population receives either a poverty-related government transfer 
(CSG or OPG) or private transfers (remittances). The CSG is the transfer with the high-
est coverage, reaching more than 40 percent of individuals (30 percent of which do not 
receive either of the other two transfers). Of those individuals living in households re-
ceiving the OPG, more than half also receive the CSG, which is consistent with evidence 
of a high number of multi-generational households in South Africa and with elderly 
individuals pooling their income and living with children. The number of households 
relying only on remittances is low and has been decreasing over time (Posel and Casale, 
2006; Posel 2009), and this can be seen in table 3.1 with only 1.8 percent of individuals 
living in households receiving remittances in 2010 (compared with 5.7 in 2008). 
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Table 3.1: Economic characteristics by transfer recipient status 
 Only OPG Only CSG Only Remittances Remit & CSG Remit & OPG OPG & CSG Remit & OPG & 
CSG 
No transfers 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 
% individuals in 
households receiving 
transfers 
6.5 9.8 26.3 28.9 5.7 1.8 5.3 2.1 1.2 0.4 7.1 10.4 1.2 0.6 46.8 46.1 
Average amount 
received (hh level) (real 
2008 prices) 
1041 1154 431 510 2377 653 1005 1523 1103 1649 1555 1697 2086 2202 - - 
Average pc income 
before transfers (real) 
400 446 277 463 1570 1073 312 435 351 245 136 296 105 315 - - 
Average pc income 
after transfers (real) 
678 731 355 553 2359 1336 489 699 676 553 342 504 371 609 2552 3008 
% of total hh income 
the grant represents 
73% 59% 49% 41% 52% 12% 56% 52% 70% 68% 71% 62% 78% 49% - - 
N 2508 3027 7506 6892 1396 404 1684 540 399 170 2547 3068 560 221 10262 12540 
Source: Authors’ calculations, NIDS 2008 and NIDS 2010. Post-stratification calibrated weights are applied. 
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In terms of the average amount received in recipient households, in 2008 remittances 
were much higher in magnitude than government transfers. However, remittances do not 
only reach poor families (this is consistent with the findings from Collinson (2010)), and 
the high average is mainly the result of high-income households receiving large amounts 
of remittances (see figure 3.1 below). It is also important to point out that in this survey 
remittances are defined as “any contribution from non-resident members or non-house-
hold members”, which means that not only transfers from migrants are included, but also 
other contributions such as child maintenance payments, payments to an elderly person 
living in another households or to a child studying in another city. The average amount 
received from the OPG is more than doubles the amount received from the CSG: the 
value of the OPG is actually almost four times the value of the CSG, but there are many 
households with more than one child receiving the CSG.  
When looking at the average per capita income before transfers, one can see that in the 
year 2008, households that rely on all three transfers are by far the poorest and house-
holds that only receive remittances are the richest (in the latter case average income is 
similar to households receiving no transfers). In 2010 remittance recipient households 
are also the richest but those that receive remittances and the OPG, or both the OPG 
and CSG and no remittances are slightly poorer that those receiving the three transfers. 
This can be due to the fact that those receiving all three transfers decreased by half in 
2010 due to a big decrease in the number of households receiving remittances. It is 
curious to see that remittances reach both rich and poor households, but when it reaches 
poor households they often complement or are complemented by government transfers. 
One explanation could be that social transfers enable household members to go to the 
city and look for a job in order to send money back home (Sienaert 2008; Ardington et 
al. 2009). Finally, the last row shows the percentage of income that each grant represents, 
on average, in recipient households. Households that receive transfers rely highly on 
them, as generally more than 50 percent of per capita income comes from transfers, 
reaching 78 percent in households receiving all three transfers (the CSG, the OPG, and 
remittances). 
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of (a) the CSG, (b) remittances, and (c) the OPG by 
expenditure decile. It shows that the CSG is relatively effective in targeting poor house-
holds. It is evident that households in the lower deciles of expenditure are more likely 
to receive – as well as to receive larger amounts of – the CSG. The lowest expenditure 
decile does not reflect this trend, which could be due to the fact that there are fewer 
children in this decile, or that very poor households do not apply for the grant due to 
lack of information or resources.26 The opposite occurs with remittances, as richer 
                                                        
26 Very poor households may be discouraged to apply if they lack the necessary documents, have to travel far away 
to apply for the grant or as a result of less motivated caregivers. 
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households receive larger amounts on average. One explanation for this could be that 
richer households are in a better position to send remittances, but one could also spec-
ulate that there is a (positive) displacement effect, where remittances between poor peo-
ple are being crowded out by public transfers, as some qualitative evidence points out 
(Du Toit and Neves 2009). 
The way transfers are targeted will determine their poverty reduction impact. As remit-
tances have been decreasing in size, and a relatively large proportion of them go to 
wealthier households, we do not expect to see a big impact of remittances on food se-
curity. At the same time, the amount of the CSG is too small to have a sizeable impact, 
even on basic needs. The OPG lies in between (figure 3.1c) – despite being weakly tar-
geted, it is big enough to have an effect on food security. The drawback is that only 
households with elderly individuals benefit from this transfer. 
In terms of frequency, social transfers are received monthly, whereas remittances are 
also received relatively frequently, with a median of 10 times per year in recipient house-
holds. Therefore, both private and public transfers are received regularly. However, re-
mittances can decrease considerably during a crisis or with an idiosyncratic shock to the 
sender, thereby reducing the poverty reduction impact of remittances. Regarding the sex 
of the recipient, child grants are mainly received by women (97 percent in 2008 and 95 
percent in 2010), whereas in the case of remittances the proportion of female recipients 
is lower but still very high (78 and 80 percent in 2008 and 2010, respectively). The deci-
sion on how money is spent may not only depend on who receives the transfer, though, 
but on who is the head of the household (which is self-defined in the survey). In this 
regard, 67.7 percent of remittance recipient households, 63.3 percent of CSG recipient 
households, and 67.5 percent of OPG recipient households are headed by a female. 
Given that there are no big differences between public and private transfer recipients in 
terms of who the head of the household is or who the recipient of grants is, we do not 
expect differences in impacts between public and private transfers to be driven by this 
factor.  
Finally, the way households spend each specific grant and who benefits from them will 
depend on whether transfers are sent with a specific purpose and on the population 
group the transfer is targeting. The CSG is targeted at children and there is a clear mes-
sage from the government that the grant is intended to improve children’s well-being, 
including nutrition and access to education.27 In the case of the OPG, even though the 
grant is targeted at elderly individuals, there is evidence that older persons usually live in 
households with children and pool their income to help all members of the household, 
in particular children (Case 2001; Lloyd-Sherlock 2012; Menendez 2007). Consequently, 
                                                        
27 In fact the CSG has school attendance conditionality but in practice this is not enforced. 
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we expect a positive effect of the CSG on children’s food security, and of the OPG on 
children as well as on adults’ food security (also due to the fact that the OPG is larger in 
size as compared to other transfers). In the case of remittances, we only expect to see 
improvements in food security in poor households, as richer ones are expected to be 
food secure. For poor households, remittances are a household level transfer which is 
expected to be poverty reducing, as evidence from internal remittances points out 
(Castalso et al. 2012; Housen et al. 2013). However, the extent of the improvement will 
depend on how the money is distributed among household members, and whether trans-
fers are big enough to cover basic needs. 
 
a) Per capita CSG  
 
b) Per capita remittances 
  
c) Per capita OPG 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Per capita income from social grants and remittances by expenditure deciles (whole sample) 
Source: NIDS 2008 
 
Table 3.2 shows food security outcomes across the different transfer recipient groups. 
Results are generally consistent across groups, meaning that when we compare the dif-
ferent food security indicators the ranking holds: households that receive no transfers 
or only remittances are better off, followed by those receiving remittances and either the 
CSG or the OPG. This group is followed by households receiving only the OPG, only 
the CSG, both the OPG and the Child Support Grant and finally by households receiv-
ing all three grants, which are in general the most food insecure.   
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Table 3.2: Food security outcomes by recipient status 
 
 
Only OPG Only CSG Only 
remittances 
Remit & CSG Remit & OPG OPG & CSG Remit & OPG & 
CSG 
No transfers 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Food adequacy               
DDI (>8) (in%) 64.1 72.1 61.8 66.8 77.6 69.0 74.1 81.7 65.8 77.8 59.5 71.2 60.8 77.5 78.4 77.6 
Average DDI 9.16 9.48 8.94 9.26 9.94 9.61 9.71 10.2 9.19 9.92 8.98 9.45 9.04 9.82 10.0 9.96 
Average share spent 
on food 
0.41 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.31 0.31 
Expenditure on 
food>60% (in %) 
16.2 19.5 16.3 19.5 7.7 15.0 15.5 16.0 16.0 35.0 19.5 27.1 24.0 20.0 9.4 8.8 
Nutrition (in %)                
Underweight (BMI 
adults) 
8.7 8.2 8.2 7.5 7.9 9.7 9.3 9.6 7.2 3.4 9.1 5.1 12.6 2.1 6.2 6.8 
Overweight (BMI 
adults) 
46.9 52.1 44.7 51.1 43.5 41.2 46.5 40.4 45.2 53.8 46.7 53.1 41.5 51.2 49.9 51.0 
Obese (BMI adults) 26.7 27.8 24.6 28.7 18.3 19.5 23.5 32.8 27.3 22.9 25.3 30.1 20.8 23.3 24.7 28.1 
Nourished (Children 
5-14) 
95.3 98.2 92.8 95.1 94.8 97.2 92 95.5 100 93.7 95.1 95.2 86.4 100 94.5 96.5 
Subjective indicators (in %)               
Child hungry 28.4 - 23.8 - 12.8 - 13.8 - 26.4 - 25.6 - 27.0 - 12.2 - 
Adult hungry 31.6 - 30.7 - 19.5 - 19.9 - 28.5 - 32.7 - 30.5 - 15.2 - 
Food adequate for 
hh needs 
57.2 - 54.2 - 71.1 - 55.3 - 54.4 - 49.7 - 46.1 - 69.9 - 
Source: Authors’ calculations, NIDS 2008 and NIDS 2010. Post-stratification calibrated weights are applied. 
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3.6 Results 
For the econometric analysis, we look at three continuous indicators of food security 
(dietary diversity and body mass index for adults and for children), and four binary indi-
cators, expressed as the odds of being food secure in terms of dietary diversity (DDI 
higher than 8) and food expenditure (spending less than 60 percent of total expenditure 
on food); being not underweight (BMI>18.5); and being not overweight (BMI<24.9) (in 
both cases for adults older than 14 years old).28 We do not estimate the regressions using 
the share of food expenditure as a continuous variable given that results are hard to 
interpret, as an increase in the share spent on food can be considered a positive outcome 
if the household is poor but richer households spend a lower share of their income on 
food. Table 3.3 shows the fixed effects and the random effects ordered probit results 
when the dietary diversity index is the dependent variable. Looking at table 3.3, while we 
do not see significant impacts of the Child Support Grant, the Older Person’s Grant is 
positive and significant in all specifications. Remittances are also positive and significant; 
although lower in magnitude as compared to the OPG. To have a clearer idea of the 
magnitude of the coefficients, we can look at the results of the random effects ordered 
probit regressions (expressed in average marginal effects in table 3.4). For this we have 
re-classified the DDI in 9 categories (from 4 to 12), as very few individuals have a DDI 
lower than 4. The regression shows that recipients of the Older Person's Grant as well 
as remittances have higher probabilities of having a higher DDI. For example, an in-
crease of 10% in both per capita remittances and the OPG increases the probability of 
having a DDI of 12 by 0.1 percent (or is associated with being 0.1% more likely to have 
a DDI of 12). 
There are several explanations for why we see a positive impact of the OPG but not of 
the CSG. First, as mentioned earlier, the OPG is approximately four times the size of 
the CSG, so it is to be expected that this grant will have a larger impact on household 
food security. Another reason is that the DDI identifies well-being at a household level, 
and we expect a higher effect from the OPG given that this grant is usually pooled and 
benefits the whole household. In addition, as discussed in Devereux and Waidler (2017), 
there is evidence that the CSG is being “diluted” in terms of what it is spent on, as poor 
households have needs other than food as well as recipients of the transfer –caregivers 
of children, many of whom are teenagers- may be spending the grant on goods that do 
not benefit their children directly. Finally, remittance income is also a household level 
transfer which is often spent on food (as shown in Chapter 2), so these results are con-
sistent with previous evidence from South Africa (Maitra and Ray 2003).  
                                                        
28 We could not estimate conditional logits for child bmi (probability of being nourished) as the sample was very 
small (very few individuals had changed from being nourished to unnourished and vice versa. 
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With regard to the effects of transfers on BMI (tables 3.5 and 3.6), we do not observe 
any significant impact of either public or private transfers on nutrition. Although the 
random effects models show a negative effect of the OPG on adults BMI, this significant 
effect disappears when we estimate Mundlak regression. This is likely caused by a nega-
tive selection into social protection transfers, where individuals with worse nutritional 
outcomes are more likely to receive transfers from the government. Once we account 
for this by removing the correlation between the error term and time invariant variables 
-through Mundlak or fixed effects models-, coefficients are no longer significant.  
Finally, table 3.7 shows the conditional logit expressed in odds ratios when food security 
indicators are expressed as binary variables. Results are consistent with the fixed effects 
regression, as we only see significant impacts in the case of DDI: an increase in one rand 
of per capita OPG and remittances increases the odds of being food secure by 0.05 
percent. We do not see significant effects when we analyse the odds of being not over-
weight, not underweight, and food secure in terms of share of expenditure on food. 
Table 3.3: Fixed Effects regressions – Effect of transfers on Dietary Diversity Index 
 Fixed effects Random effects ordered probit 
 DDI 
Whole sample 
DDI 
African sample 
DDI 
Grant recipients 
DDI  Whole sample 
Log of CSG 0.02 0.04* 0.06+ -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log of OPG 0.11** 0.12** 0.20** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log of remittances 0.08** 
(0.02) 
0.09** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.00) 
Observations 38936 32312 24731 38711 
Within R2 0.01 0.02 0.04  
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Panel weights are used and full models are shown in 
appendix; Control variables include household size and composition, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal 
areas, year, and maximum level of education attained in the household. The random effects ordered probit also 
controls for gender of household head, age of the eldest member of the household, race, location (province), hous-
ing and living conditions, and number of household members employed. 
  
Social Grants, Remittances, and Food Security: Does the Source of Income Matter? 
93 
Table 3.4: Marginal effects of transfers on Dietary Diversity Index- Random Effects Ordered Probit (whole sample) 
 DDI 
1-4 
DDI 5 DDI 6 DDI 7 DDI 8 DDI 9 DDI 10 DDI 11 DDI 
12 
Log of CSG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of OPG -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** 0.000** 0.004** 0.010** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** 0.000** 0.004** 0.010** 
Remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses; +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
Table 3.5: Fixed Effects regressions – Effect of transfers on adult BMI 
 Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak 
 BMI adults 
Whole sample 
BMI adults 
African sample 
BMI adults 
Grant recipients 
BMI adults  
Whole sample 
BMI adults  
Whole sample 
Log of CSG -0.03 -0.04 0.21** 0.00 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) 
Log of OPG 0.02 0.01 0.20** -0.07** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log of  -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
Remittances (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 16700 14233 10132 16700 16700 
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06   
Overall R2    0.16 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Panel weights are used and full models are shown in 
appendix; Control variables include household size and composition, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal 
areas, year, and maximum level of education attained in the household. Random and Mundlak estimations also 
control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of household members employed, and 
age of the eldest member of the household. 
Table 3.6: Fixed Effects regressions – Effect of transfers on children BMI 
 Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak 
 BMI child 
Whole sample 
BMI child 
African sample 
BMI child 
Grant recipients 
BMI child Whole 
sample 
BMI child Whole 
sample 
Log of CSG -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log of OPG 0.05 0.06+ 0.06 0.01 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log of 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Remittances (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 3908 3475 2875 3798 3798 
WithinR2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses; +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p< 0.01; Panel weights are used and full models are shown in 
appendix; Control variables include household size and composition, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal 
areas, year, and maximum level of education attained in the household. Random and Mundlak estimations also 
control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of household members employed, age 
of the eldest member of the household and characteristics of the child that can influence their nutritional status 
(whether the mother is alive, and subjective health status).  
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Table 3.7: Conditional logits – Odds ratios of being food secure, not underweight, not overweight 
 Food secure  
(DDI) 
Food secure  
(expenditure) 
Not underweight Not overweight 
Log of CSG 1.02 1.00 0.97 1.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Log of OPG 1.05** 1.02 1.03 1.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Log of  1.05** 1.01 1.08+ 0.98 
Remittances (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Observations 15480 11734 1652 3842 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.02 0.067 0.064 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Full models shown in ap-
pendix; Control variables include household size and composition, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal 
areas, year, and maximum level of education attained in the household. 
3.6.1 Endogeneity concerns: additional estimations 
Given that our data does not cover pre-program outcomes, and that selection into treat-
ment (receiving remittances and social protection transfers) is not random, our study 
could still suffer from endogeneity bias due to omitted -time varying- variables.29 An 
even more problematic bias could be caused by reverse causality, which would arise if 
the level of food security and nutrition of individuals determines whether they receive 
remittances or social assistance transfers. As robustness tests, therefore, and based on 
data availability and transfers’ characteristics, we perform some additional standard 
methods of policy evaluation, namely propensity score matching and instrumental vari-
able estimation. Given that we cannot apply the same econometric technique to analyse 
all three transfers, we estimate the effects of each transfer separately. Another reason 
why we cannot estimate them together is the fact that beneficiaries of remittances, OPG, 
and CSG have different characteristics, which means their correspondent control groups 
will also be different. 
In the case of the Older Person’s Grant, we are able to instrument pension receipt with 
age eligibility, given that 80 percent of age eligible individuals in South Africa receive the 
pension. This instrument has been used in other papers studying the impacts of this 
transfer (see, for example, Standish-White and Finn (2015)). The second-stage instru-
mental variable (IV) results are shown in the table below, and confirm our findings that 
pension income improves food security (the dietary diversity index), but has no effect 
on nutrition. This holds when we analyse the continuous variable (amount received), as 
well as when estimating the effects of receiving or not receiving the grant (binary varia-
ble).  
                                                        
29Although in the previous section we performed sub-sample analysis to attempt to overcome this limitation, re-
stricting the sample to specific groups threatens the external validity of the study. 
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Table 3.8: Fixed effects IV estimates of the effects of the Older Person’s Grant on DDI and nutrition 
 DDI BMI adults BMI children 
Receives OPG 0.63*** 
(0.13) 
0.20 
(0.35) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
Observations 38936 16700 3908 
F statistic first stage 583 249 66 
Log of OPG 0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Observations 38936 16700 3908 
F statistic first stage 563 243 64 
Standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; control variables and first-stage regression omitted.  
 
In the case of the Child Support Grant, we rely on matching techniques. In the absence 
of a good instrument, other studies such as Coetzee (2013) and DSD, SASSA and 
UNICEF (2012) have used this technique to estimate the effects of the CSG on different 
well-being indicators. To estimate the treatment, we use variables that influence the 
probability that an individual lives in a grant recipient household, but are unlikely to be 
affected by the outcome, such as place of residence, race, housing conditions, and the 
number of age-eligible children in the household. All the estimations shown below sat-
isfy the balancing property (meaning that differences in covariates between treated and 
control individuals are not significant after matching), and post-estimation tests indicate 
that the matching is done correctly.30 We perform two different matching techniques: 
radius matching, and nearest neighbour matching based on the three closest neigh-
bours.31 
Table 3.9 below shows the average treatment effects of the Child Support Grant on food 
security and nutrition. Again, we see that the Child Support Grant has no effect on food 
security (measured through the dietary diversity index), given that the t-statistic is less 
than 1.96 when performing both radius matching as well as nearest neighbour matching. 
The effects on adults’ BMI are also insignificant. However, when estimating the effects 
on BMI for children -and as opposed to the estimations shown in the previous sub-
section- we observe a positive effect of the CSG. Receiving the Child Support Grant 
leads, on average, to a 0.39 or 0.50 standard deviations increase in the body mass index 
depending on the matching technique used. The magnitude of this effect is quite con-
siderable given the distribution of this variable (see table A3.1). 
                                                        
30 The regression to estimate the propensity score as well as the post-estimation tests are shown in the appendix. 
31 Nearest neighbour matches a treated participant with its closest non-treated participant (or, in our case, with the 
3 closest non-participants), whereas radius matching combines nearest neighbour matching with caliper matching. 
Caliper matching imposes a restriction of a maximum permitted distance between the neighbours (avoiding in this 
way matching participants whose absolute propensity score difference is high). 
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Although results should be interpreted with caution given that we cannot use baseline 
characteristics to estimate the probability of receiving the Child Support Grant32, and 
that propensity score matching only controls for selection on observables, the advantage 
of this technique is that it allows us to create a proper counterfactual of non-participants 
and get an unbiased estimation of the effects of this programme, provided all assump-
tions hold. This may be the reason why findings differ with respect to our previous 
estimations, and why we now observe positive effects of the CSG. These positive effects 
on child nutrition are in line with previous evaluations of the Child Support Grant (see, 
for example, Coetzee (2013) and DSD, SASSA and UNICEF (2012)).  
Although some studies have found positive effects of the Child Support Grant on spe-
cific nutritional indicators, a review of the literature indicates that the levels of malnutri-
tion in South Africa have not declined, or are declining very slowly, as the proportion of 
stunted children in South Africa has fluctuated between 20% and 30% since the early 
1990s (various sources, discussed in Devereux and Waidler 2016). The next section, 
therefore, discusses why we think this is the case. 
With regard to remittances, it was not possible to find a good instrument or to imple-
ment propensity score matching, given that covariates that would be expected to influ-
ence the probability of receiving remittances did not turn out to be good predictors of 
treatment status. However, this also means that the estimation of the effects of remit-
tances is less likely to suffer from endogeneity bias, as recipients and non-recipients do 
not differ, on average, on some main socio-demographic characteristics. One possible 
explanation for this is that remittances can be received from both household and non-
household members, and therefore senders have different characteristics and send re-
mittances for different purposes. In addition, not all remittances are sent by migrant 
household members, and this lowers the likelihood of reverse causality. Assuming that, 
in fact, there is reverse causality, we would expect this endogeneity to lead to downward 
bias, given that migrants are more likely to be negatively selected in terms of income and 
education, which would imply that remittance recipient households are, in general, less 
food secure on average (Jacobs and du Plessis 2016). This would also imply that the 
effects of remittances found in this paper would be under-estimated. 
  
                                                        
32 For the propensity score matching assumptions to be satisfied, potential outcomes should be independent of 
treatment assignment. Therefore, in an ideal case, we would use baseline characteristics of individuals (which pre-
date the start of the programme), to estimate the probability of receiving the grant. 
Social Grants, Remittances, and Food Security: Does the Source of Income Matter? 
97 
Table 3.9: Average treatment effects of the Child Support Grant on DDI and nutrition (pooled sample from 2008 
and 2010) 
 ATT SE t-statistic Observations 
DDI     
Radius matching 0.24 0.29 0.82 38606 
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.14 0.17 0.82 38606 
BMI adults     
Radius matching 0.59 0.82 0.71 16512 
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.71 0.51 1.40 16512 
BMI children     
Radius matching 0.50 0.23 2.18 3861 
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.39 0.15 2.63 3861 
Source: authors’ calculations based on NIDS 2008 and 2010. Coefficients of the average treatment effects on the 
treated which are significant are highlighted in bold. 
3.7 Discussion: why are social grants failing to improve nutrition 
outcomes in South Africa, or why is their effect not bigger? 
Empirical evidence points to a paradox in South Africa: self-reported indicators of food 
insecurity are falling, but indicators of malnutrition are not, or are falling much slower. 
In the 1990s, responses to the question “In the past year, was there ever a time when 
you could not afford to feed the children in the household?” in national annual house-
hold surveys displayed a steady decline (i.e. improvement), from 41% in 1994 to 31% in 
1998 (Aliber 2009). In the 2000s, this positive trend continued. Responses in national 
annual household surveys to a slightly different question – “In the past 12 months, did 
any child in this household go hungry because there wasn’t enough food?” – registered 
a decline from 24% in 2002 to 11% in 2012 (Hendriks 2014). 
However, these self-reported indicators are not confirmed when children’s nutrition sta-
tus is measured anthropometrically. The proportion of stunted children in South Africa 
has fluctuated between 20% and 30% since the early 1990s. The highest rate of 28% was 
recorded in 2003 and the lowest rate of 20.9% was recorded in 2012, but stunting rates 
were almost identical in 1993 and 2008, at 24.5% and 24.6% respectively, and the second 
lowest rate of 21.6% was recorded in 1999 (various sources, discussed in Devereux and 
Waidler, 2016).33 
Both sets of indicators pre-date the introduction of the Child Support Grant in 1998 
and both reveal no clear association between social grants and either food security or 
nutrition outcomes. Self-reported food security was already improving for children be-
                                                        
33 These figures are not directly comparable, as different sampling frames and age cohorts were used. 
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fore the CSG was introduced, and children’s nutrition status has not improved signifi-
cantly since the CSG was introduced. This is surprising for two reasons. Firstly, the 
number of poor and food insecure children reached by the CSG has increased dramati-
cally since 1998, from just 34,000 children under 7 years old in 1998 to more than 11 
million children up to 18 years of age in 2013 (Beukes et al. 2015). In 2012, social grants 
made the single largest contribution to income in poor households (42%), more than 
wages (32%) (Stats SA 2012). 
There are several reasons why social grants are failing to significantly reduce malnutrition 
in South Africa (discussed more in detail in Devereux and Waidler (2017)). First, alt-
hough social grants in South Africa are relatively generous in comparison with cash 
transfer programmes in other countries, they are not sufficient to meet nutritional needs, 
as food prices are rising and social grants are not index-linked (e.g. the annual increment 
of the Child Support Grant is typically a modest R10 or R20, irrespective of inflation 
rates). Two other important reasons are dilution among other individuals and other cash 
needs, and deductions made by service providers, sometimes illegally. Regarding the for-
mer, social grants targeted at individuals rather than households face being ‘diluted’ in 
two ways: firstly, in terms of who they are spent on, and secondly in terms of what they 
are spent on. Both forms of dilution can reduce the impacts on the intended beneficiar-
ies. A qualitative evaluation of the CSG confirmed that the CSG cash is used for a di-
verse range of food and non-food needs by recipients (DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 
2011). In terms of the latter, the Department of Social Development (DSD) introduced 
a payment system for social grants that uses bank accounts and SASSA payment cards 
– rather than manual disbursement of cash transfers – for several reasons, including: to 
reduce leakages due to fraud and corruption, and to facilitate financial inclusion of the 
poor and to reduce their vulnerability to exploitative money-lenders. However, giving 
bank accounts to beneficiaries also gave opportunities to a range of service providers to 
make unauthorised deductions from these bank accounts, such as for airtime by cell-
phone companies and for funeral policies by insurance companies (DSD 2016). Finally, 
nutrition requires more than food. UNICEF’s conceptual framework for the determi-
nants of child malnutrition (UNICEF 1990) identified three ‘underlying causes’ of child 
malnutrition: inadequate access to food, inadequate care for children and women, and 
insufficient health services and unhealthy environment. Only the first of these can be 
directly attributed to poverty – not enough resources at the individual or household level 
to acquire adequate food. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Large numbers of South Africans receive social grants (public transfers) or remittances 
(private transfers), yet the levels of food insecurity – particularly in terms of nutritional 
outcomes – are surprisingly high. In this paper we have attempted to estimate the effects 
of both social grants and remittances on food security and nutrition, as well as to see 
whether impacts differ between these three transfers (the Child Support Grant, the 
Older Person’s Grant and remittances). While several studies have attempted to estimate 
the relationship between one of these transfers on nutrition or food security, there is no 
study comparing all three transfers. 
Drawing on the National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS), South Africa’s first nation-
ally representative panel survey, we find significant and positive impacts of the Older 
Person’s Grant and of remittances on the dietary diversity index (DDI), but not of the 
Child Support Grant. The differences in impacts between the CSG and the OPG re-
spond to differences in the size of the transfers, as well as to the fact that the CSG may 
be spent not only on children but on needs other than food. Remittances also improve 
the DDI, which is in line with other findings that remittances in South Africa are spent 
on food (especially when they are received by poor households). 
Regarding nutrition, we find no effect on anthropometry (BMI), by OPG or remittances, 
which supports other findings – both from South Africa as well as from other countries 
– that grants and remittances do not have a consistent positive impact on nutrition. On 
the other hand, however, some estimations point towards a positive effect of the CSG 
on children’ BMI. These positive effects, despite being considerable in magnitude, are 
not robust to all estimations performed, and therefore we should be cautious in drawing 
strong conclusions about them. Clearly, the determinants of nutrition status are more 
complex than food consumption alone, and more attention should be paid to other con-
tributory factors, including child feeding and care practices, hygiene behaviour, sanita-
tion facilities and water quality. Our findings support an emerging consensus that cash 
transfer programmes “need to be complemented with other nutrition-specific and nu-
trition-sensitive interventions to maximise effectiveness” (Fenn 2015: 12). 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dietary diversity index 9.41 2.34 1 12 
BMI adults 26.19 6.55 15.1 50 
BMI children (zbmi) 0.03 1.4 -4.97 4.99 
Log of CSG 2.01 2.15 0 7.22 
Log of OPG 1.34 2.29 0 7.09 
Log of remittances 0.48 1.42 0 10.68 
Number of adults 3.75 2.24 0 37 
Number of children 2.01 1.80 0 12 
Urban formal 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Rural 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Urban informal 0.06 0.25 0 1 
No education 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Years 1-4 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Years 5-7 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Years 7-12 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Metrics 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Source: authors’ calculations; NIDS 2008 and 2010.  
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Table A3.2: Effect of transfers on Dietary Diversity Index 
 Fixed effects Ordered probit 
 DDI DDI DDI DDI 
 Whole sample African sample Recipients Whole sample 
Log of pc CSG 0.02 0.04* 0.06+ -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log of pc OAP 0.11** 0.12** 0.20** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log of remittances 0.08** 0.09** 0.07** 0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Number of adults 0.08** 0.07** 0.04+ 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Number of children -0.07* -0.08* -0.12** 0.01** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) 
Urban formal 1.07** 1.34** 2.69** 0.39** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.41) (0.02) 
Urban informal 1.24** 1.42** 0.99 0.26** 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.71) (0.03) 
Maximum level of education in the household  
Years 1-4 0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.02) 
Years 5-7 0.17 0.18 -0.22 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) (0.02) 
Years 7-12 0.22 0.26 -0.14 0.08** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.30) (0.02) 
Metrics 0.18 0.14 -0.14 0.29** 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.37) (0.02) 
Year 2008 -0.05 -0.10* -0.20** -0.13** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) 
Constant 8.45** 8.03** 7.89**  
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.35)  
Observations 38936 32312 24731 38711 
Within R2 0.01 0.02 0.04  
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Panel weights are used, except in the case of the last 
specification as weights are not allowed for random effects models. 
Random effects ordered probit also controls for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number 
of household members employed, and age of the eldest household member. 
  
Social Grants, Remittances, and Food Security: Does the Source of Income Matter? 
105 
Table A3.3: Effect of transfers on adult BMI 
 Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak 
 Whole sample African sample Recipients Whole sample Whole sample 
Log of pc CSG -0.03 -0.04 0.21** 0.00 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) 
Log of pc OAP 0.02 0.01 0.20** -0.07** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log of remittances -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Number of adults -0.05 -0.03 0.08+ -0.09** -0.01 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Number of children -0.15* -0.16* -0.25* -0.10** -0.25** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) 
Urban formal -0.42 -0.32 1.17 1.07** 0.54 
 (0.49) (0.53) (1.00) (0.15) (0.45) 
Urban informal 0.39 0.44 0.01 0.71** 0.95 
 (0.69) (0.70) (1.54) (0.25) (0.66) 
Maximum level of education in the household    
Years 1-4 -1.37* -0.94 -1.50 0.33 -1.24* 
 (0.70) (0.77) (0.99) (0.25) (0.58) 
Years 5-7 -0.38 -0.20 -0.47 -0.29 0.14 
 (0.72) (0.76) (0.76) (0.21) (0.69) 
Years 7-12 0.94 1.02 -0.01 -1.07** 1.06 
 (0.75) (0.79) (0.80) (0.19) (0.71) 
Metrics 1.54* 1.53+ 0.86 -0.20 1.87* 
 (0.78) (0.83) (0.85) (0.21) (0.75) 
Year 2008 -0.76** -0.78** -0.75** -0.88** -0.65** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 26.71** 26.43** 25.65** 29.09** 28.90** 
 (0.69) (0.72) (0.86) (0.31) (0.88) 
Observations 16700 14233 10132 16700 16700 
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06   
Overall R2    0.16 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Panel weights are used, except in the case of the last 
two specifications as weights are not allowed in random effects or Mundlak models. Random and Mundlak estima-
tions also control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of household members em-
ployed, and age of the eldest household member. 
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Table A3.4: Effect of transfers on children BMI 
 Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak 
 Whole sample African sample Recipients Whole sample Whole sample 
Log of pc CSG -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log of pc OAP 0.05 0.06+ 0.06 0.01 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log of remittances 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Number of adults 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Number of children 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Urban formal 0.83+ 0.91+ 0.36 0.20* 0.55 
 (0.50) (0.51) (0.40) (0.08) (0.54) 
Urban informal -0.76 -0.69 -0.62+ 0.18 -0.07 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.36) (0.12) (0.56) 
Maximum level of education in the household    
Years 1-4 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.10 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) 
Years 5-7 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.19 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.23) (0.09) (0.16) 
Years 7-12 0.30 0.44 0.35 0.25 0.47+ 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.31) (0.18) (0.27) 
Metrics 0.02 0.04 0.43* 0.27 0.23 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.92) (1.14) 
Year 2008 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant -0.39 -0.25 -0.25 0.27+ 0.35 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.36) (0.16) (0.23) 
Observations 3908 3475 2857 3798 3798 
Within R2 0.02 0.02 0.02   
Overall    0.08 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Panel weights are used, except in the case of the last 
two specifications as weights are not allowed for random effects and Mundlak models. Random and Mundlak esti-
mations also control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of household members 
employed, age of the eldest household member and characteristics of the child that can influence their nutritional 
status (whether the mother is alive, and health status); all these variables have the expected sign and most of them 
are statistically significant. 
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Table A3.5: Conditional logits – Odds ratios of being food secure, not underweight, not overweight 
 Food secure (DDI) Food secure 
(expenditure) 
Not underweight Not overweight 
Log of pc CSG 1.02 1.00 0.97 1.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Log of pc OAP 1.05** 1.02 1.03 1.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Log of remittances 1.05** 1.01 1.08+ 0.98 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
Number of adults 1.04** 1.03* 0.92* 0.99 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Number of children 0.90** 1.11** 1.05 0.86* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) 
Urban formal 1.95** 1.91** 0.44+ 0.80 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.22) (0.25) 
Urban informal 1.40 1.69+ 1.02 0.92 
 (0.36) (0.46) (1.10) (0.44) 
Maximum level of education in the household   
Years 1-4 1.01 1.06 0.98 0.68 
 (0.09) (0.11) (1.25) (0.36) 
Years 5-7 1.12 1.31+ 0.14 1.54 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.99) 
Years 7-12 1.08 1.51* 0.05+ 2.45 
 (0.17) (0.28) (0.08) (1.60) 
Metrics 0.90 1.29 0.04* 4.07* 
 (0.19) (0.32) (0.06) (2.81) 
Year 2008 1.03 1.32** 1.35** 0.63** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.13) (0.04) 
Observations 15480 11734 1652 3842 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.019 0.067 0.064 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.6: Probit estimates: probability of receiving the Child Support Grant   
 Lives in a CSG recipient household 
Urban formal -0.06** 
 (0.01) 
Urban informal -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Race (ref category: Black)  
Coloured -0.06** 
 (0.01) 
Other (Asian or White) -0.38** 
 (0.02) 
Child in the household 0.08** 
age 13-16 years old (0.01) 
Child in the household 0.14** 
age 9-12 years old (0.01) 
Child in the household 0.18** 
age 5-8 years old (0.01) 
Child in the household age 1-4 years old 0.23** 
(0.00) 
Housing -0.04** 
 (0.01) 
Observations 38612 
Pseudo R2 0.16 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Coefficients are expressed as average marginal 
effects. 
 
Table A3.7: Matching quality 
Sample Ps R2 p>chi2 Mean bias Median bias 
Unmatched 0.161 0.00 34.3 33.6 
Matched 0.00 0.65 0.4 0.2 
Note: Estimates above show that the matching was done correctly, as the R2 of the model is almost zero and much 
smaller that the R2 before the matching. Moreover, the P-value of the likelihood-ratio test after matching is higher 
than 0.1 (i.e. no joint significance of all covariates after matching), as well as the standardised bias is highly reduced 
after matching and is less than 3%.  
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From Cradle to Grave? Poverty, Social 
Assistance, and Subjective Well-being in 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Those who don’t feel sorry about the collapse of 
the Soviet Union have no heart, but those who 
think that it may be restored have no brain” 
Elderly man in Kyrgyzstan  
(Narayan et al. 2000, p.40) 
 
“To be poor is not shameful when we are all 
poor” 
64 years-old man from a Chinese village 
(Li et al. 2016, p.7) 
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4.1 Introduction 
Despite a high number of studies looking at objective measures of well-being, subjective 
well-being has received less attention in the impact evaluation literature when estimating 
the effects of social assistance. Due to the fact that objective measures of well-being fail 
to capture fundamental aspects of life such as overall life satisfaction, there is growing 
consensus on the importance of measuring well-being through subjective indicators 
(Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009). There is also a growing literature stating that several 
dimensions of subjective wellbeing (lack of stress, happiness, satisfaction with life) have 
an instrumental value, as they are positively related with outcomes such as productivity, 
decision-making, and educational and health outcomes (Attah et al. 2016).  
The mechanisms by which social assistance transfers affect subjective well-being are 
likely to differ from the ones affecting objective indicators of well-being. One can expect 
increased levels of subjective well-being if social assistance transfers reduce poverty as 
well as address the negative mechanisms associated with poverty, such as stress, mental 
health problems or shame (Haushofer and Fehr 2014; Roelen 2017). However, if receiv-
ing social assistance leads to stigma or shame, subjective well-being could be reduced 
despite the increase in financial resources, and, hence, objective well-being. Concepts 
such as poverty and stigma may have different connotations in different contexts and 
may depend, for instance, on the type of political regime (e.g. communism or capitalist) 
(Barr 1994), or the extent of inequality in a country (Li et al. 2016).  
Drawing on three rounds of the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey (LiK), this paper studies the 
relationship between social assistance and subjective well-being in Kyrgyzstan. Under 
the Soviet Union, the state bore the responsibility of providing social benefits in the 
same way as it controlled the whole economy (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). Hence 
the popular say "From Cradle to Grave", an expectation and acceptance that the State 
will provide support to its citizens throughout their life. At the same time, most of the 
benefits such as pensions or family benefits were considered income support, meaning 
that they aimed to complement labour income. Social assistance, understood as transfers 
targeted to people living in poverty, was highly residual. As Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1992) describe, "social assistance was rudimentary, a last resort due to the denial of 
existence of poverty... benefits were stigmatising and handed only to the deserving poor" 
(pp. 220-221). In the Soviet period, poverty was seen as a pathology and, to a big extent, 
a responsibility directly attributed to the individual suffering from poverty (Barr 1994). 
Despite the large number of studies looking at the effects of social assistance pro-
grammes on objective measures of well-being, such as monetary poverty, health, or ed-
ucation (see Bastagli et al. (2016) for a summary of impact evaluations), the relationship 
between social assistance and subjective well-being remains under-explored. Moreover, 
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this topic has not been researched in a former Soviet country before and, consequently, 
findings could be informative for other countries that share a similar history. Three 
measures of well-being are studied: overall life satisfaction, individual's perception of the 
economic situation of the household compared to one year before, and the individual's 
subjective expectation of the economic situation of the household in the future. This 
paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: in addition to adding new evi-
dence on the relationship between social assistance and subjective well-being, this paper 
reduces potential endogeneity by including control variables that are usually unobserved, 
such as an index for personality traits, and relying on matching and panel data techniques 
to correct for unobserved heterogeneity.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the theoretical frame-
work and reviews the literature on the impact of social assistance on subjective well-
being. Section 4.3 introduces the case study, Kyrgyzstan; while Section 4.4 presents the 
methodology. Section 4.5 explains the data and descriptive statistics of the sample used 
in the analysis, and Section 4.6 presents the regression results of the relationship between 
social assistance and subjective well-being. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Analytical framework 
Although, historically, happiness has been considered by philosophers the ultimate mo-
tivation for human action (Diener 1984), theoretical and empirical work on subjective 
well-being only started after the 70s.34 Subjective well-being includes concepts such as 
life satisfaction, happiness, and positive affect. In the literature, it is usually defined as 
“people’s multidimensional evaluation of their lives, including cognitive judgements of 
life satisfaction as well as affective evaluations of moods and emotions” (Eid and Diener 
2004, 63). There are examples of studies looking at subjective well-being in different 
fields: The Easterlin’s paradox (1974), which argues that an increase in income does not 
necessarily lead to higher levels of happiness, is well-known in the economic literature. 
In psychology, Maslow placed happiness and subjective well-being as an ultimate goal in 
life (Maslow 1970). In the poverty literature, the participatory poverty assessments or 
“voices of the poor” which emerged at the end of the 20th century also raised the im-
portance of subjective well-being. Participatory poverty assessments confirm the idea 
that well-being is comprised of many different dimensions aside material well-being, in-
cluding family, children, livelihood, peace, dignity, and respect (Narayan et al. 2000). 
Poor people are often caught in several deprivations and the psychological consequences 
of it are intense and painful (Narayan et al. 2000). 
                                                        
34 Happiness and subjective well-being are often used interchangeably in the psychology, sociology and economic 
literature (see, for example, Stewart (2014), Bartram (2013), or Diener (1984)). 
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Happiness has many determinants besides income, such as personality traits, environ-
mental conditions, or social relations (Handa et al. 2014) In fact, a highly-cited paper on 
the topic suggests that raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all 
(Easterlin 1995). At the same time, many authors have shown that an improved eco-
nomic situation can positively affect subjective well-being (Deaton, 2008; Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2008), and this relationship is expected to be stronger in developing countries 
(Handa et al. 2014). The reason is that the quality of life of poor people highly depends 
on the satisfaction of basic needs (Handa et al. 2014). 
Moreover, and despite improvements in subjective well-being are not the primary ob-
jective of social protection programmes, subjective well-being has an instrumental value, 
as it has been found to be positively related with outcomes such as productivity, deci-
sion-making, and educational and health outcomes (Attah et al. 2016). This means that 
social protection can impact longer term outcomes through an intermediate effect on 
subjective well-being. 
Despite the importance of measuring the subjective well-being of individuals, the rela-
tionship between government (social assistance) transfers and subjective well-being has 
received little attention in the literature. After all, social transfers aim to increase objec-
tive well-being in the first place by increasing the financial resources of households and 
individuals and reduce monetary poverty. There is a large number of studies that have 
found positive effects of social transfers on different aspects of objective well-being (see 
Bastagli et al. 2016 for a summary of impact evaluations), yet the relationship between 
social transfers and subjective well-being remains understudied.35 
One can expect increased levels of subjective well-being if social assistance transfers 
reduce poverty as well as address negative mechanisms associated with poverty. For in-
stance, an increase in material resources often leads to improvements in subjective well-
being, especially in poor countries (Deaton 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). One of 
the reasons is that social assistance, through its effects on poverty reduction, can address 
some of the negative consequences of poverty, such as stress, mental health problems 
or shame (Haushofer and Fehr 2014; Roelen 2017). However, if receiving social assis-
tance leads to stigma or shame, subjective well-being could be reduced despite the in-
crease in financial resources, and, hence, objective well-being.36 Stigma and shame are 
                                                        
35 Objective well-being refers to the satisfaction of certain recognised (and objectively defined) needs or, looked at 
it the other way around, “poverty is having less than an objectively defined, absolute minimum” (Hagenaars and De 
Vos 1988). 
36 Shame is an "affect or emotion that occurs in response to social rejection or perceived loss of social attractiveness 
that threaten one’s self-esteem and sense of belonging" (Roelen 2017, p.7, from Van Vliet 2008), whereas stigma is 
defined as “a strong feeling of disapproval that most people in a society have about something, especially when this 
is unfair” (Cambridge English dictionary). Therefore, we can think of stigma as a social phenomenon while shame 
resides in the person. Moreover, public stigma can lead to self-stigma, or the ‘potential internalisation of the negative 
beliefs and feelings associated with the stigmatised condition’ (Bos et al. 2013: 2) (in Roelen 2017, p.8).  
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closely related concepts, as the former can act as a mechanism leading to the latter (Roe-
len 2017). The psychology literature has identified several negative consequences of 
shame, such as avoiding responsibilities, self-oriented distress, anger and depression 
(Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 2007, in Teroni and Bruun (2011)).  
Whether or not social assistance is associated with stigma depends on the type of social 
assistance, the context, and the targeting method (Li and Walker 2016). Receiving a social 
pension is socially accepted in most countries, and the same applies to child benefits if 
they are universal. Many times, however, programs are not supported by the population. 
For instance, when programs are narrowly targeted to specific groups or use community 
based targeting, the stigma attached to benefit receipt is likely to be higher. In some 
occasions, stigmatisation and shame occur as a consequence of how the programme is 
implemented. For example, the publication of names or having to queue in a public 
space to receive the transfer can have stigmatising effects (Roelen 2017). The same oc-
curs with community verification processes, where a community leader has to decide if 
someone deserves the benefit or not, such as China’s dibao scheme (Yan 2014). Overall, 
the level of stigmatisation will highly depend on the extent to which social assistance 
recipients are perceived as legitimate claimants of entitlements rather than beneficiaries 
of government generosity (Lister 2004). 
There are two studies looking at the effects of social pensions on subjective well-being. 
Lloyd-Sherlock et al. (2012) find that pensions in Brazil increase overall levels of satis-
faction with household well-being. In a similar vein, Moller-Radloff (2012) finds that 
pensions in South Africa lead to higher elderly well-being and overall satisfaction. The 
positive relationship between pension receipt and life satisfaction is somehow expected 
given the fact that pensions are socially accepted and are mainly an income replacement 
when individuals reach retirement age. With regard to poverty-targeted benefits, how-
ever, evidence is mixed. Two different unconditional cash transfer programs in Kenya 
increase subjective well-being levels (Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Handa et al. 2014), 
as they have positive effects on indicators such as positive feelings and satisfaction with 
life, as well as on future perceptions of quality of life. This is not the case with the con-
ditional cash transfers (CCT) programme in Colombia ‘Familias en acción’. Galama, 
Morgan, and Saavedra (2017), show that the program has positive effects on many as-
pects of well-being, including the level of satisfaction with income. However, levels of 
self-reported life satisfaction are not found to improve as a result of the transfers. 
The inconclusive evidence regarding poverty targeted transfers can be attributed to the 
differences between programmes and contexts in which they operate. This paper adds 
to the limited existing evidence of the effects of social assistance on subjective well-being 
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by looking at a new case study, Kyrgyzstan, which differs from previous ones not only 
in terms of the design of its social protection system but also with respect to its Soviet's 
past, where poverty and social assistance had different connotations than in other con-
texts. 
4.3 Social assistance and poverty in Kyrgyzstan 
The Kyrgyz Republic, or Kyrgyzstan, is a land-locked and mountainous country, con-
sidered one of the poorest in Central Asia with a Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita of $1100 (World Bank 2017). After becoming independent in 1991, poverty rates 
increased considerably due to the transition to the market economy and consequent de-
cline of industrial activity and jobs. Despite poverty decreasing since the beginning of 
the 21st century, a third of the Kyrgyz population is considered poor based on the na-
tional poverty line (World Bank 2017). 
During Soviet times, the state controlled the whole economy and was in charge of 
providing jobs, access to health-care, and education for everyone. In cases where income 
from the job market was not enough to satisfy household needs, or when individuals 
were not able to work, the government would provide social benefits, including family 
and maternity benefits, social pensions, or benefits to certain groups of the population 
such as war veterans (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). The popular saying “From Cra-
dle to Grave” reflects a circumstance where individuals were protected by the state 
throughout their life. As a result of how the economy was designed, poverty was seen as 
a pathology with high personal responsibility (Barr 1994). Social assistance (here refer-
ring to safety nets of last resorts, targeted at poor individuals) was highly residual, and 
benefits were subject to discretion by local authorities, which resulted in arbitrary deci-
sions and a high level of stigma (Barr 1994; Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). 
In spite of the progress made after the difficult years that followed the transition to the 
market economy, Kyrgyzstan still suffers from the consequences of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the impoverishment that followed, such as high unemployment, wide-
spread corruption, state failure to deliver basic services, strong gender disparities, and 
inter-ethnic conflict (ICG 2016). As an effort to protect poor individuals during the 
transition to the market economy and counteract its negative effects, the government 
implemented several reforms to its social protection system, including the introduction 
of a poverty targeted transfer (the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families –MBPF-, previ-
ously known as the Unified Monthly Benefit) (Tesliuc 2004). However, social assistance 
programmes in Kyrgyzstan have failed to lift a significant number of individuals out of 
poverty (Gassmann 2011). One reason is that, as in the Soviet era, a big percentage of 
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the social protection budget is spent on categorical benefits, which do not necessarily 
reach the poorest (Barrientos and Kudebayeva 2015). Categorical benefits focus on vul-
nerable groups unable to work, such as people with disabilities or sickness, older people, 
war veterans, or mothers with infants. The most important one is the Monthly Social 
Benefit (MSF), a cash transfer provided to orphans, people with disabilities and elderly 
individuals without pension rights (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015). 
The only transfer targeted at poor households in Kyrgyzstan is the aforementioned 
Monthly Benefit for Poor Families (MBPF), a means-tested benefit targeted at families 
living in extreme poverty. Eligibility for the MBPF is based on an income and asset 
component, as well as the presence of children in the household. The eligibility threshold 
is the Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), a discretionary threshold set by the gov-
ernment equal to approximately one third to one half of the extreme poverty line 
(Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015). Despite being relatively well-targeted, benefit 
sizes of the MBPF are too small to have a sizeable effect on poverty reduction, as they 
account for only 10 percent of total income of poor beneficiaries. Overall, all non-con-
tributory benefits in Kyrgyzstan have low coverage, reaching between 1 and 10 percent 
of the population, with the exception of energy compensations, which reach a higher 
percentage of beneficiaries (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015).37  
Given the legacy of the country as a member of the Soviet Union, poverty, as well as the 
receipt of poverty targeted benefits such as the MBPF, is likely to be associated with 
shame and stigma. Qualitative interviews conducted in Kyrgyzstan in the year 2000 re-
flect this, as it is common among respondents to report that in Soviet times they did not 
know what poverty was, and that now they feel humiliated (Narayan et al 2000). How-
ever, the expectation that the state will provide support would be accepted in the context 
of ‘from cradle to grave’ protection offered by the former system, especially in the case 
of categorical benefits, which do not necessarily reach the poorest. At the same time, 
given the limited benefit size of most social assistance transfers one would not expect a 
sizeable increase in subjective well-being, except for the subjective perception that the 
state cares for its citizens. 
4.4 Empirical strategy 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether receiving social assistance has a positive 
or negative effect on subjective well-being. I answer this question through the following 
specification: 
                                                        
37 Energy compensations are provided to pensioners with a small pension and to households living in high-mountain 
areas. 
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 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝑆𝐴𝑖ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑘 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘 (1) 
𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘 measures subjective well-being of individual i in household h in oblast k, and 
SA is a binary variable indicating whether an individual lives in a household receiving 
social assistance. The coefficient of interest is therefore 𝛽1, which indicates if social as-
sistance has a positive or negative effect on subjective well-being. 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘 is a vector of 
individual level controls, while 𝑋ℎ𝑘𝑡 is a vector of household level characteristics. 𝛼𝑘 re-
fers to the oblast fixed effects, and 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘 is the idiosyncratic error. 
Given that recipients of social assistance are not randomly selected from the population, 
simply comparing recipients with non-recipient will yield biased results, as the two groups 
have different characteristics which, at the same time, affect subjective well-being. To ad-
dress the unobserved heterogeneity as well as the lack of an appropriate counterfactual, 
this analysis relies on matching as well as difference in difference techniques. The matching 
is done in two steps: I calculate the probability of receiving social assistance (propensity 
score) based on a number of covariates which are unlikely to change over time, such as 
oblast and region of residence (urban/rural), housing conditions and possession of assets 
and livestock, age, gender, ethnicity, and education of the recipient, gender of the head of 
the household, and whether the household head is engaged in agriculture. As a second 
step, I regress subjective well-being on social assistance recipient status (and a set of addi-
tional control variables) and apply inverse probability weights (IPW) to the specification.  
Inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) uses weights based on the propensity 
score to create a sample where the distribution of covariates is independent of treatment 
assignment (Austin 2011). 38 If ?̅? is the propensity score, which is an estimate of the prob-
ability of being in the treatment group given a set of individual and household covariates 
𝒙, individuals who receive social assistance will have a weight 
𝟏
?̅?
, and non-recipients a weight 
𝟏
𝟏−?̅?
 . A similar approach was taken by Handa el al. (2014) when estimating the relationship 
between social assistance and subjective well-being in Kenya. Regressions are estimated 
for the pooled sample (pooling three years of data), as well as for each year separately. 
Subjective well-being is influenced by many factors, from economic conditions to person-
ality traits and environmental conditions (Handa et al. 2014). Therefore, in addition to the 
observable characteristics used to match treated and control individuals, I include in the 
regressions other variables which are expected to affect subjective well-being. These in-
clude characteristics of respondents that were not included estimation of the propensity 
score, such as working status and whether the individual practices sports. Moreover, given 
that the survey includes a section on personality consisting on different questions that 
                                                        
38 This method was first proposed by Rosenbaum (1987). 
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measure the extent of extraversion, openness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and conscien-
tiousness of the respondent (the big five personality traits), an index for personality is cre-
ated through factor analysis and included as an independent variable in the regressions.39  
Household characteristics include the household size, whether the household has children, 
whether the household experienced an idiosyncratic shock in last year, and an index of asset 
holding created through factor analysis which includes media appliances (including televi-
sion, radio, phone, and computer), and home appliances (including refrigerator, washing 
machine, and other assets).40 Many authors have proven how an improvement in material 
conditions can positively affect subjective well-being (Deaton, 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 
2008). This relationship is stronger and more robust in developing countries as the quality 
of life of poor people highly depends on the satisfaction of basic needs (Handa et al. 2014).  
Given that individuals can receive social assistance in any of the years studied and ben-
efits were in place before the survey was collected, it is not possible to use baseline 
characteristics (pre-treatment) to calculate the probability that an individual receives so-
cial assistance. To check for the robustness of the results, I estimate a difference in dif-
ference regression with the three years of data, as well as difference in difference com-
bined with matching for the years 2011 and 2012 (and excluding the year 2013). In both 
cases and in order to compare the situation of beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries before 
and after receiving social assistance, I drop individuals who receive social assistance in 
2011. In the second case, and with the aim of combining difference in difference with 
matching techniques, I restrict the sample to the years 2011 and 2012 and estimate the 
propensity score of receiving social assistance in 2012 with variables from 2011.41 The 
difference in difference specification is shown in equation (2). 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2013 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012_2013 +
                        + 𝛽4 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2012 + 𝛽5𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2013 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2012 +
                        + 𝛽7𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2013 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2013 + 𝛽8𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012_2013 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2012 +
                        + 𝛽9𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012_2013 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2013 + 𝛽10𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽11𝑋ℎ𝑘 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘   
  (2) 
Where 𝜷𝟏 and 𝜷𝟐 measure the pre-treatment differences between treated and controls in 
2012 and 2013, respectively, and 𝜷𝟑 measures pre-treatment differences between those 
receiving social assistance in both years (2012 and 2013), with respect to those who do 
not receive transfers in any of the three years. Changes in subjective well-being over time 
                                                        
39 More information on how the personality index is created is provided in the appendix. 
40 More detailed explanation of the asset index is provided in the appendix. 
41 The reason why I drop the year 2013 in the last specification is that, as mentioned before, the probability of 
receiving social assistance changes every year, and it is not possible to include two different weights per individual 
in the difference in difference estimation. Nevertheless, and as it is shown below, it seems reasonable to look at the 
change in subjective well-being levels from 2011 to 2012, as between these years the number of beneficiaries of 
social assistance increased, whereas in 2013 the number of beneficiaries decreased with respect to 2012. 
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for the control groups are given by 𝜷𝟒 and 𝜷𝟓. The difference-in-difference estimators 
(DD) are given by 𝜷𝟔, 𝜷𝟕, 𝜷𝟖, and 𝜷𝟗;  𝜷𝟔 compares changes in well-being levels be-
tween 2011 and 2012 among those receiving social assistance only in 2012, to the changes 
in the same period among the control group (those who do not receive social assistance 
neither in 2011, nor in 2012). 𝜷𝟕 captures changes in well-being levels between 2011 and 
2013 among those receiving social assistance only in 2013, to the changes in the same 
period among the control group (those who do not receive social assistance in any of the 
three years). Finally, 𝜷𝟖 and 𝜷𝟗 compare subjective well-being levels between those re-
ceiving social assistance in both years -2012 and 2013- and those who do not receive 
social assistance in any of the three years, for the years 2012 and 2013, respectively. The 
remaining coefficients to be estimated are the same as in equation (1). 
Finally, the difference in difference regression combined with propensity score match-
ing, restricted to the years 2011 and 2012, is denoted as: 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2012 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡2012 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2012 + 
                          +  𝛽4𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑋ℎ𝑘 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘   (3) 
In equation (3), 𝛽3 captures the DD estimator, which measures the changes in subjective 
well-being between treated and controls before and after the receipt of the transfer. As 
before, 𝛽2 captures the change in subjective well-being levels between 2011 and 2012 
among those who do not receive social assistance, whereas pre-treatment differences be-
tween those receiving and those who do not receive social assistance is captured by 𝛽1. 
The regression includes inverse probability weights, which in this case are used to match 
treated and non-treated units based on “pre-program” characteristics (Khandker et al. 
2010). The advantage of combining difference in difference with matching techniques is 
that, given that participants are not randomly selected from the population, there can still 
be time-varying selection bias attributable to differences in initial observable characteris-
tics and which is not accounted for in the difference in difference estimation.  
4.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
This analysis draws on data from the Life in Kyrgyzstan (LiK) study, a panel survey 
conducted annually that covers a sample of approximately 3,000 households (and 8,000 
individuals). The survey was administered in all seven oblasts of Kyrgyzstan and the 
cities of Bishkek and Osh, and data were collected at the household, individual (admin-
istered to all adults aged 18 and above), and community level. LiK provides comprehen-
sive information on income, consumption patterns, remittances, well-being indicators, 
employment and socio-demographic characteristics of households (Bruck et al. 2014). 
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The survey tracks individuals over time, and includes new household members that be-
come part of the households that are re-interviewed. To make the analysis more con-
sistent, individuals who have missing information on the key variables in any of the three 
years are dropped. The final balanced sample consists of 5,899 individuals per year and 
only includes adults who are 18 years old or older, given that the subjective well-being 
questionnaire was only administered to adult household members.  
In this paper social assistance is defined as all non-contributory benefits (both categorical 
and means-tested). The household questionnaire includes a section of income sources 
which asks the main respondent whether the household received any social assistance 
transfers in the last 12 months, including the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families (means-
tested), the Monthly Social Benefit, Compensatory Payments, and other social payments 
(categorical), as well as the amount received from each transfer per month. Table 4.1 
provides this information and confirms previous evidence in that approximately 10 per-
cent of the population receives social assistance, although this percentage is lower in 
2013 (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015). On average, households receive between 
KGS 1,400 and 1,800 per month, which represents approximately 15 percent of their 
total income. In 2013, however, the percentage of individuals receiving categorical trans-
fers dropped by almost 4 percentage points.42 
Table 4.1: Social assistance characteristics by year 
Social assistance 2011 2012 2013 
% individuals in recipient hhs 9.1 10.2 5.3 
Average amount received (monthly) in 
recipient hhs (KGS) 
1469 1561 1721 
% of total income (recipients) 15.6 13.8 14.6 
Source: authors’ calculations, LiK 2011, 2012, 2013 
 
Three measures of subjective well-being are used; the first one relates to the general 
satisfaction with life, and the other two constitute subjective measures of economic well-
being. Life satisfaction has been identified by the OECD (2013) as one of the core 
measures of subjective well-being; it has been widely used across countries and proven 
to be reliable and valid. Self-reported life satisfaction is measured on an 11-point scale, 
ranging from 0 (‘completely dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘completely satisfied’). 
Subjective economic well-being is measured with two questions: (1) “If you look back one 
year, how has your household’s economic situation changed since that date?”, and (2) 
“How do you think the economic situation of your household will be in one year from 
                                                        
42 In 2013, social protection benefits were recorded in a separate section (as opposed to previous years), and more 
disaggregated categories were added. In 2013 categorical benefits non-contributory pensions, social monthly allow-
ance, compensations from local authorities and other allowances. The decline in benefits received in this year could 
be partly a result of measurement error given the change in the questionnaire and the way of recording the benefits. 
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now?” Respondents can choose between five options: highly increased, moderately in-
creased, stayed the same, moderately decreased, and highly decreased. Based on this infor-
mation I create a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the situation has improved or 
0 if the situation has worsened or remained the same. The possibility to compare the cur-
rent economic situation with the situation either in the past or future reduces the noise of 
subjective economic well-being measures, as subjective answers often depend on how re-
spondents compare themselves to other individuals, as well as their personality or emo-
tional circumstances. As this could imply very different answers even if individuals have a 
similar economic situation, looking at a relative measure avoids the problem of establishing 
an absolute standard for what is economic well-being and what is not (Jones 2014). 
Table 4.2 shows subjective well-being rates by recipient status. The average life satisfac-
tion score is 6.82, and differences between social assistance recipients and non-recipients 
are not significant. The same applies to the variable measuring whether the economic 
situation of the household has improved with respect to the past, as in both groups, on 
average, 47 percent of respondents consider that the household is better off compared 
to one year before. When looking at the expectation with regard to the future, however, 
social assistance recipients have lower well-being levels as compared to non-recipients, 
as a smaller percentage expects an improvement in the household’s economic situation. 
In addition, this difference is statistically significant. Although these statistics shed some 
light on the differences in subjective well-being levels between recipients and non-recip-
ients, subjective well-being is driven by many other factors besides social assistance re-
cipient status. Moreover, these two groups are expected to be highly heterogeneous. The 
next section presents the regression results, which rely on matching and difference in 
difference techniques to account for this heterogeneity. 
Table 4.2: Subjective well-being by recipient status (pooled sample) 
Indicator Mean 
Recipients 
Mean 
non-recipients 
T stat Mean 
Total 
Life satisfaction 6.88 6.82 -1.10 6.82 
Economic situation has improved with respect 
to the past 
0.47 0.47 -0.04 0.47 
Economic situation will improve in the future 0.52 0.54 1.73 0.54 
Observations 1445 16252  17697 
Source: authors’ calculations, LiK 2011, 2012, 2013; Subjective well-being rates express averages across the three 
years 
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4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Results based on matching 
Table 4.3 provides mean differences for the variables used to calculate the probability of 
receiving social assistance, for both treated and control individuals before and after 
matching. Looking at the unmatched sample (panel A), we can see that recipients and 
non-recipients differ in all characteristic except for the gender of the household head. 
Recipients of social assistance are more likely to live in the poorer oblasts of Issik-Kul, 
Jalal-abad and Naryn, and less likely to live in an urban area. A slightly higher percentage 
of recipients are the spouse of the household head, are married, and have access to good 
flooring. However, on average, recipients have less household appliances as well as lower 
levels of education. Moreover, recipients are more likely to live in a household engaged 
in agriculture, as recipient households own more livestock and have a higher percentage 
of heads working on agriculture, as compared to non-recipient households. After match-
ing, one can see that no significant differences remain between the variables (panel B). 
Table A4.1 in the appendix shows the results of the probit regression used to calculate 
the probability of receiving social assistance and associated weights. Further evidence 
that the matching is appropriate is provided in table A4.2 and figure A4.1 in the appen-
dix: table A4.2 shows the statistics of the quality of the matching, and figure A4.1 the 
distribution of the probability scores before and after applying the inverse probability 
weights. Moreover, table A4.3 gives a summary of all the variables used in the analysis. 
The results based on the inverse probability weighted regressions are reported in tables 
4.4 and 4.5 below. According to table 4.4 (based on the pooled sample), receiving social 
assistance leads to a reduction in life satisfaction. Moreover, recipients of social assis-
tance have a 6-percentage point lower likelihood of expecting an improvement in the 
economic situation of the household in the future. Table 4.5 confirms these results, as 
the negative relationship between social assistance and life satisfaction holds when per-
forming the regressions for each year separately (2011, 2012, and 2013), whereas the 
effect of social assistance on subjective economic well-being with regards to the future 
is again negative and significant in the years 2012 and 2013. On the contrary, the coeffi-
cient for social assistance is insignificant when estimating the subjective economic situ-
ation of respondents with respect to the past. 
Based on these findings, one can conclude that social assistance has no positive effects 
on subjective well-being. In addition, receiving social benefits is associated with lower 
levels of satisfaction with life and an expectation that the household's economic situation 
will not improve in the near future. This can be due to the fact that benefits are not 
addressing the negative consequences of poverty. It can also imply that poverty and 
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social assistance benefits are still stigmatised. The next subsection shows the results 
based on the difference in difference analysis. 
Table 4.3: Differences between recipients and non-recipients before and after matching 
 
Unmatched sample 
(Panel A) 
Matched sample 
(Panel B) 
 
SA Recipients SA Non-recipients p-value SA Recipients SA Non-recipients p-value 
Variable       
Rural 0.79 0.62 0.00 0.79 0.80 0.46 
Oblast (ref: Bishkek) 
      
Issyk-Kul 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.13 
Jalal-Abad 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.24 0.25 0.63 
Naryn 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.39 
Batken 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.40 
Osh 0.23 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.12 
Talas 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.70 
Chui 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.59 
Osh city 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.36 
Age 41.6 43.0 0.00 41.6 42.0 0.46 
Age squared 1947 2097 0.00 1947 1989 0.42 
Relationship to household head (ref: head) 
    
Spouse 0.30 0.27 0.03 0.30 0.29 0.39 
Son/Daughter 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.21 0.20 0.58 
Other 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.44 
Married 0.79 0.73 0.00 0.79 0.77 0.23 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.75 0.66 0.00 0.76 0.77 0.22 
Education (ref: primary/ no education) 
    
Secondary 0.69 0.54 0.00 0.69 0.70 0.63 
Technical 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.35 
University 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Head agriculture 0.31 0.19 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.90 
Male hh head 0.78 0.77 0.34 0.78 0.77 0.96 
Good flooring 0.75 0.71 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.76 
Livestock 2.05 1.33 0.00 2.05 2.12 0.21 
Appliances 3.09 3.40 0.00 3.09 3.09 0.94 
Observations 1443 16226  1443 16226  
 Source: authors’ calculations, LiK 2011, 2012, 2013 
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Table 4.4: Association between social assistance and subjective well-being with inverse probability weights (pooled 
data) 
 Life Satisfaction Economic situation is better 
than in the past 
Expects economic 
Situation to improve 
Receives SA -0.27** -0.02 -0.06** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male -0.16+ 0.00 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.46** 0.03 0.03 
 (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.22+ 0.08** 0.07** 
 (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) 
Urban -0.60** -0.12** -0.13** 
HH size 0.05* 0.02** 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has kids -0.20 -0.04 -0.05* 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education (ref: primary or no education)   
Secondary -0.22 0.03 -0.04 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) 
Technical -0.28 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.22) (0.03) (0.04) 
University -0.17 0.10* 0.03 
 (0.25) (0.05) (0.04) 
Works 0.14 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) 
Plays sports 0.59** 0.10** 0.07** 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) 
Personality 0.55** 0.04** 0.06** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.38** 0.09** 0.10** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.03 -0.04* -0.05* 
Shock (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 7.08** 0.16* 0.32** 
 (0.64) (0.07) (0.09) 
Observations 17589 17589 17589 
R2 0.18 0.13 0.17 
Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights;  
+p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. I originally controlled for the presence of 
networks, as there is evidence that a rich social life and having a network support improves subjective well-being 
(Diener and Seligman 2002). However, due to the large number of missing observations, I have excluded this vari-
able from the analysis. Results were not altered, though.  
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Table 4.5: Association between social assistance and subjective well-being with inverse probability weights (cross-sections) 
 2011 2012 2013 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Econ. situation 
better than in  
the past 
Expects 
Econ. situation to 
improve 
Life 
satisfaction 
Econ. situation is 
better than in  
the past 
Expects 
Econ. situation to 
improve 
Life 
satisfaction 
Econ. situation is 
better than in  
the past 
Expects 
econ. situation to 
improve 
Receives SA -0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.29* 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.30* 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 5873 5873 5873 5874 5874 5874 5842 5842 5842 
R2 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.21 
Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; full regressions are shown in table A4.4 in the appendix. 
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4.6.2 Results based on difference in difference (DD) estimation 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the difference in difference regression. Compared to the 
inverse probability weighted regressions from the previous sub-section, receiving social 
assistance is not associated with changes in life satisfaction. However, receiving social 
assistance is negatively related with the subjective economic expectations of recipients 
with respect to the future, as significant coefficients are observed for those who receive 
social assistance only in 2012 as well as for those receiving social assistance in both years 
-2012 and 2013-, compared to those who do not receive social assistance in any of the 
three years. In addition, there is some indication that social assistance reduces subjective 
economic well-being with respect to the past among those who receive social assistance 
in both 2012 and 2013. 
There are some factors that could explain why significant effects of social assistance on 
life satisfaction are no longer observed. On the one hand, it is likely that there are unob-
served factors which are not accounted for in the inverse probability weighted (IPW) 
regressions that affect both the probability of receiving social assistance as well as sub-
jective well-being. The reason why matching techniques do not account for unobserved 
heterogeneity is that the probability of receiving social assistance and resulting inverse 
probability weights are based on observed covariates. At the same time and as a result 
of excluding individuals who receive social assistance in 2011, 543 observations were 
excluded from the difference in difference estimations. Moreover, given that the sample 
is highly heterogeneous, it is possible that there are time-varying variables that differ 
between recipients and non-recipients at the baseline (before beneficiaries started receiv-
ing social assistance) and, as a result, an appropriate counterfactual is lacking in the dif-
ference in difference regression.  
As a next step, I combine difference in difference with matching techniques by weighting 
each observation based on the probability of receiving social assistance in the year 2012 
with characteristics at the baseline (2011). To be able to combine the two techniques, 
observations from the year 2013 are dropped. The reason why changes in subjective 
well-being between the years 2011 and 2012 (and not 2013) are analysed, is that in 2012 
there was an increase in beneficiaries with respect to 2011, while in 2013 the percentage 
of beneficiaries decreased with respect to 2012.  
These estimations are presented in Table 4.7, and show negative and significant effects 
of receiving social assistance on the three indicators of well-being. Even though there 
was an overall increase in well-being levels in the year 2012, those receiving social assis-
tance had, on average, 0.47 points lower life satisfaction and were 11 and 17 percentage 
points less likely to report an improvement in the economic situation with respect to the 
past or expect an improvement in the economic situation in the future, respectively. 
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Based on these findings, one can conclude that receiving social assistance does not con-
tribute to an improvement in well-being. In terms of the life satisfaction indicator, both 
inverse probability weighted regressions as well as difference-in-difference combined 
with inverse probability weighting (restricting the sample to the years 2011 and 2012) 
indicate that receiving social assistance leads to lower levels of life satisfaction. Moreo-
ver, all estimations point towards a negative relation between social assistance and the 
expectations that the economic situation will improve in the future. In this case, how-
ever, one should be aware that the negative effects can be a result of reverse causality, 
which would arise if those who think their economic situation will not improve are less 
inclined to perform income generation activities and, therefore, need to rely on social 
assistance. Regarding the perceptions regarding changes in the economic situation with 
respect to the past, only the difference in difference regressions show a negative effect 
of social assistance, as coefficients are insignificant when estimating inverse probability 
weighted regressions (section 4.6.1). 
There are different reasons that can explain the non-existent or negative association be-
tween receiving social assistance and subjective well-being. One is the small amount of 
social assistance benefits, which are not sufficient to lift recipients out of poverty and 
improve their subjective well-being. Another explanation could be that beneficiaries are 
disappointed by the state, given that the help they expect is only marginal and not enough 
to cover their basic needs. Finally, an additional explanation is that, based on its past as 
a member of the Soviet Union, poor individuals who receive social assistance in Kyrgyz-
stan suffer from stigma and shame, which would result in lower subjective well-being 
levels. The next sub-section explores whether the effects of social assistance differ with 
regards to age, by making a distinction between those individuals who were part of the 
Soviet system, and those who became adults after independence. 
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Table 4.6: Difference in difference estimation (years 2011, 2012, and 2013) 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Econ. situation better 
than in the past 
Expects 
econ. situation to 
improve 
Treated only in 2012* year 2012 0.20 -0.04 -0.09** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treated only in 2013* year 2013 0.26 0.06 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) 
Treated in 2012 and 2013*  -0.18 -0.15* -0.18** 
Year 2012 (0.26) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treated in 2012 and 2013*  -0.22 -0.01 -0.02 
Year 2013 (0.25) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treated only in -0.09 0.00 0.04* 
2012 (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
Treated only in  -0.43** -0.11** -0.11** 
2013 (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treated in  0.19 0.04 -0.00 
2012 and 2013 (0.21) (0.05) (0.05) 
Year 2012 0.20** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2013 0.20** 0.06** 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17079 17079 17079 
R2 0.13 0.10 0.14 
Source: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights; Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; full regressions are shown in table A4.5 in the appendix. 
Table 4.7: Difference in difference estimation with inverse probability weights (years 2011 and 2012) 
 Life satisfaction Econ. situation better than in 
the past 
Expects econ. situation 
to improve 
Treated*Year 2012 -0.47* -0.11* -0.17** 
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) 
Treated 0.01 0.04 0.08* 
 (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) 
Year 2012 0.23** 0.05** 0.06** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11107 11107 11107 
R2 0.29 0.17 0.22 
Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights; Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; full regressions are shown in table A4.6 in the appendix. 
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4.6.3 Heterogeneity in effects 
In order to shed light on whether perceptions towards poverty and social assistance have 
changed with respect to the former system and whether effects are heterogeneous with 
regards to age, I look at whether those individuals who were adults when Kyrgyzstan 
was still a part of the Soviet Union (currently elderly individuals) assess their situation 
differently than younger individuals.  
The results shown in table 4.8 are an extension of the model presented in table 4.4 and 
include an interaction term between receiving social assistance and whether the respond-
ent is 60 years old or older as an explanatory variable. The table shows that the negative 
effects of social assistance remain, but the interaction is not significant. It seems, there-
fore, that the negative effect of receiving social assistance on subjective well-being ap-
plies to the whole population, and not only to those who lived under the Soviet system.  
Table 4.8: Heterogeneity of the effect of social assistance regarding age (pooled sample) 
 Life satisfaction Econ. situation better than  
in the past 
Expects econ. situation to 
improve 
Receives SA -0.31*** 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Receives SA*elderly 0.27 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 17589 17589 17589 
R2 0.18 0.13 0.17 
Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights; Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; all the other explanatory variables remain very similar to the 
previous estimation (Table 4.4). 
4.7 Conclusion 
There is little evidence about the relationship between social assistance and subjective 
well-being. This is an important question, not only because there is now a consensus on 
the importance of measuring well-being through subjective indicators (Stiglitz, Sen and 
Fitoussi 2009), but also because the mechanisms by which social assistance affect sub-
jective well-being differ from the ones affecting objective well-being. Factors such as the 
design, targeting, and implementation of social protection programmes and, especially, 
whether transfers are associated with shame and stigma, are likely to influence the effects 
of social assistance on subjective well-being. 
Drawing on three rounds of the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey, this paper has analysed a 
country where the social protection system in place and the connotations of poverty are, 
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to a big extent, influenced by its history as a member of the Soviet Union. Under the 
Soviet period, poverty was seen as a pathology and a responsibility directly attributed to 
the poor individual (Barr 1994), and poverty targeted transfers were highly residual and 
stigmatised. Contrary to previous studies that have found a positive relation between 
social assistance and subjective well-being (Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Handa et al. 
2014), this paper finds, in most of the estimations performed, a negative effect of social 
assistance on life satisfaction, as well on the subjective economic expectations with re-
spect to the future. Moreover, to a certain extent, it is also observed that social assistance 
recipients are less likely to report an improvement in the economic situation with respect 
to the past. There are several factors that can explain these finding in the Kyrgyz context.  
One reason could be that benefits are, in general, not large enough to address the nega-
tive mechanisms associated with poverty and, hence, increase satisfaction with life and 
with the household's economic situation. Another explanation could be that beneficiar-
ies are disappointed by the State, given that the help they expect is only marginal and 
not even enough to cover their basic needs. Finally, an additional explanation is that, 
based on its past as a member of the Soviet Union, poor individuals who receive social 
assistance in Kyrgyzstan suffer from stigma and shame, which would result in lower 
subjective well-being levels. This stigmatisation could be partly a result of government 
officials' behaviour. On a recent public opinion survey among residents of Kyrgyzstan, 
more than 70 percent of the citizens think that corruption is a big problem in the country 
and that the government is not making a sufficient effort to fight corruption (Interna-
tional Republican Institute 2017). Concerns about corruption apply to different kinds of 
institutions and organisations, including ministries, universities, the police, etc. This also 
supports past evidence that there are important complaints among social protection ben-
eficiaries about social service officials, who are accused of engaging in unlawful practices, 
abusing their power and humiliating clients (Narayan et al. 2000). 
Moreover, a robust finding is that receiving social assistance is associated with a lower 
likelihood of expecting an improvement in the economic situation in the future. An ad-
ditional explanation for this finding besides the ones mentioned before is that social 
assistance, as compared to labor income, is unlikely to contribute to social mobility in 
Kyrgyzstan. In a study about the prospects for Central Asia, Davalos et al (2016) find 
that citizens in this region believe that new and better jobs, as compared to social assis-
tance and other types of money transfers, are the most important factors to get ahead. 
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution as it could be the result of 
reverse causality (where receiving benefits is, to a certain extent, a result of negative 
hopes about the future).  
One mechanism that this paper cannot test, unfortunately, is whether the negative ef-
fects of social assistance come from the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families, which is a 
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poverty-targeted transfer. As explained before, categorical benefits were not stigmatised 
during Soviet times given that they were income support provided by the state to com-
plement labour income or meet the needs of individuals who were unable to work. Social 
assistance targeted at poor families, on the contrary, was highly stigmatized, as poverty 
was attributed high individual responsibility. One would therefore expect stronger neg-
ative effects on subjective well-being from the MBPF than from categorical benefits. 
The reason why testing this mechanism is not possible is that, when one splits the sample 
of beneficiaries of social assistance between those receiving categorical benefits and 
those receiving the MBPF, descriptive statistics look different to official sources based 
on the Household Integrated Survey, as in the LIK categorical benefits look over re-
ported while the MBPF underreported. An explanation for this is that respondents are 
not aware of the different types of benefits they receive, as the survey includes many 
different categories of social assistance. This potentially results in measurement error. 
To conclude, this study finds that social assistance leads to lower subjective well-being 
levels in Kyrgyzstan. Previous studies have shown that social protection in Kyrgyzstan 
does not lead to big reductions in poverty and, based on these findings, neither does 
social assistance improve the subjective well-being of beneficiaries. Based on the history 
of this country as a member of the Soviet Union, there are reasons to suspect that pov-
erty and poverty-targeted benefits are stigmatised. Moreover, even if categorical benefits 
may not be associated with stigma, individuals seem to have lost the feeling of "from 
cradle to grave" protection that they used to enjoy in the past. 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4.1: Probability of receiving social assistance (marginal effects) 
 Receives SA  
 coef Se 
Urban -0.00 0.01 
Oblast (ref category: Bishkek)  
Issik-Kul 0.01 0.01 
Jalal- Abad 0.06** 0.01 
Naryn 0.06** 0.01 
Batken 0.05** 0.01 
Osh 0.03** 0.01 
Talas 0.05** 0.01 
Chui 0.02+ 0.01 
Osh City 0.03* 0.01 
Age -0.00 0.00 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 
Relation to hh head (ref: hh head)  
Spouse -0.00 0.01 
Son or daughter -0.04** 0.01 
Other -0.02+ 0.01 
Married 0.01 0.01 
Head agriculture 0.02** 0.01 
Head is male -0.03** 0.01 
Ethnicity (ref category: Kyrgyz)  
Uzbek -0.01 0.01 
Russian -0.03** 0.01 
Other -0.01* 0.01 
Good flooring -0.01* 0.00 
Education (ref: no education or primary)  
Secondary -0.01 0.01 
Technical -0.02** 0.01 
University -0.06** 0.01 
Livestock 0.02** 0.00 
Appliances -0.00** 0.00 
Observations 17669  
R2 0.06  
Standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; coefficients are expressed as average marginal effects.  
Table A4.2: Matching quality 
Sample R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched 0.06 0.00 16.7 11.1 
Matched 0.005 0.61 2.8 2.7 
Note: Estimates above show that the matching was done correctly, as the R2 of the model is almost zero and much 
smaller that the R2  before the matching. Moreover, the P-value of the likelihood-ratio test after matching is higher 
than 0.1 (i.e. no joint significance of all covariates after matching), as well as the standardized bias is highly reduced 
after matching and is less than 3%.  
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure A4.1: distribution of the probability of receiving social assistance before (a) and after (b) applying inverse 
probability weights 
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Table A4.3: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Receives SA 17697 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Male 17697 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age 17697 42.8 15.80 18 95 
Age squared 17697 2085 1489 324 9025 
Married 17697 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 17697 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Uzbek 17697 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Russian 17697 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Other 17697 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Oblast  
    
Jalal-Abad 17697 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Naryn 17697 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Batken 17697 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Osh 17697 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Talas 17697 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Chui 17697 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Bishkek 17697 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Osh city 17697 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Urban 17697 0.37 0.48 0 1 
HH size 17697 5.36 2.34 1 15 
HH has kids 17697 0.73 0.11 0 1 
Secondary 17693 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Technical 17693 0.15 0.35 0 1 
University 17693 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Works 17674 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Sports 17681 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Networks 17408 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Personality 17650 0.00 0.82 -3.29 2.19 
Good flooring 17693 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Idiosyncratic shock 17697 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Asset index 17697 0.09 0.92 -1.07 3.11 
Life satisfaction 17697 6.82 2.07 0 10 
Past 17697 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Future 17697 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Livestock 17697 1.39 1.42 0 6 
Appliances 17697 3.38 1.44 0 7 
Head agriculture 17677 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Head male 17677 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Head 17697 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Spouse 17697 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Son or daughter 17697 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Other 17697 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Source: authors' calculations, LiK 2011, 2012 and 2013; estimates express averages across the three years  
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Table A4.4: Association between social assistance and subjective well-being- cross-sections 
 2011 2012 2013 
 Life Econ. Expects Life Econ. Expects Life Econ. Expects 
 Satisfac-
tion 
Situation 
better than 
past 
Econ situ-
ation to 
improve 
Satisfac-
tion 
Situation 
better than 
past 
Econ situ-
ation to 
improve 
Satisfac-
tion 
Situation 
better than 
past 
Econ situ-
ation to 
improve 
Receives SA -0.20* -0.01 -0.03 -0.29* -0.03 -0.06** -0.30* -0.01 -0.08* 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) 
Male -0.20+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.12** -0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01* -0.01* 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.62** 0.05 -0.02 0.68** 0.05 0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.09* 
 (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ethnic 
Kyrgyz 
0.24+ 0.06+ 0.03 0.32+ 0.11** 0.12** 0.13 0.09* 0.09** 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) 
Urban -0.92** -0.15** -0.17** -0.53** -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.44** -0.17** -0.16** 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.20) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) 
HH size 0.03 0.02** 0.03** 0.07* 0.03** 0.04** 0.05* 0.01+ 0.01+ 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH has kids -0.11 0.00 -0.02 -0.24 -0.15** -0.14** -0.22 0.04 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.04) (0.03) 
Education (ref category: primary or no education)       
Secondary      0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.07+ 0.03 -0.75** 0.00 -0.12** 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.05) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.25) (0.04) (0.05) 
Technical     0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.10+ 0.07 -1.16** -0.01 -0.12+ 
 (0.23) (0.05) (0.06) (0.28) (0.05) (0.05) (0.43) (0.05) (0.07) 
University 0.17 0.10 0.07 -0.26 0.09+ 0.07 -0.84* 0.07 -0.11 
 (0.31) (0.07) (0.07) (0.35) (0.05) (0.05) (0.41) (0.09) (0.07) 
Works 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.26+ 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.16) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) 
Plays sports 0.43** 0.19** 0.11** 0.61** 0.01 0.03 0.74** 0.09* 0.10** 
 (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) 
Personality 0.52** 0.01 0.03+ 0.77** 0.10** 0.11** 0.25** -0.00 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.81** 0.12** 0.15** 0.24* 0.10** 0.09** 0.22* 0.04 0.06** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) 
Experienced 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.10** -0.10** -0.11 -0.05+ -0.09** 
Idiosyncratic 
shock 
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 8.37** 0.06 0.09 6.76** 0.26* 0.41** 5.99** 0.22+ 0.50** 
 (0.75) (0.12) (0.11) (0.60) (0.12) (0.12) (1.04) (0.11) (0.17) 
Observations 5873 5873 5873 5874 5874 5874 5842 5842 5842 
R2 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.21 
Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights;  
+p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
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Table A4.5: Difference in difference estimation, full model 
 Life Economic Expects 
 Satisfaction Situation better than past Economic situation to improve 
Treated only in 2012*year2012 0.20 -0.04 -0.09** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treated only in 2013*year2013 0.26 0.06 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) 
Treated in 2012 and  -0.18 -0.15* -0.18** 
2013*year2012 (0.26) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treated in 2012 and  -0.22 -0.01 -0.02 
2013*year2013 (0.25) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treated only in 2012 -0.09 0.00 0.04* 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
Treated only in 2013 -0.43** -0.11** -0.11** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treated in 2012 and 2013 0.19 0.04 -0.00 
 (0.21) (0.05) (0.05) 
Year 2012 0.20** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2013 0.20** 0.06** 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male -0.10** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.05** -0.00* -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.44** 0.06** 0.04** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic kyrgyz 0.29** 0.09** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Urban -0.56** -0.09** -0.07** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH size 0.02* 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has kids 0.10* 0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Works 0.23** 0.03** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Plays sports 0.45** 0.09** 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.43** 0.05** 0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset index 0.41** 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Idiosyncratic shock -0.21** -0.04** -0.03** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 7.05** 0.17** 0.24** 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 17079 17079 17079 
R2 0.13 0.10 0.14 
Linear probability OLS regressions; Robust standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01; Regressions 
include oblast fixed effects and control for the level of education of respondents. 
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Table A4.6: Difference in difference estimation with inverse probability weights, full model 
 Life Economic Expects 
 Satisfaction Situation better than past Economic situation to improve 
Treated in 2012*year2012 -0.47* -0.11* -0.17** 
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) 
Treated in 2012 0.01 0.04 0.08* 
 (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) 
Year 2012 0.23** 0.05** 0.06** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male -0.14 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.02 -0.01** -0.01* 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00* 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.90** 0.10** 0.11** 
 (0.17) (0.02) (0.03) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.32+ 0.14** 0.13** 
 (0.18) (0.02) (0.03) 
Urban -0.39** -0.09** -0.09** 
 (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
HH size 0.05+ 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH has kids -0.35+ -0.09** -0.08** 
 (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) 
Secondary -0.39+ 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) 
Technical -0.17 0.02 0.05 
 (0.27) (0.04) (0.04) 
University -0.87* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.42) (0.05) (0.05) 
Works 0.17 0.04+ 0.04 
 (0.18) (0.02) (0.03) 
Plays sports 0.86** 0.09** 0.14** 
 (0.17) (0.03) (0.04) 
Personality 0.72** 0.08** 0.11** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.21+ 0.07** 0.05** 
 (0.12) (0.01) (0.02) 
Idiosyncratic shock -0.23 -0.04+ -0.06** 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 6.44** 0.25** 0.28** 
 (0.46) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations 11107 11107 11107 
R2 0.29 0.17 0.22 
Linear probability OLS regressions; Robust standard errors in parentheses; +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Regressions 
include oblast fixed effects 
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Table A4.7: Personality index, factor analysis 
Variable Eigenvalue Factor Uniqueness 
Extraversion 1.49 -0.37 0.86 
Openness 0.29 0.53 0.72 
Agreeableness -0.01 0.49 0.76 
Neuroticism -0.20 0.62 0.61 
Conscientiousness -0.25 0.67 0.56 
Note: only eigenvalues higher than one are retained, although the index is robust to different options. 
Table A4.8: Asset index, factor analysis 
Variable Eigenvalue Factor Uniqueness 
Refrigerator 2.16 0.32 0.90 
Gas stove 0.76 0.58 0.66 
Electric stove 0.36 -0.09 0.99 
Microwave 0.26 0.46 0.79 
Sewing machine 0.13 -0.03 0.99 
Washing machine -0.01 -0.18 0.97 
Washing machine -0.05 0.68 0.54 
Mobile phone -0.07 0.12 0.99 
Landline phone -0.12 0.60 0.64 
Internet -0.15 0.52 0.73 
TV -0.17 0.08 0.99 
Computer -0.22 0.60 0.64 
Radio -0.27 0.07 0.99 
Note: only eigenvalues higher than one are retained, although the index is robust to different options. 
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“People think about life in terms of changes, not 
levels. They can be changes from the status quo 
or changes from what was expected, but whatever 
form they take, it is changes that make us happy 
or miserable.” 
(Richard H. Thaler) 
 
“Happiness is the meaning and purpose in life” 
(Aristotle) 
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5.1 Introduction 
Subjective well-being is an important -yet understudied- topic in the migration and re-
mittances literature. The self-assessment by individuals of their own situation with re-
spect to economic, social or political aspects of life is important, as each person is likely 
able to best assess their own welfare (Anderson 2014). Moreover, there is recent litera-
ture stating that different dimensions of subjective well-being, such as lack of stress, 
happiness, and satisfaction with life are positively related with increased productivity, 
improved decision making, and better educational and health outcomes (Attah et al. 
2016).43 While extensive evidence has been found of remittances having a positive effect 
on objective measures of well-being of the household left behind, such as income, con-
sumption, asset accumulation, or educational attainment (see Ratha and Mohapatra 
(2011) for a review of studies), the relationship between remittances and subjective well-
being is more ambiguous. 
When analysing indicators such as life satisfaction, circumstances associated with migra-
tion such as family separation may imply that remittances do not increase happiness, or 
that the increased satisfaction due to an improved economic situation cannot offset the 
decline in happiness due to the migration of a relative and the hard-living conditions 
he/she has to face abroad (Borraz 2008; Jones 2015). Moreover, if one looks at relative 
measures of well-being (how individuals compare themselves to others), it is possible 
that the migration experience of a household member exposed migrant households to 
other lifestyles and therefore the subjective benchmark may now be a different (richer) 
reference group. For instance, there is recent evidence that migration does not lead to 
happiness because, among other reasons, people adjust their reference group (Bartram 
2013).  On the other hand, individuals could feel that they are better off if migration 
increases their economic or social status or if the increase in income is highly correlated 
with improvements in subjective well-being. 
While several studies have looked at the effects of migration and remittances on the 
subjective well-being of migrants, studies looking at the subjective well-being of the 
household left behind are more limited. Anderson (2014), looking at the effects of re-
mittances on subjective economic well-being in Ethiopia using matching techniques, 
finds that money transfers from migrants have a significant and positive impact on 
household subjective economic well-being. Semyonov (2008) combines two measures 
of subjective economic well-being, the households’ self-reported capacity to meet its 
basic needs and its self-assessed relative position compared to the average Filipino fam-
ily, and finds a positive effect of remittances on household well-being. 
                                                        
43 A more extensive definition and discussion of subjective well-being is given in the previous chapter. 
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Looking at indicators such as happiness or satisfaction with the economic situation of 
the household, studies from Latin America find positive or no effects of remittances, 
but negative effects of migration. This means that remittances cannot compensate for 
the decrease in happiness associated with the loss of a family member. Borraz et al. 
(2008) investigate the impact of migration and remittances on household self-reported 
happiness in Ecuador, and find that households with close family members abroad (par-
ents, children, spouses) are less happy than households without a close migrant, whereas 
remittances appear to have no effect on happiness. Jones (2015) finds that the perceived 
economic situation in Mexico improves as a result of remittances received from abroad, 
but that happiness is lower when compared to non-migrants. The author concludes that 
social cohesion (family unity and maintenance of values) is an important determinant of 
happiness, and that the decline in happiness due to lower social cohesion (as a result of 
migration) is higher than the increase in happiness due to remittances. Similarly, Jones 
(2013) findings from his research in Bolivia indicate that economic well-being due to 
migration increases levels of family happiness. However, family disintegration resulting 
from migration decreases family happiness even more, with the net result that migrant 
households are considerably less happy than non-migrant households.  
Drawing on three rounds of the Life in Kyrgyzstan Survey, this paper studies how re-
mittances affect subjective well-being in Kyrgyzstan. This paper contributes to the ex-
isting literature by introducing a new case study and by looking at how money transfers 
from abroad affect both life satisfaction (often used as a proxy for happiness) as well as 
subjective economic well-being. High levels of unemployment after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and a lack of livelihood opportunities in rural areas of Kyrgyzstan, resulted 
in many families choosing migration as the only way out of poverty (ICG 2016). Remit-
tances, therefore, constitute an important poverty reduction strategy and many families 
rely on them to cover their daily needs (Guelfi and Sattar 2015). The specificities of 
migration in Kyrgyzstan, its history as a member of the Soviet Union, and its family 
values and traditions, are likely to influence the relationship between remittances and 
subjective well-being and, consequently, lead to different findings from the previous case 
studies analysed so far. 
The next section provides a more detailed overview of migration and remittances in 
Kyrgyzstan, while section 5.3 presents the data and the empirical strategy to study the 
relationship between remittances and subjective well-being. Section 5.4 discusses the re-
sults, while section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Case study: Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan is considered one of the poorest countries in Central Asia. The country’s 
main economic activity is agriculture (predominantly farming), and a third of its popula-
tion is considered poor. Lack of livelihood opportunities in rural areas, where most of 
the poor live, encourages families to engage in migration to escape poverty (World Bank 
2017). As a result, the country is highly dependent on remittances: in 2016, money sent 
by migrants abroad accounted for 34.5 percent of the country’s GDP (World Bank and 
KNOMAD 2017), which makes Kyrgyzstan first in the world in terms of the relative 
importance of international remittances to the country’s economy. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, limited income generating opportunities 
due to low industrial production resulted in many working age adults seeking better op-
portunities abroad. Labour migrants mainly seek temporarily employment in Russia and 
other neighbouring countries (Lukashova and Makenbaeva 2009). In 2010, the stock of 
migrants was estimated at 204,382 (UNDP 2017). This is a conservative estimate as it 
does not take into account long-term migrants that are no longer considered a part of 
the household, or a large number of the undocumented and irregular migrants (Ruget 
and Usmanalieva 2008). Other sources (Lukashova and Makenbaeva 2009) give esti-
mates that go up to 1 million migrants. 
Migration is part of the everyday people's lives in Kyrgyzstan, and it is mainly a tempo-
rary solution for young people that should conclude with return (Thieme 2014). Due to 
the determinant role of remittances -received by approximately 25 percent of the Kyrgyz 
population- for poverty reduction (Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015; Guelfi and 
Sattar 2015), migration is regarded as something positive as it has significantly improved 
the economic situation of households. Nevertheless, the side effects of migration include 
labor shortages and lack of qualified and well-trained personnel in rural areas, where 
most migrants come from (Thieme 2014).  
While it is clear that the economic situation of migrant households has improved as a 
result of migration, the subjective assessment of individuals of their own well-being can 
also include the wider impacts of migration for the family and the community such as 
labour shortages and changes in care arrangements for children and the elderly (Thieme 
2014). As a social worker from the province of Batken explains in an interview: “Our 
country is saved by migration”... but it has destroyed the family as an institution, and children are left 
behind” (ICG 2016, P.4). As a result, and while one would expect migrant families to 
report an improvement in their economic situation, the effects on life satisfaction will 
depend on how individuals define well-being and how migration affects the different 
components of well-being, which not only include material aspects. 
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5.3 Data and methodology 
5.3.1 Data and indicators 
This analysis draws on data from the Life in Kyrgyzstan (LiK) survey, a longitudinal 
dataset which covers a sample of approximately 3,000 households (and 8,000 individu-
als) and is representative at the national level. Three waves (2011, 2012, and 2013) are 
used and merged into a balanced panel. Regarding the measures of well-being used, the 
first one relates to the general satisfaction with life, and the other two constitute subjec-
tive measures of economic well-being: whether the household’s economic situation has 
improved with respect to the previous year, and whether the household expects to be 
better-off in the next year.  
The main explanatory variable is the amount of remittances received by the respondent’s 
household. This variable is based on the sub-section “material aid” of the household 
questionnaire, which asks whether the household has received money transfers from 
persons living abroad and, if this is the case, the average amount received per month. A 
more detailed explanation of the dataset and subjective well-being indicators analysed 
are provided in Chapter 4. 
The LiK dataset includes many variables which are relevant in determining subjective 
well-being and can therefore be included in the analysis (see Handa et al. 2014; Deaton 
2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). These include basic demographic and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of respondents -such as sex, age, education, ethnicity, and whether 
the individual works-, as well as household characteristics, such as whether the house-
hold experienced an idiosyncratic shock in the last year, the household size, assets hold-
ing, and place of residence (including the oblast and whether the household lives in an 
urban or rural area).44 Asset holding is an index created through factor analysis, and 
includes media appliances (such as radio, computer, television, mobile phone) and home 
appliances (including refrigerator, washing machine, etc.).  
Finally, the analysis includes individual characteristics that are expected to affect subjec-
tive well-being, such as whether the individual practices sports. Given that the survey 
includes a section on personality consisting of different questions that measure the ex-
tent of extraversion, openness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness of the 
respondent (the big five personality traits), I create an index for personality and include 
it as an independent variable in the regressions.45  
                                                        
44 Other variables such as quality of flooring or the income per capita before transfers were originally included in 
the analysis, but were finally left out as they were highly correlated with other welfare variables and lacked explana-
tory power.  
45 The asset and personality indices are created in the same way as in the previous chapter (see appendix A4). 
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5.3.2 Empirical strategy 
To estimate the relationship between remittances and subjective well-being and using the 
three years of data available, several versions of the following equation are estimated: 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 (1) 
Where i indexes individuals, h households, k oblasts, and t time (years). 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 refers 
to three different subjective well-being indicators, while  𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 is the main explana-
tory variable that indicates the monthly per capita amount of remittances received by an 
individual. As robustness checks, the value of remittances is substituted with a binary 
variable indicating treatment status (whether or not an individual lives in a household 
that receives remittances).  𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 is a vector of individual level controls, whereas 𝑋ℎ𝑘𝑡 is 
a vector of household level controls. 𝛼𝑘 refers to the oblast fixed effects, and 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 is 
the idiosyncratic error. 
Panel data techniques are useful to address econometric challenges such as unobserved 
heterogeneity, which arises when the explanatory variables are correlated with individual 
unobserved effects. In this specific case, one can expect that certain variables which are 
unobserved and are expected to influence whether an individual receives remittances, 
such as ability, motivation, specific needs that the individual may have, may also influ-
ence his or her level of life satisfaction or subjective economic well-being. When the 
dependent variable is continuous, this is often solved by estimating a fixed effects re-
gression, exploiting the within individual variation over time. However, this is not pos-
sible in nonlinear models (for example, in cases where the dependent variable is dichot-
omous). 
One way to solve this problem is by applying a correlated random effects model (CRE) 
employing the Mundlak (1978) approach, which allows correlation between the unob-
served individual effects and the regressors by adding group means of the time varying 
explanatory variables in the model (Gebreeyesus 2015). Given that the subjective well-
being variables analysed in this paper can be either binary (in the case of therelative 
economic situation with respect to the past and to the future) or ordinal (in the case of 
the life satisfaction indicator), I estimate correlated random effects probit in the first 
case, and correlated random effects ordered probit in the second one. A modified ver-
sion of the model is shown below: 
𝑆𝑊𝐵∗𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽4?̅?𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽5?̅?ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘 +
𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡   (2) 
Equation (2) is an extended version of (1), and incorporates a vector of the average time 
varying variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 𝑆𝑊𝐵∗ is the latent variable 
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to be estimated. Alternatively, linear probability models are estimated treating the de-
pendent variables as continuous and incorporating the time invariant error or individual 
fixed effect “ 𝛼𝑖 ”.  
Although panel data analysis can solve the heterogeneity and self-selection problem46 
(assuming that the unobserved variables correlated with the variables in the regression 
are time invariant), in the case of remittances there can also be a problem of reverse 
causality that cannot be solved with fixed effects estimators. The reason for this is that 
low levels of life satisfaction or subjective economic well-being can drive members of a 
household to migrate and therefore to send remittances. To solve the identification 
problem, an instrumental variable approach is used. 
The instrument is an indicator of migrant networks (measured through the percentage 
of households in the community with a migrant abroad) interacted with a variable indi-
cating the percentage of households in the community where the eldest person speaks 
Russian as a second language. The first one has been widely used in the migration liter-
ature, as networks are shared at the community level and decrease the costs of migration 
(McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Waidler et al. 2016, among others). Regarding the sec-
ond one, and given that the majority of migrants go to Russia, one can assume that those 
individuals who grew up in a household where a member spoke Russian are more likely 
to migrate. A similar instrument has been used by Azzarri and Zezza (2011) for Tajiki-
stan, a country that shares the same past Soviet history and has similar migration patterns 
to Kyrgyzstan. According to the sample used, only 6 percent of respondents are ethnic 
Russians and the majority speaks Kyrgyz as a first language, so it is unlikely that living 
in a household where a household member speaks Russian is correlated with individual 
subjective well-being, which would violate the exogeneity condition.47 Both indicators 
are defined at a community level, as in this way they are less likely to influence the de-
pendent variable. While this paper acknowledges that the instrument could still violate 
the exogeneity condition, the aim is to see whether results hold when applying this tech-
nique, as this will give more validity to the findings. 
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method of instrumental variable estimation is used. 
The instrumental variable estimation is denoted as: 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑚
∗
𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 (3) 
Where 𝑆𝑊𝐵 is the outcome variable,  𝑟𝑒𝑚∗ is the instrumented variable indicating the 
amount of per capita remittances that households receive (measured in logs), and 𝑌 and 
                                                        
46 Recipients of remittances are not randomly assigned, and therefore they are likely to have specific characteristics 
which are different from non-recipients. 
47 To be cautious, however, we also estimate the regressions using only the instrument for networks (and exclude 
the language one). Results remain qualitatively very similar. 
Chapter 5 
150 
X are the same exogenous variables included in the models presented above. The esti-
mation is performed in two steps: first, the amount of remittances is estimated based on 
the instrument (Networks and Russian as a second language interaction variable) and 
the other exogenous variables. Second, the fitted values of the first regression are used 
in the main equation to predict subjective well-being. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive results 
Given that the subjective well-being questionnaire was only administered to individuals 
over 17 years old, this analysis only includes adult respondents. After removing from the 
sample those individuals who did not answer the subjective well-being questionnaire in 
the three years, the final balanced sample is made of 5,899 individuals. The tables below 
show some descriptive statistics of the final sample. Table 5.1 shows the percentage of 
individuals living in households receiving international remittances, as well as the average 
amount received (per capita), and the percentage of total household income that this 
transfer represents. More than 15 percent of individuals in the sample live in households 
receiving remittances. International remittances have been increasing in value and consti-
tute an important source of income in recipient households: in 2013, 56 percent of house-
hold income came from international remittances. Table 5.1 also shows that the majority 
of migrant households (more than 80 percent) receive remittances. 
Table 5.1: Transfer incidence by year 
International remittances 2011 2012 2013 
% living in recipient households 15.7 15.2 16.3 
% living in recipient –migrant-households 88.5 82.2 81.2 
Per capita received in recipient hhs (KGS)* 982 1683 2672 
% of remittances out of total income in recipient 
households 
30.9 39.1 56.0 
Source: authors’ calculations; LiK 2011, 2012, 2013. *KGS is the abbreviation of the local currency (Kyrgyz Som). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the mean levels of life satisfaction by transfer recipient status. In gen-
eral, differences in average levels of life satisfaction between remittance recipients and 
non-recipients are small. Remittance recipients are slightly more satisfied than non-re-
cipients in 2011 as well as in 2012 (although in the first case differences are only signifi-
cant at a 10 percent level). Looking at subjective economic well-being (figure 5.2), remit-
tance recipients have always, on average, higher subjective well-being levels than non-
recipients, and differences are always significant at a 1 percent level.  
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At a first glance, it seems that remittance recipients have better economic conditions than 
non-recipients, yet differences in life satisfaction are smaller or insignificant. These de-
scriptive results only provide a preliminary view of how subjective well-being differs be-
tween remittance recipients and non-recipients, however. In order to see the extent to 
which remittances affect subjective well-being, regression analysis is needed. Table A5.1 
in the appendix presents a descriptive summary of all the variables used in the analysis, 
and the next sub-section shows the results from the econometric estimations. 
 
                            Figure 5.1: Average life satisfaction by remittance recipient status 
                          Source: authors’ calculations, LiK 2011, 2012, and 2013. 
                Differences between recipients and non-recipients are significant in 2011 (at a 10% level), and in 2012 (at a 1% level) 
 
                             Figure 5.2: Subjective economic well-being by transfer recipient status 
                            Source: authors’ calculations, LiK 2011, 2012, and 2013.  
                   Differences between recipients and non-recipients are always significant at a 1% level  
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5.4.2 Results from regression analysis 
The effects of transfers on life satisfaction are shown in table 5.2, whereas tables 5.3 and 
5.4 show the results for the subjective economic wellbeing indicators. The effect of re-
mittances on life satisfaction is insignificant in all specifications, and this also holds when 
one looks at the continuous variable as well as the binary variable indicating remittance 
recipient status (table A5.3 in the appendix). This means one cannot conclude that 
money sent from migrants living abroad corresponds with increases in life satisfaction. 
It seems that money coming from remittances is not sufficient to change the levels of 
life satisfaction of households left behind, which could be due to the negative costs as-
sociated with migration, such as labor shortages and lack of services in rural areas, adults 
having to leave their children and parents behind, etc.  
When looking at how remittances affect the subjective economic situation of the house-
hold with respect to the past, however, findings are more positive (table 5.3). An increase 
in 100 Kyrgyz Soms (KGS) of per capita remittances received increases the probability 
of individuals reporting an improvement in the economic situation by 1 percentage 
point, and this holds in all three specifications (random effects probit, correlated random 
effects probit, and fixed effects). Moreover, those who receive remittances are 6 to 7 
percentage points more likely to report an improvement in the economic situation with 
respect to the past, as compared to non-recipients (table A5.4). Given the size of remit-
tances in recipient households, results confirm expectations that remittances are likely 
to contribute to an improvement in subjective economic well-being. Remittances also 
increase the expectation that the economic situation will improve in the next year; yet, 
the coefficient for remittances is only significant in the first specification (table 5.4). 
Looking at the control variables, most coefficients have the expected sign: individuals 
who are younger, married or female are more likely to have higher subjective well-being 
levels. However, the effects of age and gender only hold for the life satisfaction indicator 
(and not in all specifications), as the coefficients are not significant in the subjective 
economic well-being regressions. Factors like working, practicing sports, and having 
good living conditions (such as more assets) are also associated with higher subjective 
well-being levels. Having been exposed to a shock, on the contrary, is negatively associ-
ated with well-being. Belonging to an ethnic minority, as well as living in urban areas, 
also corresponds to lower well-being levels. The level of education, however, does not 
seem to affect subjective well-being. 
Table 5.5 shows the second stage results of the instrumental variable estimations (both 
fixed and random effects), and the first stage regression is shown in table A5.2 in the 
appendix. The instrument used to predict international remittances is positive and sig-
nificant at a one-percent level. Additional goodness-of-fit tests—the Kleibergen-Paap F 
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statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) further confirm the relevance of the instrument. 
Most of the other variables included in the first stage regression are statistically signifi-
cant. Not surprisingly, individuals who work, who are male, and who live in urban areas 
are less likely to live in households receiving large amounts of remittances. Furthermore, 
all the provinces with the exception of Naryn receive, on average, larger amounts of 
remittances than the capital Bishkek, which confirms previous evidence from Kyrgyz-
stan that most remittances go to rural areas (Thieme 2014). The likelihood of receiving 
larger amounts of remittances increases with household size, with idiosyncratic shocks 
and with education up to the university level. This means that the amount of remittances 
received is higher for those with secondary or technical education, but those with a uni-
versity degree are not necessarily more likely to receive remittances than those with pri-
mary education. Given that highly educated people are usually better-off and that the 
demand for highly skilled personnel in Central Asia is large (Sondergaard et al. 2012), it 
is expected that those with higher levels of education are less likely to migrate or receive 
remittances. Household wealth (measured through the asset index) is positively related 
with the amount of remittances received. 
Looking at the coefficient of interest in table 5.5 –logarithm of remittances- we see that 
the effect on life satisfaction is insignificant, whereas the effect on the subjective eco-
nomic well-being with respect to the past is positive and significant in both the random 
and the fixed effects models, which confirms the findings presented above. In addition, 
coefficients are higher in magnitude: an increase in 100 KGS of per capita remittances 
increases the likelihood of reporting improvements with respect to the past by 6 to 10 
percentage points. A possible explanation for this is that individuals who migrate have 
lower subjective well-being levels to begin with, so not accounting for reverse causality 
leads to downward bias. This is very likely in Kyrgyzstan, given that migrants leave the 
country due to a lack of economic and job opportunities. With regard to the subjective 
economic situation with respect to the future, now coefficients are positive and signifi-
cant in both the random effects and fixed effects instrumental variable regressions. 
These results suggest that, after accounting for the fact that remittance recipient house-
holds (most of which are migrant households) have lower subjective well-being levels 
than non-recipients before receiving remittances, an increase in the amount of money 
received from abroad improves their economic expectations. 
Given that the 2SLS regression model is designed for continuous dependent variables 
and to account for the fact that the dependent variables in this analysis are either binary 
or ordinal, control functions are estimated. Following Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and 
Gebreeyesus (2015), I combine the correlated random effects approach (CRE) from be-
fore with a control function approach (CF), which produces consistent estimates in non-
linear models with endogenous explanatory variables. Within this method, I estimate the 
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residuals from the first-stage regression predicting the amount of remittances received 
and include them as an additional variable in the second stage equation (Waidler et al. 
2016). The first stage includes all explanatory variables described before, as well as the 
means of the time varying variables, and the networks-language instrument.  
After applying this technique (see table 5.6), the effects of remittances on life satisfaction 
remain insignificant, whereas the effects on respondents’ economic situation with re-
spect to the past are again positive and significant (in line with previous estimations). In 
terms of the last specification, however, the coefficient for remittances becomes insig-
nificant, which means that the positive effect of remittances on subjective economic 
expectations does not hold with respect to the previous instrumental variable estimates. 
Moreover, a diagnostic test of endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman rejects that 
remittances are exogenous only when analysing the subjective economic situation with 
respect to the past, as the residuals are only significant in this specification. 
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Table 5.2: Effects of remittances on life satisfaction 
 Life satisfaction 
RE ordered probit 
Life satisfaction 
Fixed effects 
Life satisfaction 
CRE ordered probit 
Log of per capita 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Remittances (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Male -0.05*  -0.08** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Age -0.03** 0.09* 0.04+ 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
Age squared 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.25** 0.19+ 0.12+ 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.17**  0.18** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Urban -0.31**  -0.34** 
 (0.03)  (0.03) 
Household size 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Household has kids 0.05+ -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) 
Education (ref category: primary or no education)  
Secondary 0.00 0.09 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.23) (0.15) 
Technical -0.01 -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.15) 
University 0.07+ 0.19 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.28) (0.18) 
Works 0.13** 0.21** 0.13** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Plays sports 0.25** 0.26** 0.16** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Personality 0.27**  0.27** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.06** -0.08* -0.03 
Shock (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Asset index 0.23** 0.13** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Constant  3.60**  
  (1.07)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma2_u 0.25  0.25 
Within R2  0.01  
Means of time-varying variables No - Yes 
Joint test of time-average variables - - 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
Given that the coefficients of the ordered probit do not have an interpretation, I also calculate marginal effects for 
each level of the dependent variable, but coefficients are not significant either. Means of average time variables are 
excluded in the correlated random effects probit, but most of them are significant. The joint test of equality of 
means is rejected, which means that there is unobserved heterogeneity and the correlated random effects model is 
the correct specification. 
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Table 5.3: Effects of remittances on subjective economic well-being with respect to the past 
 SWB-past 
RE probit 
(marginal effects) 
SWB-past 
Fixed effects 
SWB-past 
CRE probit 
(marginal effects) 
Log of per capita  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
Remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.00  -0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age -0.00* 0.02* 0.02+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.06** 0.12** 0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.09**  0.09** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Urban -0.10**  -0.10** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household size 0.01** -0.02* -0.01+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household has kids 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education (ref category: primary or no education)  
Secondary 0.01 0.21** 0.22** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
Technical 0.01 0.13* 0.14* 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
University 0.05** 0.27** 0.28** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Works 0.03** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Plays sports 0.08** 0.04** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.05**  0.05** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.03** -0.04** -0.04** 
Shocks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.07** 0.02 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  -0.62*  
  (0.26)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma_u 0.44  0.45 
Within R2  0.01  
Includes means of time-varying 
variables 
No - Yes 
Joint test of time-average variables 
(Prob > chi2) 
- - 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
Means of average time variables are excluded in the correlated random effects probit, but most of them are signifi-
cant. The joint test of equality of means is rejected, which means that there is unobserved heterogeneity and the 
correlated random effects model is the correct specification. 
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Table 5.4: Effects of remittances on subjective economic well-being with respect to the future 
 SWB-future 
RE probit 
(marginal effects) 
SWB-future 
Fixed effects 
SWB-future 
CRE probit 
(marginal effects) 
Log of per capita  0.01** 0.00 0.00 
remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.00  -0.02* 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age -0.00 0.02+ 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.05** 0.08** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.10**  0.10** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Urban -0.07**  -0.08** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household size 0.01** -0.02** -0.02* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household has kids 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education (ref category: primary or no education)  
Secondary -0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
Technical -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
University 0.03 0.11 0.12 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Works 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Plays sports 0.07** 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.08**  0.08** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
Shocks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.06** 0.02+ 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  -0.35  
  (0.28)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma_u 0.50  0.50 
Within R2  0.01  
Includes means of time-varying 
variables 
No - Yes 
Joint test of time-average variables - - 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
Means of average time variables are excluded in the correlated random effects probit, but most of them are signifi-
cant. Moreover, the joint test of equality of means is rejected, which means that there is unobserved heterogeneity 
and the correlated random effects model is the correct specification. 
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Table 5.5: Second-stage IV results 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
Life 
Satisfaction 
SWB - Past SWB - Past SWB - Future SWB - Future 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Log of  0.04 0.06 0.06** 0.10** 0.02+ 0.05* 
Remittances (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Male -0.08*  0.00  -0.00  
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Age -0.05** 0.09* -0.01** 0.02+ -0.00 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00** -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.44** 0.20+ 0.07** 0.13** 0.05** 0.09** 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Urban -0.55**  -0.09**  -0.07**  
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Household size 0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.02* 0.01* -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Household has  0.09+ -0.07 0.04* 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Kids (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Education (ref category: primary or no education)     
Secondary 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.16+ -0.02 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.26) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) 
Technical -0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.08 -0.03+ -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.24) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
University  0.12 0.15 0.04** 0.21* 0.02 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.31) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07) 
Works 0.22** 0.22** 0.04** 0.06** 0.01 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.44**  0.05**  0.08**  
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Experienced  -0.12** -0.08+ -0.04** -0.05** -0.02** -0.03* 
idiosyncratic shocks (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.37** 0.13** 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 7.24** 3.68** 0.31** -0.50* 0.30** -0.29 
 (0.18) (0.91) (0.05) (0.25) (0.04) (0.30) 
Observations 17613 17658 17613 17658 17613 17658 
R2 0.13 0.002 0.06 0.004 0.13 0.0001 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
 200  200  200 
Davidson-Mackinnon 
test of exogeneity 
 p-value 
=0.33 
 p-value 
=0.00 
 p-value 
=0.00 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed 
effects. The test of exogeneity is rejected in the two subjective economic well-being regressions (past and future), 
which means that in these regressions the coefficient for remittances is endogenous. 
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Table 5.6: Control function estimates 
 Life satisfaction SWB- Past SWB- Future 
  Probit Probit 
 Ordered probit Marginal effects Marginal effects 
Logarithm of per capita 0.10 0.19** 0.02 
Remittances (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
Residuals -0.10 -0.18** -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Average time varying  
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17613 17613 17613 
Sigma2_u 0.25   
Sigma_u  0.45 0.50 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions include all the controls 
variables from the previous regressions as well as the averages time varying variables to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In the last few decades we have seen an increase in the number of studies looking at the 
effects of remittances on different indicators of well-being. While there is extensive ev-
idence and general agreement that remittances improve objective indicators of well-be-
ing (such as income, educational attainment, consumption, food security, etc.), the rela-
tionship between remittances and subjective levels of well-being is more ambiguous. 
Migration and remittances can increase or decrease subjective well-being based on the 
reference group of the household left behind, as well as on the emotional consequences 
of having a member abroad.  
This paper has estimated the relationship between remittances and several indicators of 
subjective well-being through several econometric techniques, such as correlated ran-
dom effects models and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, control variables 
that are usually unobserved, such as an index for personality traits, were included in the 
analysis. Subjective well-being has mainly been studied in Latin America and, given the 
specificities of migration in Kyrgyzstan and the country's history as a member of the 
Soviet Union, providing a new case study is an important contribution to the literature. 
Due to the determinant role of remittances for the country's economy, this paper hy-
pothesised that money transfers from migrants would increase the subjective economic 
well-being of households left behind. This paper finds that remittances are associated 
with feelings of improvement in the economic situation of the household with respect 
to the past, and these positive effects hold in all specifications. These findings are also 
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in line with previous studies looking at the effects of remittances on subjective economic 
well-being, which all find positive effects. Moreover, in some of the estimations per-
formed, remittances are associated with a higher likelihood of expecting an improvement 
in the economic situation in the future.  
When looking at the indicator for life satisfaction, remittances appear to have neither 
positive nor negative effects on subjective well-being. In line with previous evidence, 
other negative factors related to receiving remittances and having a member abroad 
could counteract the positive feelings of experiencing an improvement in the economic 
situation. According to a World Bank book about how poor people define well-being in 
different parts of the world, people in Kyrgyzstan understand well-being as "good life 
and wealth...however... well-being is impossible without tolerance, peace, family and 
children". Well-being is also defined as “stability on a household and society level and 
ability to satisfy one’s material and spiritual needs.” (Narayan et al. 2000). It seems, there-
fore, that despite being vital for helping households to satisfy basic needs and improving 
their living conditions, remittances are not sufficient to increase recipients’ satisfaction 
with life. 
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Appendix 5 
Table A5.1: Summary statistics at baseline (2011) 
Variable  Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Receives remittances 5899 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Logarithm of remittances 5899 0.98 2.32 0 8.87 
Male 5899 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age 5899 41.7 15.8 18 93 
Age squared 5899 1991 1454 324 8649 
Married 5899 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 5899 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Oblast      
Jalal-Abad 5899 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Naryn 5899 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Batken 5899 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Osh 5899 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Talas 5899 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Chui 5899 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Bishkek 5899 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Osh City 5899 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Urban 5899 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Household size 5899 5.5 2.4 1 15 
Household has kids 5899 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Secondary 5897 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Technical 5897 0.18 0.38 0 1 
University 5897 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Works 5894 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Sports 5897 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Personality 5883 0.01 0.82 -3.29 2.18 
Idiosyncratic shock 5899 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Asset index 5899 0.09 0.89 -1.07 3.11 
Life satisfaction 5899 6.74 2.21 0 10 
Past 5899 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Future 5899 0.51 0.50 0 1 
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Table A5.2: First-stage IV regression 
Logarithm of per capita Coefficient Standard 
Remittances  error 
Male -0.13** (0.05) 
Age 0.05** (0.01) 
Age squared -0.00** (0.00) 
Married -0.14* (0.06) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz -0.07 (0.05) 
Household size 0.16* (0.01) 
Household has kids -0.63** (0.06) 
Oblast (ref Bishkek)   
Issyk-Kul 0.22* (0.11) 
Jalal-Abad 1.34** (0.11) 
Naryn -0.06 (0.14) 
Batken 1.17** (0.12) 
Osh 0.87** (0.11) 
Talas 0.62** (0.14) 
Chui 0.18+ (0.10) 
Osh city 0.48** (0.13) 
Urban -0.17* (0.07) 
Education (ref primary or no education)   
Secondary 0.20** (0.07) 
Technical 0.25** (0.09) 
University 0.11 (0.09) 
Works -0.14** (0.05) 
Sports 0.17** (0.05) 
Idiosyncratic shock 0.00 (0.03) 
Personality 0.14** (0.04) 
Asset index 0.09** (0.03) 
Networks*Russian 4.05** (0.19) 
Constant -1.41** (0.21) 
Observations 17613  
R2 0.14  
Wald chi2(25)  
Prob > chi2  
1941 
0.00 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table A5.3: Effects of receiving remittances on life satisfaction 
 Life satisfaction 
RE ordered probit 
Life satisfaction 
Fixed effects 
Life satisfaction 
CRE ordered probit 
Receives  0.02 0.01 0.02 
remittances (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Male -0.05*  -0.09** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Age -0.03** 0.09* 0.04+ 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
Age squared 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.25** 0.19+ 0.12+ 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.17**  0.18** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
Urban -0.31**  -0.34** 
 (0.03)  (0.03) 
Household size 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Household has kids 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) 
Secondary 0.00 0.09 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.23) (0.15) 
Technical -0.01 -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.15) 
University 0.07+ 0.19 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.28) (0.18) 
Works 0.13** 0.21** 0.13** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Plays sports 0.25** 0.26** 0.16** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Personality 0.27**  0.27** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.06** -0.08* -0.03 
shock (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Asset index 0.23** 0.13** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Constant  3.60**  
  (1.07)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma2_u 0.25  0.25 
Within R2  0.01  
Joint test of equality of means -  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
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Table A5.4: Effects of receiving remittances on subjective economic well-being with respect to the past 
 SWB-past 
RE probit 
(marginal effects) 
SWB-past 
Fixed effects 
SWB-past 
CRE probit 
(marginal effects) 
Receives  0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 
remittances (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male -0.00  -0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age -0.00* 0.02* 0.02+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.06** 0.12** 0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.09**  0.09** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Urban -0.10**  -0.10** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household size 0.01** -0.02* -0.02+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household has kids 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Secondary 0.02 0.21** 0.22** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
Technical 0.01 0.13* 0.14* 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
University 0.05** 0.27** 0.28** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Works 0.03** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Plays sports 0.08** 0.04** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.05**  0.05** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.03** -0.04** -0.05** 
shock (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.07** 0.02 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  -0.64*  
  (0.26)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma_u 0.44  0.45 
Within R2  0.01  
Joint test of equality of means -  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
In pursuit of happiness: do remittances improve subjective well-being? 
167 
Table A5.5: Effects of receiving remittances on subjective economic well-being with respect to the future 
 SWB-future 
RE probit 
(marginal effects) 
SWB-future 
Fixed effects 
SWB-future 
CRE probit 
(marginal effects) 
Receives  0.03** 0.02 0.02 
remittances (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male -0.00  -0.02* 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age -0.00 0.02+ 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.05** 0.08** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnic Kyrgyz 0.10**  0.10** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Urban -0.07**  -0.08** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household size 0.01** -0.02** -0.02* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household has kids 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Secondary -0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
Technical -0.04* -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
University 0.03 0.11 0.12 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Works 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Plays sports 0.07** 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personality 0.08**  0.08** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Experienced idiosyncratic -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
shock (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index 0.06** 0.02+ 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  -0.36  
  (0.28)  
Observations 17613 17658 17613 
Sigma_u 0.50  0.50 
Within R2  0.01  
Joint test of equality of means -  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Regressions also include oblast fixed effects. 
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This final chapter highlights the key findings derived from this dissertation. Section 6.1 
summarises and discusses the main conclusions as well as the implications for policy and 
research from each chapter. Section 6.2 gives a more general overview of the role of 
social assistance and remittances in the fight against poverty. Finally, Section 6.3 dis-
cusses the main limitations of this study as well as directions for future research, while 
Section 6.4 concludes. 
6.1 Key findings and implications 
This dissertation has explored the relationship between public (social assistance) and 
private (remittances) transfers and a wide range of well-being indicators, from food se-
curity to subjective well-being and expenditure patterns. In doing so, it has contributed 
to a better understanding of the links between remittances and social assistance given 
that both are social protection mechanisms used by households to meet basic needs and 
build resilience against shocks. They key findings from each chapter are summarised 
below. 
Key finding 1: Social assistance transfers can achieve the desired outcomes even 
in the absence of conditions tied to certain behaviours 
Key finding 2: Neither remittances nor social assistance transfers are “misused”. 
Chapter 2 explored the expenditure patterns of remittances and social assistance trans-
fers in South Africa and showed that the two social assistance transfers (Old Age 
Pension and Child Support Grant) as well as remittances are spent differently than other 
sources of income. The Child Support Grant increased expenditure on education and, 
in some cases, on food. This increase was not only due to an income effect, but also due 
to a substitution effect: households spent more on education from the Child Support 
Grant than from other sources of income. One possible explanation for this finding is a 
labelling effect, which would imply that transfers are spent on children because the 
programme is targeted at them and it is aimed at improving their well-being. Meanwhile, 
the Old Age Pension was spent disproportionately on goods that improve child well-
being as well as the well-being of the household as a whole, as an increase in pension 
income led to an increase in the share spent on food, education, and utility bills. This 
result was unexpected, as one would not anticipate pension income to alter the patterns 
of expenditure within a household (as they often replace the income that was previously 
earned in the market). A possible explanation is that a non-negligible amount of 
households in South Africa depend on this grant, and in many of them it constitutes the 
main source of income. Remittance income was also spent differently than other sources 
of income, as it increased expenditure on food and decreased the share of expenditure 
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on other non-basic goods, such as alcohol, tobacco, and clothing by more than other 
sources of income.  
One main implication from these findings is that social assistance transfers can bring the 
desired outcomes despite not being conditional upon certain behaviours. Provided that 
the effects from the Child Support Grant are explained by a labelling effect, this would 
imply that the government is effectively targeting and delivering the message that the 
grant is meant to be spent on children and, especially, on children’s education. This 
would also imply that the programme is achieving its intended outcomes even if the 
grant is unconditional. 
In addition, this chapter adds to the existing evidence that unconditional cash transfers 
are spent on necessities like food as well as on human capital goods (Haushofer and 
Shapiro 2013; The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012). This implies unconditional 
transfers can lead to positive long-term well-being outcomes and contribute to breaking 
the inter-generational transmission of poverty despite transfers not being conditional 
upon certain behaviours (such as attending school). Conditional cash transfers have very 
high administrative costs and high costs of participation for beneficiaries (Handa et al. 
2009). In addition, and although there are political motivations for implementing 
conditional cash transfers, it is not clear whether the positive impacts of CCTs that have 
been observed in other contexts like Latin America are due to the conditionalities per 
se, or as a result of an increase in income that would be spent on these goods and services 
anyways (Handa et al. 2009). 
A key factor when analysing the efficiency of social protection programmes is the way 
in which recipients spend social assistance transfers. In policy debates, many arguments 
against the broadening of social protection systems are based on presumptions that 
recipients misuse or make unwise decisions on how to spend transfers (Du Toit and 
Neves 2009). As a result, it is important to understand how expenditure decisions are 
made in poor households. In the migration and development debate, there have also 
been claims that remittances are used for conspicuous consumption and that, thefore, 
they do not contribute to development. This chapter has shown that neither social 
assistance nor remittances are misused, as they are associated with an increase in 
spending either on basic goods or on human capital goods. 
Key finding 3: Food security is more than food. Both public and private transfers 
increase the quantity and variety of food consumed, but this does not necessarily 
translate into better nutritional outcomes 
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Chapter 3 examined the impact of social grants (social assistance) and remittances on 
food security and nutritional outcomes. Dietary diversity index (DDI) at the household 
level and body mass index (BMI) at the individual level (children and adults) were used 
as the key measures of food security status. This Chapter concluded that the Old Age 
Pension and remittances improved food security due to an income effect. This was not 
the case with the Child Support Grant, most likely due to the fact that transfers were 
very small in size. Neither the Old Age Pension nor remittances improved nutritional 
outcomes, however. In the case of the Child Support Grant, after performing some ad-
ditional estimations to create an appropriate counterfactual and reduce the likelihood of 
endogeneity bias, a positive effect on children’s BMI was observed. This is also an im-
portant finding and it gives further indication (in line with the findings from Chapter 2) 
that the Child Support Grant leads to positive nutritional outcomes. 
Despite the positive effects found in this Chapter on either food security or nutritional 
outcomes, a review of the evidence on the state of food security and nutrition in South 
Africa in the last 20 years shows that food insecurity has been falling, but that undernu-
trition indicators are falling more slowly, if at all (Devereux and Waidler 2017). Given 
the high coverage of social protection transfers in South Africa, this raises an obvious 
question: why are social transfers not making a more substantial contribution towards 
improving nutrition outcomes in grant-receiving households?  
Although social transfers in South Africa are relatively generous compared to other 
countries, they are not sufficient to meet nutritional needs. The reason is that food prices 
are rising, and social grants are not index-linked according to inflation. Another im-
portant reason why social grants do not significantly reduce malnutrition is that transfers 
are often diluted among other individuals (and not only the intended beneficiary) and 
among other needs, such as educational expenditure, clothing, transportation, etc. (sev-
eral sources, explained in Devereux and Waidler (2017)).  
In addition, and despite the positive evidence of cash transfer programmes found to 
date, there are non-financial or structural barriers that can prevent transfers from achiev-
ing their full potential and improving long-term outcomes (Roelen et al. 2017). This is 
underscored by the extensive literature finding limited effects of social assistance trans-
fers on nutrition (Manley, Gitter and Slavchevska 2012; Bastagli et al. 2016). It has been 
recognised that malnutrition is a complex phenomenon that has multiple causes (Deve-
reux and Waidler 2017). UNICEF’s conceptual framework for the determinants of child 
malnutrition (UNICEF 1990) identified three ‘underlying causes’ of child malnutrition: 
inadequate access to food, inadequate care for children and women, and insufficient 
health services and unhealthy environment. Only the first of these can be directly at-
tributed to poverty – not enough resources at the individual or household level to acquire 
adequate food. Nutrition, therefore, needs more than food.  
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The implication is that neither social transfers nor remittances are enough to eradicate 
malnutrition in South Africa. Even if increases in income can raise food expenditure and 
lead to increased food consumption, indicators of malnutrition could remain unchanged 
at the aggregate level if the scope and scale of transfers are not enough to affect national 
nutrition statistics. “Even at the individual level, increased food consumption, largely 
financed by social grants, might not improve the person’s nutrition status if care prac-
tices are poor or the sanitation environment is unhygienic” (Devereux and Waidler 2017, 
p. 23). Social grants and, to a lesser extent, remittances are essential to reduce food inse-
curity and hunger in poor households, but the determinants of nutrition status are more 
complex than food consumption. As stated in Devereux and Waidler (2017), “a holistic 
approach is needed to tackle the persistent and unacceptably high levels of child malnu-
trition in South Africa” (p. 24). 
Key finding 4: The impacts of social assistance on subjective well-being depend 
on the context where the social protection programme is implemented and can 
be influenced by factors such as stigma, trust in the government, or poverty  
Chapter 4 analysed the relationship between social assistance and subjective well-being 
in Kyrgyzstan. Under the Soviet period, poverty and poverty-targeted transfers were 
highly residual and stigmatised (Barr 1994). Contrary to previous studies that have found 
a positive relationship between social assistance and subjective well-being (all of them in 
Sub-Saharan Africa),48 this Chapter found a negative effect of social assistance on life 
satisfaction, as well on the subjective economic expectations of respondents with respect 
to the future. Moreover, to a certain extent, social assistance recipients were less likely 
to report an improvement in the economic situation with respect to the past. 
The findings from Chapter 4 confirm previous evidence from Kyrgyzstan that transfers 
are inadequate to lift a significant percentage of the population out of poverty 
(Gassmann and Zardo Trindade 2015). However, the negative effect on the subjective 
well-being indicators chosen is counterintuitive and different from previous studies on 
this topic. One reason could be that government benefits in Kyrgyzstan are, in general, 
not large enough to address the negative mechanisms associated with poverty and, 
hence, increase satisfaction with life and with the household's economic situation.        
Another explanation can be that beneficiaries are disappointed by the State, given that 
the help they expect is only marginal and not enough to cover basic needs. Finally, an 
additional explanation is that, based on its past as a member of the Soviet Union, poor 
individuals who receive social assistance in Kyrgyzstan suffer from stigma and shame, 
which would result in lower subjective well-being levels.  
                                                        
48 See Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), Kilburn et al. (2018); Daidone et al. (2015); Natali et al. (2018). 
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An important implication that arises from the findings of this Chapter is that the impacts 
of social protection programmes can differ depending on the history and the character-
istics of the countries where they take place. A bad implementation (not only in terms 
of the way the cash is delivered but also in terms of the behaviour of the officials in-
volved in the process of delivering it) can also result in a bad experience of participants 
towards social assistance and a higher likelihood of feeling stigma or shame. Based on a 
recent public opinion survey among residents of Kyrgyzstan, more than 70 percent of 
the citizens think that corruption is a big problem in the country and that the govern-
ment is not making a sufficient effort to fight corruption (International Republican In-
stitute 2017). Concerns about corruption apply to different kinds of institutions and or-
ganisations, including ministries, universities, the police, etc. Moreover, past evidence 
points out that there are important complaints among social protection beneficiaries 
about social service officials, who are accused of engaging in unlawful practices, abusing 
their power and humiliating clients (Narayan et al. 2000).  
The conclusions from Chapter 4 can be informative to other Former Soviet or Central 
Asian countries, where research on subjective well-being is lacking (such as Tajikistan or 
Kazakhstan). Therefore, collecting qualitative data and extending this research to similar 
countries would be helpful to confirm these findings and extend the evidence base on 
this topic. 
Key finding 5: Remittances can improve the economic situation of households, 
but not necessarily their life satisfaction  
Due to the determinant role of remittances for the Kyrgyz economy, Chapter 5 looked 
at whether remittances improved the subjective well-being of beneficiary households. 
This Chapter found that remittance income was associated with feelings of improvement 
in the economic situation of the household with respect to the past, which confirms 
findings from previous studies that looked at the effects of remittances on subjective 
economic well-being. Moreover, after controlling for reverse causality through an instru-
mental variable approach, remittances were associated with a higher likelihood of ex-
pecting an improvement in the economic situation in the future. The relationship be-
tween remittances and life satisfaction was not significant, though. A potential explana-
tion for this finding is that other negative factors related to receiving remittances and 
having a member abroad could counteract the positive feelings of experiencing an im-
provement in the economic situation. For instance, qualitative evidence points out to 
labour shortages, lack of qualified and well-trained personnel in rural areas, and changes 
in care arrangements for children and elderly as a result of migration (Thieme 2014). 
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The findings from Chapter 5 confirm the existing evidence (mainly from Latin America) 
that remittances increase the satisfaction with the economic situation of the household, 
but do not necessarily lead to an increase in recipients’ happiness or satisfaction with life 
6.2 Remittances, social assistance, and poverty 
Although complementarity or substitutability between social assistance and remittances 
is not directly tested in this thesis,49 the aim was to investigate how effective public and 
private transfers are in improving different poverty dimensions. As explained in the in-
troduction, several factors can explain differences in poverty reduction effectiveness, 
including the targeting, coverage, transfer adequacy, regularity and expenditure patterns 
of transfers. The first point to highlight from this work is the very small overlap between 
social assistance and remittance recipients, both in South Africa and in Kyrgyzstan. This 
has posed methodological challenges, as comparing the effects of remittances and social 
assistance in the same estimation when groups of recipients are highly heterogeneous 
can be problematic. However, this is a finding per se, as the fact that remittances and 
social assistance reach different population groups implies that these two transfers are 
to a larger extent complements than substitutes. The usual explanation for this phenom-
enon is that migrants do not necessarily originate from the poorest households, as mi-
gration entails certain costs, whereas social assistance often targets the poorest popula-
tion. In the two case studies analysed, however, this is only true to a certain extent. 
In South Africa, both remittances and social assistance transfers are received by the poor 
(although some remittances do reach wealthier households), as a majority of migrants 
are low-skilled and negatively selected in terms of income and education (Jacobs and 
Plessis 2016). On the one hand, the African National Congress (ANC), which has been 
ruling since the start of democracy in South Africa, has invested in broadening the social 
protection system and, as a result, expenditure on social grants has been growing in the 
last two and a half decades. On the other, migration and remittances have become less 
significant due to a decline in local light manufacturing activity and an overall decline in 
jobs in the manufacturing and mining sectors, which were a priority under the Apartheid 
government (du Toit and Neves 2009). This means that while social assistance coverage 
has been expanding since the end of Apartheid, migration and remittances have declined, 
which explains the small overlap between social assistance and remittance beneficiaries. 
                                                        
49 First of all, it is different to test complementarity if social assistance and remittances target different parts of the 
population. Second, since I have neither randomised control nor baseline surveys, I can only indirectly establish a 
sense of causality. 
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Moreover, some studies point out that social assistance transfers have crowded out re-
mittances, meaning that an increase in social spending has led to a decline in remittances 
received by social grant beneficiaries (Jensen 2004; Du Toit and Neves 2009). Many 
authors argue that this can be perceived as sub-optimal indirect effect of social spending, 
as there is a reduction in effectiveness of social protection programmes. Chapter 3 argues 
that this is not necessarily a bad outcome, as this means that senders of remittances, who 
have in general low levels of well-being, can be better off as they can use the money for 
other pressing needs. Du Toit and Neves (2009), in line with sociologists and anthro-
pologists, argue that crowding out can be bad only if households are considered in iso-
lation and not in the context of spatially extended reciprocation networks. The authors 
find qualitative evidence based on detailed case studies that access to social assistance by 
migrants’ relatives allow migrants to have better lives, invest in their human capital, and 
help other relatives who do not receive social assistance. In these cases, remittances are 
redirected for purposes other than meeting basic needs or helping close family members. 
This does not mean, however, that they do not contribute to improvements in well-
being, as it implies that either migrants are better off than before, or other relatives who 
were not receiving remittances can benefit from these transfers. 
In addition, Chapter 2 has shown that the way transfers are labelled influence the ex-
penditure behaviour of recipient households. This means that governments can contrib-
ute to improving specific dimensions of well-being across the population through the 
design of its social protection programmes. This is not the case with remittances, as 
expenditure patterns will depend on the situation and expectations of both senders and 
recipients of remittances, and this may vary across different households and different 
migratory contexts. 
In South Africa, social transfers and remittances also complement each other. Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3 show that, among the poorest households and in line with previous 
evidence, both social assistance and remittances help to cover every day needs. In some 
cases, as some previous evidence has shown (Sienaert 2008; Ardington et al. 2009), social 
assistance transfers ‘crowd in’ remittances, as government transfers are used to finance 
job searches in urban areas. This would also explain the findings from Chapter 2 that 
remittances and social transfers are not spent in the same way, although all transfers play 
a key role in financing basic household needs and human capital investments. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the situation is different. After independence and with the end of the 
planned economy, informal transfers (including remittances, informal networks, and in-
ter-household transfers in general) became a more important source of protection as a 
result of the loss of transfers from the Soviet Union central budget (Tesliuc 2004). De-
spite the efforts from the government to reform the social protection system to reduce 
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extreme poverty, social assistance transfers have low coverage and therefore many poor 
households do not benefit from social assistance.  
After 1991 and, as opposed to the case of South Africa, remittances have gained im-
portance relative to other sources of income. Remittance income has higher coverage 
and adequacy than social assistance transfers, as it constitutes a much more important 
source of income in recipient households. Like in South Africa, migrants also originate 
from poor households (although, most likely not the extreme poor), although in Kyr-
gyzstan a higher percentage of the poorest receive remittances than social assistance 
(Gassmann 2011). These factors can explain the different effects observed between re-
mittances and social assistance on subjective well-being, as remittances improve recipi-
ents’ perception of their economic situation, whereas social assistance recipients do not 
feel they are better off than in the past, nor do they perceive that their economic situation 
will improve in the near future.  
In Kyrgyzstan, therefore, informal sources of social protection are a better strategy for 
poverty reduction. However, this also implies that the country’s economy is highly de-
pendent on the financial situation of Russia (which is the main destination country for 
migrants) and therefore vulnerable to changes in the country’s exchange rates, immigra-
tion policies, and unemployment rates. Moreover, other potential negative effects of 
migration in Kyrgyzstan include brain drain, labour shortages, and limitations to achieve 
economic growth as a result of a reduced motivation to invest in the country (ICG 2016; 
Thieme 2014). This means that migration and remittances should be complemented with 
policies that encourage investment in Kyrgyzstan, promote employment, and improve 
the living conditions of households in sending communities. For example, the govern-
ment could encourage the productive use of remittances in a way that it leads to better 
livelihood opportunities in migrant sending areas of Kyrgyzstan. Investing in rural areas 
is essential for households not being fully dependent on migration, and to avoid labour 
shortages and lack of basic services in the most deprived areas of the country. Moreover, 
given that migration to Russia and other neighbouring countries is temporary and mi-
grants plan their permanent return as they reach their retirement age (Thieme 2014), the 
government could facilitate this transition and provide return migrants with better living 
conditions through, for example, a pension or saving scheme. This would improve the 
living conditions of returnees while generating positive outcomes for the economy, such 
as increased employment and savings accumulation. 
As this dissertation has shown, the importance of remittances vis-a-vis social assistance 
depends, to a large extent, on the history and level of development of a country. Being 
aware of the importance of different strategies households rely upon to improve their 
well-being is important and can inform policy making in different ways. Inasmuch as 
both social assistance and remittances contribute to improvements in well-being in both 
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South Africa and Kyrgyzstan, as this thesis has shown, it is important to recognise the 
limits to what these transfers can achieve. In the case of remittances, putting a heavy 
burden on recipients on how they should spend these transfers (for example, by encour-
aging them to invest in productive activities) is unlikely to improve their poverty reduc-
tion effectiveness. The reason is that migrant households have many different needs 
which vary over time, and will use remittances for the purposes that they consider more 
appropriate in each situation. In the case of social assistance transfers, and even if gov-
ernments can encourage recipients to spend transfers on specific goods and services 
which are likely to improve their nutritional or educational outcomes, the positive effects 
of transfers may not be sufficient to lift a significant proportion of the population out 
of poverty (as Chapter 3 has shown). This is also why it is important to consider other 
development strategies to complement social protection programmes. 
6.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
While the studies included in this dissertation have overcome some major methodolog-
ical barriers from previous work comparing the effects of remittances and social assis-
tance transfers, these studies are not without their limitations. In absence of randomisa-
tion in the selection of social assistance or remittance recipients, as well as in absence of 
baseline data collected before the first migration episode or before the launch of the 
social protection programmes, all the empirical chapters rely on quasi-experimental tech-
niques of policy evaluation to deal with endogeneity, such as propensity score matching, 
instrumental variables estimation, and panel data techniques like fixed effects estimation. 
However, each method has its advantages and disadvantages, and therefore proving cau-
sality is always challenging. The availability of longitudinal surveys to analyse changes in 
well-being and livelihood strategies, such as the two surveys used in this dissertation, is 
a big step forward in this regard, and more countries in the future should have repre-
sentative longitudinal household surveys (with information on both informal and formal 
transfers) available to researchers. The challenge of proving causality is harder when 
studying the impacts of remittances than of social protection transfers, as the decision 
to send remittances is taken at the household level and therefore it is inherently endog-
enous. Although throughout the thesis the word ‘effects’ is used when describing the 
findings from each of the chapters, this is done assuming that the conditions from each 
method hold and that quasi-experimental techniques properly address endogeneity bias. 
This is unlikely to be always the case, especially in Chapter 2. Therefore, in some cases, 
the word ‘effects’ could instead reflect ‘associations’ between transfers and well-being 
outcomes.  
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In addition, lab or field experiments would be recommended to better test the fungibility 
of money and analyse how people spend different sources of transfers. Qualitative stud-
ies would also be very helpful and should complement quantitative ones in order to get 
a better understanding of households’ dynamics and the way they combine different 
social protection strategies. 
Another feature that has posed methodological challenges is the fact that remittance 
recipients and social assistance recipients are heterogeneous groups, meaning that if this 
heterogeneity is not accounted for, it is not possible to know whether the differences in 
impacts from remittances and social assistance transfers are due to the transfers them-
selves or to the fact that they are received by different individuals or households. In 
South Africa, econometric techniques that account for this heterogeneity were used in 
an attempt to overcome this, such as fixed effects estimation and several sub-sample 
estimations to compare more homogeneous groups of recipients. In Kyrgyzstan, the 
overlap was so small that social assistance and remittances had to be analysed separately, 
acknowledging that they are received by different population groups. This is likely to be 
the case in many countries, however. This also implies that when studying the linkages 
between social assistance and remittances (or other sources of informal transfers), one 
should be aware that these transfers are likely to cover different population groups. 
In terms of directions for future work, it would be recommended to study case studies 
and datasets with a bigger overlap of remittances and social assistance beneficiaries. In 
addition, other sources of informal transfers –and not only remittances- should be ana-
lysed. In developing countries, households engage in many different forms of informal 
exchanges, such as inter-household transfers, mutual solidarity or rotating saving asso-
ciations, etc. Consequently, and even though further analysis on the links between re-
mittances and social assistance is needed, future work should focus on the links between 
social assistance and other kinds of private or informal transfers. 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
This dissertation has shown that both social assistance transfers and remittances are im-
portant social protection strategies that households rely upon to achieve better well-
being outcomes, albeit the extent to which one transfer is more effective than the other 
is highly dependent on the history and level of development of the country studied. 
Despite the percentage of household receiving both social assistance and remittances is 
low, transfers are likely to complement each other in poor households. The reason is 
that government money can be used to finance migration or cover the costs of searching 
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for a job in the city, and this will most likely translate into higher well-being improve-
ments than if only one transfer is received. Moreover, ‘Crowding out’ -or a decline in 
remittances resulting from an increase in social spending- is not necessarily a bad out-
come, given that the receipt of social assistance can ease the burden on migrants and 
allow them to allocate their income to different uses or to meet other needs. Households 
should not be considered in isolation, especially in developing countries, where migrants 
send remittances not only to the immediate family, but also to extended family living in 
other households. 
Complementarity between social assistance and remittances could be further exploited 
to maximise the poverty reduction potential of these transfers. For instance, offering 
social protection to return migrants will improve individuals’ well-being and bring at the 
same time important benefits to rural areas or sending communities if the resources and 
skills that migrants bring back home can be utilised in an effective way. At the same 
time, it is important that migrant households who stay behind in sending communities 
have access to services and to social protection in general. For instance, if there are no 
health facilities available or if migrant children do not have access to good quality edu-
cation, remittances cannot contribute to improvements in human capital. 
It is important to recognise that despite remittances and social assistance transfers are 
important poverty reduction instruments, neither of them can be seen as a unique solu-
tion to meet the first sustainable development goal ‘No Poverty’. Structural and non-
financial barriers often prevent these transfers from improving long-term well-being 
outcomes. Moreover, public and private transfers do not always reach the poorest house-
holds and therefore their poverty reduction potential is compromised. While the cover-
age and adequacy of social protection transfers should improve, migration costs as well 
as the transaction costs of remittances should be reduced to allow the poorest to benefit 
from migration, so that no one is left behind. All in all, formal and informal strategies of 
social protection are not isolated from each other, and therefore both should be analysed 
together when designing policy interventions. 
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In accordance to Article 23 of the regulation governing the attainment for doctoral degree in the Maas-
tricht University, the following section discusses the valorisation opportunities offered by this PhD thesis. 
Following the corresponding guidelines, these opportunities are analysed in terms of the social and econo-
mic relevance of the thesis, the potential target groups to whom the results can be interesting and the degree 
of innovativeness of the research methods used. 
The main focus of the thesis has been to explore and compare the role of social assis-
tance transfers and remittances in the fight against poverty, an objective that govern-
ments around the world pursue and which has culminated in the formulation of 17 global 
goals for sustainable development. In addition to the academic contribution of looking 
at two different kinds of transfers and exploring several poverty dimensions, the findings 
from this dissertation have direct social and economic relevance, as they are valuable for 
the design of public policies. 
Chapter Two looks at how recipients spend the cash received through government trans-
fers (social assistance), as compared to private transfers sent by relatives (remittances). 
The findings are relevant for policymakers given that the effectiveness of government 
programmes and the extent to which programme objectives are met are directly linked 
to how transfers are utilized. Arguments against the expansion of social protection 
programmes are often based on the presumption that recipients abuse government 
transfer programmes or that they make bad decisions on how to spend the money. Hav-
ing a better knowledge of and more evidence on how remittances are used is also rele-
vant for policymakers, given that these transfers have a strong poverty reduction poten-
tial. Remittances represent more than 20 percent of the GDP in many developing 
countries, and they have become more important than official development aid. In the 
migration and development debate, there have been claims that remittances are used for 
conspicuous consumption and that, thefore, they do not contribute to development. 
Chapter Two finds that both remittances and social assistance transfers are used to cover 
basic needs. Moreover, government transfers are spent according to the programmes’ 
objectives. 
Chapter Three explores whether social assistance transfers and remittances are effective 
in reducing food insecurity and malnutrition. Ending hunger is the second sustainable 
development goal that the United Nations has set for 2030. Reducing malnutrition is a 
major concern for governments and international organisations all around the world, 
given that child malnutrition has detrimental effects on child development in the long-
run. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how cash transfers, private or 
public, can contribute to improving this poverty indicator. This Chapter finds that both 
remittances and social assistance are effective in improving the quantity and quality of 
food consumed (food security). However, they are not sufficient to improve nutritional 
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outcomes, such as children and adults’ body mass index (BMI). These findings suggest 
that other interventions are needed to improve nutritional outcomes of the most vulner-
able population. This thesis recommends a holistic approach to overcome structural bar-
riers that prevent transfers from achieving their full potential. Structural barriers include, 
among others, limited knowledge on nutrition, unhygienic environments, and lack of 
access to safe drinking water. 
Chapters Four and Five look at the relationship between transfers and subjective well-
being. Although improving subjective well-being may not be the primary objective of 
government transfers or remittances, understanding this relationship has an important 
value in development, as improvements in subjective well-being have been linked to 
improved education and health outcomes, increases in productivity and consumption, 
and better social relationships. Moreover, poverty is not simply a lack of income but can 
materialise in other dimensions, including subjective well-being. Chapter Four finds that 
social assistance does not necessarily increase subjective well-being. An important impli-
cation for policymaking is that the attitudes of participants towards social protection 
depend on how these programmes are implemented. Badly designed or implemented 
programmes can result in negative experiences of participants, in particular if transfer 
receipt induces feelings of stigma or shame, which then leads to lower subjective well-
being. Chapter Five finds that remittances have a positive effect on recipients’ percep-
tions of their economic situation. However, receiving remittances does not lead to im-
provements in life satisfaction.  Other negative factors related to receiving remittances 
and having a member abroad could counteract the positive feelings of experiencing an 
improvement in the economic situation. 
 
This dissertation uses novel longitudinal surveys to answer the research questions at 
hand, and combines different econometric techniques in each Chapter. In terms of the 
diffusion of the results of the research, the main outcomes of the thesis have been pub-
lished or are in the process of being published as working papers or peer-reviewed jour-
nal articles. Moreover, results have been presented at several international conferences. 
Specifically, Chapter Two has been presented at the IAREP-SABE Conference on Be-
havioural Economics in Sibiu, Romania (2015); Chapter Three has been presented at a 
seminar at the University of Western Cape, in South Africa (2016), the Social Protection 
Conference in Bonn, Germany (Tying the knots) (2016), and at the APPAM Interna-
tional Conference in Brussels, Belgium (2017). Chapters Four and Five have been pre-
sented at the 3rd Life in Kyrgyzstan Conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (2017). Chapter 
Four has also been presented at the HDCA Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
(2018). 
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